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THE LAW OF BUSINESS TORTS IN MISSISSIPPI
[Note: This Article has been divided with the first
half appearing in 15 Miss. C. L. REV. Fall 1994, ed.]*
James L. Robertson**
VII. TRADEMARKS
A. A Discrete and Developed Means of Marketing
Trademark49 is one of those areas where the law has struggled mightily to re-
spond to the market participant's need to know his rights and alternatives and with
some reasonable certainty. Of concern as well has been the need of consumers to
be free of confusion regarding the source of goods and services, as they contem-
plate purchasing choices. Because of the prevalence of marks and the potential for
infringement, lawmakers have founded the field with increasing clarity. By pro-
viding for the registration of trademarks and associated designations, and thereaf-
ter protecting priority of right, the law has taken a giant step forward.
Although the law of trademarks is one of the most developed and sophisticated
within the field of business torts, in origin and concept its commonality is unmis-
takably within the field as a whole. Trademark infringement remains a form of un-
fair competition. The infringer, as well as the deceptive marketer and other
business tortfeasors, is made subject to the law's proscriptions because he is inter-
fering with the legitimate prospective advantage of others by means generally seen
as unfair and thus labeled by the law as improper and made actionable.
B. The Nature and Function of Trademarks
Marks used in trade are convenient means of communication between sellers
and buyers. Callmann has examined the utility and function of the trademark and
has found in it four qualities, overlapping yet conceptually distinct and identifi-
able.496 These include (1) the figurative quality of the mark-"[i]t evokes a reac-
tion to that which it symbolizes," (2) its intangibility and transcendence-the
trademark represents not the real nature of the product or its service but the repu-
tation a business or its product enjoys, (3) its motivating power-its power to
* The first half sets forth the balkanized landscape that has traditionally made up the law of business torts-
in Mississippi and elsewhere, the common principles and policies that explain and underlie the field, the reasons
why we profit when we see the field as a whole, and a circumstanced external approach to interpretation of the
field. The first half then begins our consideration -continued here-of historically discrete areas of the law of
business torts in Mississippi, viz. the areas of antitrust and deceptive marketing.
** Partner, Wise Carter Child & Caraway, Jackson, Mississippi; Justice, Supreme Court of Mississippi,
1983-92; B.A., 1962, University of Mississippi; J.D., 1965, Harvard University.
495. By trademarks, we mean trademarks properly so called, service marks, trade names, certification
marks, collective marks and the like, as will presently appear.
496. 3 RUDOLF CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 17.01 (4th
ed. 1993).
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generate a response beyond that induced by the information alone, and (4) its pub-
lic acceptability recognized by the community.
497
The trademark performs at least three functions in the marketing of goods and
services. First, it suggests the origin and ownership of goods or services.498 It tells
the purchaser something about the origin of what he is about to buy. It also per-
forms what has been called the guarantee function- "the function of giving the
purchaser a satisfactory assurance of the make and quality of the article he is buy-
ing."4 9 Justice Stewart was right when he wrote that "[a]n important ingredient of
the premium brand inheres in the consumer's belief, measured by past satisfaction
and the market reputation established by . . . [the market participant] for its prod-
ucts, that tomorrow's can will contain the same premium product as that pur-
chased today."5 ' Third, there is the advertising function. "Trademarks serve as a
means of communication between otherwise unknown or anonymous producers
and their prospective customers. "5°" As Callmann puts it: "A trademark is some-
times a more convincing selling point than even the quality of the product to which
it refers. Frequently there is little, if any, actual difference between competing
products, so that competition is between trademarks rather than qualities." ' 2 In
the words of Justice Frankfurter, "The creation of a market through an established
symbol implies that people float on a psychological current engendered by the vari-
ous advertising devices which give a trademark its potency. "503
C. History and Structure of the Law of Trademarks
A trademark identifies and distinguishes goods or services. Historically, it has
meant an "arbitrary or fanciful mark that could be protected without additional ev-
idence that consumers understand it to identify the source or sponsor of goods or
services. ""' Trademark protection is traceable to the common law. Before any
constituent assembly gave thought to the matter, common law courts saw the wis-
dom of protecting the names and symbols market participants used to distinguish
their goods or services from those of others. For better or for worse, there have
long been those active in the marketplace who would seek to pass their goods off as
those of another, to deceive the consumer, and thus to reap the benefits of the oth-
er's favorable market reputation. As manufacturers began to adopt marks to iden-
tify their goods, the trade pirates began appropriating those marks. From the
beginning, trademark infringement was but a form of deceptive marketing or un-
497. Id.
498. Id. § 17.02.
499. Id. § 17.03, at 9. See also, I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETI-
TiON § 3.0411) (3d ed. 1994).
500. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 651 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
501. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. c (1995).
502. 3 CALLMANN, supra note 496, § 17.04, at 13. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9
cmt. c (1995); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 499, § 3.05.
503. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 208 (1942).
504. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION xvi (1995).
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fair competition and well within the premises and rules courts recognized and en-
forced.
Rights in marks have always been acquired through use. Cause for concern
came when a market participant began using a mark already in use by another. For
years, the judicial response was uncertain. Courts offered less than helpful state-
ments like "such cases must stand or fall on their own facts" and " 'no rule of
thumb' fitting all cases could be laid down.""' 5 Securing protection and relief from
infringers was a process plagued by difficulties of proof regarding the use of the
mark, its origin, its extent, and when it conferred rights. It is a part of the genius of
law that it may create new structures to meet felt needs, and so lawmakers con-
ceived the idea of a central registry for trademarks, drawing upon concepts and
processes already in effect for patents and copyrights. Yet the acts have never filled
the field. Unlike patent law, trademark law has always allowed market participants
to acquire limited rights in marks through mere use without any formal registra-
tion with federal or state authorities.506
The genera and species of trademark law today are not unlike those seen in the
case of antitrust and deceptive marketing generally. Most prominent and most su-
perior is federal law-the Lanham Act, originally enacted in 1946, °1 and fre-
quently amended, most recently in 1988.58 Enacted under the Commerce
Clause, 0 9 the Lanham Act applies only to marks used in interstate commerce.
Prevailing views of what constitutes commerce among the states are broad," 0 and
so the federal law covers much of the field and casts its shadow on all else. Section
39(b) of the Act declares that the states may not interfere with the federal scheme
of things. " But it effects only "a limited preemption of state law."5 1 2 The Lanham
Act provides a federal action for infringement of common law trademarks. The
Act "bars only state statutes or doctrine that would permit the sort of confusing or
deceptive practices the. . . act sought to prevent."513 But state law may provide a
federal registrant with greater rights, so long as those do not conflict with superior
505. McKay v. Legler, 36 So. 2d 793, 794 (Miss. 1948).
506. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
507. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (prior to 1988 amendment). Restatement commentary
provides "[tihe statutes ... do not preempt the protection of trademarks at common law." RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. e (1995).
508. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
509. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (holding that Congress' power to regulate trademarks was
limited to an exercise of its power under the Commerce Clause).
510. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), and
progeny.
511. 15 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1988).
512. Spartan Food Sys., Inc. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1284(4th Cir. 1987); see2 MCCARTHY, supra note
499, § 22.02[].
513. Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 372 n.3 (1st Cir. 1980).
1995l
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federal law. 14 And, of course, the states are wholly free to regulate marks used
only in intrastate commerce. 1 5
The Mississippi Trademark Registration Act first appeared in 1952.56 It was
amended a generation later. 7 Its obvious source 18 is the Model State Trademark
Act, originally prepared and published by the United States Trademark Associa-
tion (USTA) in 1949.19 The idea behind federal and state acts, and, indeed, all
trademark law, is simple. "The buyer is entitled to assume that all products carry-
ing the same trademark are somehow linked with or sponsored by. . .[the same]
source. It matters not that the source be anonymous or unknown." 2  From the be-
ginning, the Mississippi Act has made clear that it does not preempt what the
Lanham Act does not preempt. The state Act provides: "Nothing herein shall ad-
versely affect the rights of [sic] the enforcement of rights in marks acquired in
good faith at any time at common law." 2 ' Of course, common law is state law for
all practical purposes. 522 Substantively, what this means is that post-enactment as
well as pre-enactment rights acquired through use enjoy protection though the
mark is not registered. Happily, the Model Act is patterned after the Lanham Act,
and it seems sensible that the far more frequently litigated federal act should be
514. Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 646 F.2d 347, 352 (9th Cir. 1980); see 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 499, §
22.02[1].
515. Still, the Mississippi Act requires that a registrant provide:
A statement that no other person has a registration of the same or similar mark in the United States Patent
Office for the same or similar goods or services or a statement that applicant is the owner of a concurrent
registration in the United States Patent Office of his mark covering an area including this state.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-25-5(e) (1991).
516. H.R. 321, Reg. Sess., 1952 Miss. Laws 338.
517. S. 1583, Reg. Sess., 1971 Miss. Laws 475. See technical amendments thereafter. H.R. 607, Reg. Sess.,
1981 Miss. Laws 975; H.R. 442, Reg. Sess., 1985 Miss. Laws 139 (codified at Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-25-1 to
-27 (1991)).
518. I MCCARTHY, supra note 499, § 3.03[2].
519. The Model Act was amended in 1964 to provide for registration of service marks, among others. As of
1992, forty- six states had used the Model Act as the basis for their state trademark legislation. See 2 MCCARTHY,
supra note 499, § 22.0311].
520. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. c (Tentative Draft 1994); Mastercraf-
ters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantine-LeCoultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955). Re-
call that he Lanham Act includes within the definition of protected marks those used to identify and distinguish
goods and services "and to indicate the source of the goods [or services] even if that source is unknown." 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
521. Section 13 of the original Model Act provided: "Nothing herein shall adversely affect the rights or the
enforcement of rights in marks acquired in good faith at any time at common law." 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 499,
§ 22.04[1]. In addition, the 1992 Model Act preserves common law rights in Section 16 in identical wording.
Again, the proofreader did not catch the use of "of" instead of "or."
522. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,
222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See supra note 40 and accompanying quoted text.
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regarded as "persuasive authority" when considering the meaning and effect of the
state act.' 2
As a practical matter, only the local family business or service establishment
seeks state trademark registration. Registration with the Secretary of State of Mis-
sissippi is a simple and inexpensive process and gives the registrant protection
against the use by others of the same or similar mark on similar goods or services,
but the protection is limited to the State of Mississippi. Although it is a bit more
trouble, federal registration on the Principal Register of the Patent and Trademark
Office is the registration of choice. Addressing the questions that traditionally
troubled litigants, the Lanham Act affords the registrant a presumption of his
ownership of the mark and his exclusive right to use the mark in commerce.
524
Federal registration gives constructive notice of the registrant's rights in the mark
across the country. It strips the infringer of his ability effectively to claim innocent
infringement or lack of knowledge .52' A federally registered mark becomes incon-
testable after five years. 26
D. Protection Designations and Their Definitions
1. Trademarks and Service Marks
With these preliminaries and generalities before us, we turn to some specifics.
It is often said that form follows function. The definition is the height of form. The
Lanham Act defines "trademark 527 as including "any word, name, symbol or de-
vice, or any combination thereof" used by a person "to identify and distinguish his
or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by oth-
ers and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown."528
The state act excludes indicia of source as an element of the definition when it
defines trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination
thereof adopted and used by a person to identify goods made or sold by him and to
distinguish them from goods made or sold by others."52 The omission is of no
consequence, as indicia of source is there anyway. It inheres in the mark. As a
523. See, e.g., Rolls-Royce Motors, Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689,694 (N.D. Ga. 1977);
Tio Pepe, Inc. v. El Tio Pepe de Miami Restaurant, Inc., 523 So. 2d 1158, 1159 n.6 (Fla. 1988). The 1992
version of the Model Act declares that it provides "a system of state trademark registration and protection sub-
stantially consistent with the federal system of trademark registration and protection under the [Lanham] Trade-
mark Act of 1946, as amended." From this premise, the Model Act provides: "[T]he construction given the
federal Act should be examined as persuasive authority for interpreting and construing this Act. MODEL STATE
TRADEMARK AcT § 19 (1992). Clarity and predictability being preeminent policies in this area of law, and, as we
have seen, in our field as a whole, the fact that Mississippi has not yet adopted the 1992 version of the Model Act
should not preclude resort to the federal act where its statutory language is substantially identical in relevant re-
spects.
524. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1988).
525. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(c), 1072 (1988).
526. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1988). Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 197 (1985).
527. One commentator has found a "satisfactory, somewhat broader, and perhaps more felicitously phrased
definition" in a proposed international convention, to-wit: "A trademark is any mark or medium that can be con-
ceived by the senses, that is capable of distinguishing merchandise, products or services of a (natural orjuridic)
person from those of another." 3 CALLMANN, supra note 496, § 17.01.
528. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
529. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-25-1(a) (1991).
1995]
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practical matter, any trademark that identifies goods made or sold by a market par-
ticipant and distinguishes them from goods made or sold by others, will indicate
the source of goods.
Many market participants today provide services instead of goods and make a
similar use of marks. Federal law defines a service mark as "any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof" used to identify and distinguish
one's services from those of others and to suggest the source of services . 3' The
state act again pretermits indicia of source from its definition of service mark, 31
and, probably, with the same lack of effect.
The new Restatement of Unfair Competition combines the definitions. "A
trademark . . . is distinctive of a person's goods or services and . . . is used in a
manner that identifies those goods or services and distinguishes them from the
goods or services of others."532 The Restatement then declares: "A trademark used
in connection with services is a service mark. ' 33 The reason the Restatement
combines the definitions is that "[t]he substantive rules applicable to both types of
marks are fundamentally identical. ''5 34 The single definition is offered as a "con-
venient usage," with the term "service mark" denoting "a specific category of
trademark.5 13' The definition "includes all designations that are distinctive of the
user's goods or services."536
2. Trade Names
Trade names also enjoy legal protection. Within the Lanham Act we find: "The
terms 'trade name' and 'commercial name' mean any name used by a person to
identify his or her business or vocation.5 137 The state act has no analogue, 38 al-
though the Mississippi Business Corporation Act precludes incorporation under a
name that is "deceptively similar" to that of an existing corporation. 
39
Trademark and trade name, though often confused when sloppily used, are con-
ceptually distinct. 40 For example, in Dollar Department Stores v. Laub, 41 the Su-
preme Court of Mississippi defined "trade name" as
530. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
531. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-25-1(b) (1991).
532. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995).
533. Id.
534. Id. at cmt. f; I MCCARTHY, supra note 499, § 4.04.
535. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. f (1995).
536. Id.
537. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). Although trade names are not eligible for federal registration, the Lanham Act
proscribes trade name infringement. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1988); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 499, § 9.01[4]
n.24 (citations omitted).
538. The Model State Trademark Act was amended by the United States Trademark Association in 1964 to
include a definition of trade name; see MODEL STATE TRADEMARK ACT, § 1 (D) (1964). The 1992 Model Act in-
cludes a definition essentially identical to that in the Lanham Act. Mississippi has never enacted either of these
provisions of the Model Act.
539. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-4.01 (b) (1989) requires corporate names to be "distinguishable upon the records
of the Secretary of State."
540. See I MCCARTHY, supra note 499, §§ 4.04, 9.01.
541. 120 So. 2d 139 (Miss. 1960).
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any designation which (a) is adopted and used by a person to denominate goods
which he markets or services which he renders or a business which he conducts, or
has come to be so used by others, and (b) through its association with such goods,
services or business, has acquired a special significance as the name thereof, and (c)
the use of which for the purpose stated in Clause (a) is prohibited neither by a legisla-
tive enactment nor by an otherwise defined public policy. 542
This definition is less than satisfactory. A designation that denominates a person's
goods is a trademark, as we have seen. One that denominates his services is a ser-
vice mark. The Dollar Department Stores definition includes these within trade
name and then adds "any designation. . . used by a person to denominate. . . a
business which he conducts." 43 This latter element is what most of us think of
when we see the label trade name. Acme Hardware Store is a trade name, and only
confusion attends calling the mark on the merchandise Acme sells a trade name as
well.
The Dollar Department Stores definition is quoted from the original Restate-
ment of Torts,'" a point of significance in that the new Restatement declares a
more sensible definition. 45
A trade name is a word, name, symbol, device, or other designation, or a combina-
tion of such designations, that is distinctive of a person's business or other enterprise
and that is used in a manner that identifies that business or enterprise and distin-
guishes it from the businesses or enterprises of others.546
A trade name "identifies and distinguishes businesses and other enterprises.""' It
refers to "descriptive, geographic, or surname marks that could be protected only
upon proof of acquired distinctiveness." 5 In commentary, the Restatement makes
clear its view of trade names is "not limited to designations adopted by commer-
cial enterprises" but "includes enterprises conducted by nonprofit organiza-
tions.
3. Certification Marks and Collective Marks
Federal law extends protection as well to certification marks and collective
marks. A certification mark is a mark "used by a person other than its owner" and
which certifies "regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality,
accuracy, or other characteristics of such person's goods or services or that the
work or labor on the goods or services was performed by members of a union or
other organization."5 50 Examples would include "AAA Approved" or "Made to
542. Id. at 141 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 716 (1938)).
543. Id.
544. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 716 (1938).
545. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12 (1995).
546. id.
547. Id. at cmt. a.
548. Id.
549. Id.
550. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
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Last with NAILS Preservative" where NAILS represents a distinctive chemical
wood preservative its owner produces."' Again, there is no state statutory ana-
logue, but the new Restatement posits a state law concept of a certification mark:
A certification mark is a word, name, symbol, device, or other designation, or a
combination of such designations, adopted by a person for authorized use by others,
that is distinctive of the fact of certification by that person of the others' goods or
services and that is used in a manner that certifies regional origin, materials, qual-
ity, method of manufacture, or other characteristics of the goods or services. 5 2
Similarly, federal law protects collective marks that are used in connection with
the marketing of goods or services to inform consumers that the goods or services
originate from a member of a collective group. 55 3 The AFL-CIO Union "bug"
would be an example.
Both certification marks and collective marks are used by persons other than
the owner of the mark. Restatement commentary explains the conceptual distinc-
tion between the two. "Collective trademarks . . . indicate that the goods or ser-
vices originate from a member of a group, while certification marks certify
characteristics of the product. . . . The distinction . . .[is] important . . . in the
application of the rules restricting use and discrimination by the owner of a regis-
tered certification mark."
5 54
E. Distinctiveness, Whether Inherent or Acquired
Distinctiveness is a core concept in the law of trademarks. It is the characteris-
tic that permits the mark to suggest the source or sponsor of goods or services. It is
a central part of the definition of marks eligible for registration and protection.
Trademarks "distinguish" the market participant's goods and services from those
of others.555 A trade name distinguishes his business from that of another.
Distinctiveness inheres in some marks and names. In others, it is acquired, and
you must step into the shoes of the average consumer to see the point. A mark is
inherently distinctive if "because of the nature of the designation and the context in
which it is used, prospective purchasers are likely to perceive" the mark as a trade-
mark. 5 8 In commentary, we are told: "Fanciful terms coined by a user to identify
itself or its goods or services are inherently distinctive .... [Indeed] a fanciful
term has no meaning other than as an identifying symbol. . . .,s Inherently dis-
tinctive marks are valid per se from the moment of their first appropriation and
use by a market participant. The Restatement offers an illustration: "A, a manufac-
turer of steel girders, prominently places the coined word TRAQ on its goods as
551. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11, illus. 2 (1995).
552. Id. § 11.
553. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 10 (1995).
554. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § II cmt. a (1995).
555. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-25-1(a), (b) (1991); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 9-12 (1995).
556. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13(a) (1995).
557. Id. § 13 cmt. c.
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an indication of source. The designation is a fanciful term that is inherently dis-
tinctive."558
Other marks are not inherently distinctive. Assume, for example, that our man-
ufacturer uses the word RIGID on its girders. 5 9 Such a designation may only be-
come distinctive through use. Such marks are said to have acquired a "secondary
meaning, 56' and these acquire validity and protection through time, as a "result of
gradual, steady growth traceable to a substantial investment in the enterprise and
extensive distribution of numerous advertisements, circulars, labels, etc. 561 Such
a mark "may eventually achieve legal status by acquiring a secondary meaning. It
then sheds its congenital infirmity and becomes valid."562
The Supreme Court of Mississippi has declared: "[A] generic word or term
may. . . by usage, acquire a secondary, special or trade meaning as indicating the
goods or business of a particular person, so as to entitle him to protection against
any unfair or piratical use or simulation thereof by another."5 63 The word "Dollar"
became such when used in the trade name Dollar Department Stores. The court
has explained: "[T]he test of secondary meaning is whether the mark has become
broadly known throughout the public as denoting a product of certain origin." 64 In
commentary the new Restatement refines the point. "Secondary meaning exists
only if a significant number of prospective purchasers understand the term, when
used in connection with particular goods, services, or businesses, not merely in
its lexicographic sense, but also as indicative of an association with a specific per-
son. "565 The word "Dollar" is ordinarily not protectable, but one company using
the trade name "The Dollar Store" over 25 years in Natchez was protected, as the
trade name had acquired a secondary meaning. 566 Similarly, rights in trade names
such as "Yellow Cab"5 67 and "Ham House"568 have been acquired and protected un-
der the secondary meaning doctrine.
Restatement commentary reminds us "[t]he concept of secondary meaning is
also applicable to designations such as graphic designs, symbols, packaging fea-
tures, and product designs. In this context secondary meaning denotes that the
558. Id. illus. I.
559. Id. illus. 4.
560. See William C. Walker, Jr., Common Law Protection of Economic Expectancies: "Business Torts"in Missis-
sippi, 50 Miss. L.J. 335, 366-67 (1979). In the trade name context, Professor Walker calls secondary meaning
"[perhaps the most often litigated issue." Id. at 366.
561. Dixie Oil Co. of Ala., Inc. v. Picayune "66" Oil Co., Inc., 245 So. 2d 839, 842 (Miss. 1971).
562. Id. at 841 (quoting 3 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPO-
LIES § 66.1 (3d ed. 1969)).
563. Dollar Dep't. Stores of Miss., Inc. v. Laub, 120 So. 2d 139, 142 (Miss. 1960) (quoting 52 Am. JUR.
Trademarks, Trade Names, and Trade Practices § 55 (1944)).
564. Dixie Oil Co., 245 So. 2d at 842 (quoting 150 A.L.R. 1067, 1079 (1944)).
565. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. e (1995).
566. Dollar Dept. Stores, 120 So. 2d at 143.
567. Meridian Yellow Cab Co. v. City Yellow Cabs, 41 So. 2d 14, 18 (Miss. 1949).
568. Richardson v. Thomas, 257 So. 2d 877, 880 (Miss. 1972).
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feature, although not inherently distinctive, has come through use to be uniquely
associated with a specific source." '69
Whether distinctiveness is inherent or acquired becomes important in the case
of descriptive, geographic and personal name designations. Market participants
often have bona fide interests in describing their goods and their geographic ori-
gins"'0 and, most certainly, in using their own names. The unfairness of allowing a
small number of market participants to appropriate the use of descriptive words to
the exclusion of others seems obvious. And so only when secondary meaning has
been acquired through use does the law provide protection.
The law looks at all of this from the perspective of prospective purchasers and
how they are likely to understand the words used in the designation. Absent sec-
ondary meaning acquired in fact, the average buyer is likely to perceive the mark
or name as one that is "merely descriptive of the nature, qualities or other charac-
teristics of the goods." ' The point is that the words have no way of suggesting
source until they have secured their secondary meaning. Words that merely de-
scribe the attributes of goods, services or a business to which the words are ap-
plied ordinarily are understood only in their descriptive sense. Because of this,
there is no threat of confusion or deception. This insight explains and justifies the
rules' focus on the point of view of prospective purchasers. By way of illustration,
Restatement commentary tells us "[t]he term TRIM may be descriptive when used
in connection with hedge clippers, clothing, or hair styling services but arbitrary
when used as a trademark for toothpaste, cement, or brokerage services." 72 Fail-
ing a showing of secondary meaning, descriptive slogans are also unprotectable -
a familiar illustration being the phrase "EXTRA STRENGTH PAIN
RELIEVER" used in marketing an analgesic. 
573
Trademark law excludes from the inherently distinctive and, thus, inherently
protectable, any "designation that is likely to be perceived by prospective pur-
chasers . . . as merely geographically descriptive of their origin or location." '74
Where geographical origin is important to consumers, all market participants
within the area have an equal interest in proclaiming this fact. Merchants should
be free to tout the source of their wares without having to prove the intrinsic value
of the location. All who market Smith County cantaloupes are free to use the geo-
graphical descriptive and need not prove Smith County cantaloupes are any better
than anyone else's. But one who grows his cantaloupes in Simpson County may not
with impunity proclaim his produce "Smith County" even if he can prove they are
569. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. e (1995).
570. Here we are carrying forward the rule of deceptive marketing generally to the discrete area of trademark
infringement. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(2)(d) (Supp. 1994), which proclaims generally that "[mlisrepre-
sentation of designations of geographic origin in connection with" the marketing of goods and services is an un-
fair or deceptive trade practice.
571. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 14 (1995).
572. Id. at cmt. a.
573. Id.
574. Id. § 14.
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just as good. And the same of Gulf shrimp, Delta cotton, or even Northeast Mis-
sissippi furniture.
A person's name is not inherently distinctive. As Restatement commentators
put the point: "[T]he first person who adopts a particular personal name to identify
the person's goods, services, or business obtains no rights in the designation un-
less consumers have in fact come to recognize the name as a symbol that distin-
guishes the products or business of that person from those of others." 75 The case
of Louisiana's Singin' Governor Jimmie Davis... is consistent with this view.
Davis was successful in his action for trade name infringement because James
Davis Cockrell, acting only after Davis' name had become well known, changed
the name of his band to "Jimmie Davis and His. . "to the obvious confusion of
the public. 77
E Use and the Acquisition and Priority of Rights
At common law a market participant acquired no protectable interest in a mark
prior to actual use. Not just any use would suffice. Intra-company uses which did
not put the mark before the public were insufficient. Specific requirements include
the following:
[T]he manner of use must be calculated to cause prospective purchasers to associate
the designation with the goods, services, or business of the user. . . . [T]he manner
of use must project to prospective purchasers the significance of the designation as
an identifying symbol .... [T]he designation must create a separate commercial
impression, distinct from that created by other accompanying marks, the designa-
tion's function as a symbol of identification. 78
The original Lanham Act and the USTA's Model State Act continued this ac-
tual use requirement. No mark was eligible for registration until the applicant
could show it was actively using the mark in marketing its goods or services. This
requirement is understandable in historical context. The statutorily created regis-
tration systems built upon the common law and provided enhanced protections for
the market participant using a mark. The oft-stated goal of statutory registration
system was that "the right to register follows the right to use," a view defended as
"reflecting the realities of the marketplace." 7 9 In practice this proved an aspira-
tional goal, as unachievable as it was problematic.
The statutes left practical difficulties for the merchant not wishing to make a
substantial investment in the promotion of a mark until he was sure it was his. For
forty-plus years, market participants lived with a chicken-and-egg problem: A le-
gal prerequisite to registrability remained actual use, while an economic prerequi-
575. Id. at cmt. e.
576. Cockrell v. Davis, 23 So. 2d 256 (Miss. 1945).
577. Id. at 259.
578. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18 cmt. d (1995).
579. Application of E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1364 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (discussed in 2
MCCARTHY, supra note 499, § 19.01[2]).
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site to actual use remained registrability. People found themselves investing
heavily in marketing campaigns surrounding a new mark, only to have it rejected
by the registrar or copied by a competitor. This led to subterfuges such as token
use and the like.
In 1988, Congress amended the Lanham Act to introduce intent-to-use and
constructive use concepts. In the case of all registrable marks-trademarks, ser-
vice marks, trade names, certification marks and collective marks-the applicant
may proceed prior to actual use so long as he "has a bona fide intention to use in
commerce and applies to register" his mark. 8' Still, conflicting policy premises
led to relatively short time limits. The advantage of intent-to-use registration-
priority of right from date of registration - is contingent on the applicant's actual
use of the mark "within six months of the allowance of the. . . application. Exten-
sions can prolong this period for an additional thirty months," 81 but that is all.582
As a general rule, priority of rights-and, thus, registrability-in a mark is a
function of priority of appropriation. 83 This rule has a geographical dimension.
The general premise, not surprisingly, is that "the prior user has priority in areas
in which a subsequent use of the designation by another would be likely to confuse
prospective purchasers.1"584 But the user need not be actively engaged in marketing
its goods or services in that area. We can readily see that McDonald's Corporation
can and does enjoy priority of right to the Golden Arches in counties and com-
munities where the first Big Mac has yet to be sold, and this priority would exist
even if there were no Lanham Act.
585
Federal registration entitles the owner of a mark to exclusive use.588 State regis-
tration, however, protects the mark only against use that "is likely to cause confu-
sion or mistake or to deceive as to the source of origin of such goods."587 Absent
federal registration of an eligible mark, there is no right to relief from the use of
one's mark or name in a locality where no competition exists.588 An oil distributor
using the trade name "Dixie Gas" was entitled to no protection from another using
the same trade name where "approximately 100 miles separated the sales areas" of
the two market participants.5 89 The owner of the "Old Southern Tea Room" in
Vicksburg was denied protection from the defendant's use in Jackson of the trade
name "Jackson Olde Southern Tea Room" on grounds the distance between Jack-
son and Vicksburg was sufficient so that there would be no likelihood of confu-
580. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1988). See I MCCARTHY, supra note 499, § 5.05[4].
581. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18 cmt. b (Tentative Draft 1994).
582. These problems aside, some 49% of federal filings since the new law became effective hav been intent-
to-use filings. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 499, § 19.01[l].
583. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19 cmt. a (1995).
584. Id. at cmt. b.
585. The Lanham Act provides for priority even in remote areas. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1988).
586. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b), (c) (1988).
587. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-25-21(a) (1991).
588. Dixie Oil Co. of Ala., Inc. v. Picayune "66" Oil Co., Inc., 245 So. 2d 839, 841 (Miss. 1971); Cockrell v.
Davis, 23 So. 2d 256, 259 (Miss. 1945). Contrast 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1988).
589. Dixie Oil Co., 245 So. 2d at 840.
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sion. 90 On the other hand, the first to use the trade name "Yellow Cab" in
Meridian was granted injunctive relief against another using a confusingly similar
name which included the words "Yellow Cab," although the protection of the in-
junction extended only to "the City of Meridian, and environs." 91 One acquiring
rights in the trade name "Ham House" by using it in his business near Interstate
Highway 55 in Grenada County was protected from interference" 'in any manner
whatsoever in Grenada County, Mississippi.' "592 One who opened a new business
even closer to 1-55 under the name "Jack's Hamhouse" was appropriately en-
joined.593
Geographical separation aside, the law will intervene to protect prior use where
confusion of the public is apparent. Shreveport, Louisiana, is a good distance from
Jackson, Mississippi, but the Singin' Governor Jimmie Davis had phonograph re-
cords, sheet music, and songs of his own composition on sale in Jackson."' Davis'
band's broadcasts were heard in Jackson. For this reason, James Davis Cockrell's
use of the name Jimmie Davis was deemed unfair competition. 95 "Distance is a
factor in such cases, 595 but not a conclusive one.
G. Infringement of Rights
Trademark infringement is the label the law has given the tort of improper inter-
ference with another's reasonable economic expectancy through the continued use
of his trademark. As in all deceptive marketing cases, the law focuses upon likeli-
hood of confusion. More fundamentally, the likelihood of public confusion is what
justifies the tort and the state's use of it to invade the market. When one has rights
in a trademark and priority under the rules noted above, the law provides a remedy
against another who infringes his trademark. To be liable, the defendant market
participant must have used a mark or other designation in the marketing of its
goods and services in a manner that causes confusion:
(a) that the actor's business is the business of the other or is associated or other-
wise connected with the other; or
(b) that the goods or services marketed by the actor are produced, sponsored,
certified, or approved by the other; or
(c) that the goods or services marketed by the other are produced, sponsored,
certified, or approved by the actor.597
590. McKay v. Legler, 36 So. 2d 793, 794 (Miss. 1948). This decision should be relied upon with caution
today in view of the prevalence of businesses and particularly restaurants using the same name in many com-
munities.
591. Meridian Yellow Cab Co. v. City Yellow Cabs, 41 So. 2d 14, 18, 19 (Miss. 1949).
592. Richardson v. Thomas, 257 So. 2d 877, 880 (Miss. 1972).
593. Id.
594. Cockrell v. Davis, 23 So. 2d 256, 259 (Miss. 1945).
595. Id.; McKay v. Legler, 36 So. 2d 793, 794 (Miss. 1948).
596. McKay, 36 So. 2d at 794.
597. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 (1995). Note the similarity of standards in cases of
deceptive marketing generally in the MUTPCPA, Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(2)(b), (c), (e) (Supp. 1994).
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The Jimmie Davis case decided half a century ago is important here. For twelve
years, Davis had been before the public as a singer, composer, radio and recording
artist.598 Davis played what was then known as hillbilly music. His reputation was
national, if not international, and throughout music circles he was known as "Jim-
mie Davis." 99 Long after Davis' reputation was established, James Davis Cockrell
formed a "dance music" or "swing" orchestra. For a number of years Cockrell
worked under the trade name "Jimmie Cockrell and his Orchestra."6"' He then sus-
piciously began using names such as "Jimmie Davis and his band," "Jimmie Davis
and his Orchestra," and "Jimmie Davis and his Novoliers."601 The court found that
"[tihere has been, sufficiently proven, confusion on account of his using the name
'Jimmie Davis' after it had acquired the attributes of a trade name, and had be-
come identified with appellee [Davis] in Jackson, in Mississippi, in the nation and
internationally, and that opportunity exists for further confusion."" 2 And this con-
fusion is present even though the parties are not in head-to-head competition. Pro-
tection is "not confined to cases of actual market competition between identical or
similar products of the parties, but extends to all cases in which the use by a junior
appropriator of a trademark or trade name leads to a confusion of source."603 In
elaboration, the Restatement draftsmen have reiterated and reaffirmed that the
rule "applies to all forms of confusion" of sponsorship.6 4
As elsewhere, the law is settled that intent or purpose is not an element of a
claim for trade name infringement. Whether a court will intervene "in a particular
case must depend upon circumstances; the identity or similarity of the names;...
[and] the extent of the confusion which may be created or apprehended." 0 5 No
doubt trying to force the law into its prior forms, half a century ago the supreme
court said: "The act, however innocent, is considered constructively fraudulent, if
the result would tend to unfair trade, to confusion of goods, and to interference
with the rights of another."0 6 The court goes on to make clear that neither the
phrase nor the concept "fraudulent intent" has a part in the law, save its link with
the concepts of the past, for "the injury is the same regardless of the intent with
which it is done. '607 The court repeated this view fifteen years later, holding that
infringement occurs when another uses a confusingly similar trade name, and this
confusion is evident even though the infringer "does not use it for purposes of de-
ception. It is sufficient if the natural and probable consequence of his acts is to pass
598. Cockrell, 23 So. 2d at 259.
599. Id.
600. Id.
601. Id. at 258.
602. Id. at 259.
603.Id. at 261-62.
604. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 cmt. d (1995).
605. Meridian Yellow Cab Co. v. City Yellow Cabs, 41 So. 2d 14, 17 (Miss. 1949).
606. Cockrell v. Davis, 23 So. 2d 256,260(1945) (quoting HARRY D. NIMS, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE
MARKS § 318 (3d ed. 1929)).
607. Cockrell, 23 So. 2d at 261. See also Dollar Dep't. Stores of Miss., Inc. v. Laub, 120 So. 2d 139, 143
(Miss. 1960).
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off his business as that of the plaintiff."608 This view is brought forward in the new
Restatement, as it proclaims "intent to deceive or confuse is not required for...
liability . . . . The likelihood of confusion standard focuses on the consequences
of the defendant's conduct, not on the defendant's motivation."6 9
To be sure, each of these cases focused upon injunctive relief. There is no rea-
son or principle why intent should be required as an element of an infringement
action for damages. The Mississippi Trademarks Act provides that a registrant
may not recover "profits or damages" in an infringement action "unless the acts
have been committed with knowledge that such mark is intended to be used to
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive."61 As before, such proof will invariably
be made by reference to what a reasonable person under the circumstances should
have known. The court, of practical necessity, will act according to objective ex-
ternal standards, whether it says it is doing so or not.
H. Policies and Principles Found in the Field
We have presented the beginnings of an introduction survey. It is enough to af-
ford a feel for the field of trademark. Our market participant and his lawyer need
more. They need to know and understand the policies implicit in the positive law
of protected marks as an aid to future interpretation. From what we have seen and
from our interpretive stratagem outline in Part III above,611 we find familiar vari-
ants on our now familiar themes: protecting (1) the legitimate interests of the mar-
ket participant using the mark, (2) the consumer, and (3) the integrity of the
market and realizing the public benefits afforded by competitive markets. We see
the law of trademarks as having turned to experience and seen what market behav-
ior adversely affects these interests and fashioned rules to inhibit that behavior. We
see the law of trademarks as tending to promote and protect fair competition while
at once inhibiting unfair competition.
A major premise long implicit in the law in the field is that deceitful use of an-
other's mark is an unfair means of competition.612 Trademark infringement is a
form of unjust enrichment in the sense that the infringing party secures benefits
rightly those of the party who owns the mark. 3 As the Restatement reporters put
it: "The fundamental justification for the recognition of trademark rights is the
protection of prospective purchasers from confusion and the prevention of the un-
just enrichment that results when a seller profits from such confusion."
64
More generally, the positive law in the field imports a policy of protection of the
integrity and utility of the marketplace. Trademark infringement "deprives con-
sumers of their ability to distinguish among the goods of competing manufactur-
608. Dollar Dept. Stores, 120 So. 2d at 142. See also Walker, supra note 560, at 370.
609. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 cmt. c (1995).
610. Miss. CODE ANN. §75-25-21(b) (1991).
611. See James L. Robertson, The Law of Business Torts in Mississippi, 15 Miss. C. L. REv. 13, 24-48 (1994).
612. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. c (1995).
613. Id.; I MCCARTHY, supra note 499, § 2.11.
614. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION XV - xvi (Tentative Draft 1994).
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ers."61 "The public benefits afforded by competitive markets cannot be fully
realized unless prospective consumers can differentiate the products of competing
sellers."616 This differentiation is possible only where there is effective trademark
protection, for only in that event may "individual sellers gain. . . from improve-
ments in product quality or service."617 Otherwise, "they cannot easily recapture
the benefits of a favorable consumer response."618 The law in the field is thus seen
as a prime means of encouraging "investment in quality and service by securing to
the trademark owner the benefits of a favorable reputation."619 If investment in
quality were not protected, it would often not be made, to the detriment of the
consuming public.
Of course, there are the doubting Thomases. Some argue that legal protection
of trademarks acts as a barrier to entry into the market.62 Others argue that legal
protection of trademarks enables owners "to escape the full rigors of competition
through product differentiation and irrational brand loyalty sustained by advertis-
ing."621 It is certainly hard to justify the success of McDonald's solely by reference
to the taste and quality of the product. Little legitimacy attends the use of these
views to inform interpretation. The point for the moment is that, whatever merit
these views may have, they are remote as explanations of and justifications for the
law in the field. The reason this is so, as we have seen in Part 111,622 is that no ra-
tional lawmaker who accepted these premises as controlling could have written
the law as we find it. Assuming intellectual integrity in the legislative process,
persons harboring these doubts would have given us a very different law of trade-
marks. A Fifth Circuit case halfa century ago well put the point: "[W]here as here
it plainly appears that there is a purpose to reap where one has not sown, to gather
where one has not planted, to build upon the work and reputation of another, the
use of the advertising or trade name or distinguishing mark of another, is in its nat-
ure, fraudulent and will be enjoined." '623
The protection of consumers is a further policy judgment implicit in trademark
law. By protecting the integrity of marks, the law "serves to preserve the reliability
and utility of trademarks as a source of information for prospective purchasers."624
Consumers are thus enabled "to base their purchasing decisions on the reputation
of the business identified by the mark." '625 Although in practice the consumer is
615. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n. 14 (1982).




620. Id.; I MCCARTHY, supra note 499, § 2.05(3).
621. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. c (1995); see also, I MCCARTHY, supra note
499, § 2.05(3).
622. Robertson, supra note 611, at 24-48.
623. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Aetna Auto Fin. Inc., 123 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied 315
U.S. 824 (1942).
624. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. c (Tentative Draft 1994).
625. Id.
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seldom a party to trademark infringement litigation, "the consumer's state of
mind" predominates. 626
VIII. TRADE SECRETS
A. The Federal Backdrop
The law of trade secret protection differs from the other business torts consid-
ered to this point in that there is no congressional enactment that provides an over-
arching principle shadowing the field. To the contrary, trade secret protection
arose through and has remained relegated to the positive law of the several states
and, as well, the private law of contract. It is also addressed in the new Restate-
ment (Third) of Unfair Competition. Still, there are three strands of federal law
that need to be noted at the outset.
International News Service v. Associated Press"' recognized a federal common
law rule proscribing a market participant's misappropriation of its competitor's in-
tangible trade values. The case is a most unusual one, arising in the context of
news coverage of what was happening in Europe in the course of World War I. The
International News Service [hereinafter INS] had managed to get itself and its war
correspondents excluded from direct access to the events of the day, and in re-
sponse, began pirating war news stories released by the Associated Press [herein-
after AP] on the East Coast and relaying them to INS affiliates on the West
Coast.628 Employing an unjust enrichment rationale, the Supreme Court held
INS's conduct actionable on grounds it was
taking material that has been acquired by [API as the result of organization and the
expenditure of labor, skill and money, and which is salable by [AP] for money, and
that [INS] in appropriating it and selling it as its own, is endeavoring to reap where it
has not sown, and by disposing of it to newspapers that are competitors of [AP's]
members is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown.629
Famous as it is, the International News case has not met with broad support as the
founder of a common law tort of misappropriation. 6 ' Formally, International
News met its interment in 1938 in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, which declared
the non-existence of any such federal common law rules.631 Since that time, there
has been little movement in state courts to develop the common law action for mis-
appropriation.
Second, federal patent and copyright law preempts many would-be applications
of any state or common law doctrine of misappropriation of trade values. In Sears,
626. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 499, § 2.12[1].
627. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
628. Id. at 238.
629. Id.
630. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmts. b, c (Tentative Draft 1994).
631. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. ,632 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 633
the Court held the patent and copyright fields were exclusively within the federal
legal domain. The Court reaffirmed this view in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft
Boats, Inc. ,634 which held that the congressional scheme for federal patent rights
exists "almost entirely on a backdrop of free competition in the exploitation of un-
patented designs and innovations ."63 The Court then declared that "[a] state law
that substantially interferes with the enjoyment of the unpatented utilitarian or de-
sign conception which has been freely disclosed by its author to the public at large
impermissibly contravenes [federal patent policy] .636
These things said, the central federal judicial expression in the trade secrets
area is Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. ,637 which holds that state trade secret pro-
tection has not been preempted .638 The Court concluded:
Trade secret law and patent law have co-existed in this country for over one hundred
years. Each has its particular role to play, and the operation of one does not take
away from the need for the other .... Congress, by its silence over these many
years, has seen the wisdom of allowing the states to enforce trade secret protection.
Until Congress takes affirmative action to the contrary, states should be free to grant
protection to trade secrets.
639
Since Kewanee Oil, the states have proceeded apace to develop their law of
trade secret protection, most prominent of which is the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, which became law in Mississippi in 1990."4
B. The Mississippi Law of Trade Secrets
There has never been reason to doubt this state's law would recognize and pro-
tect trade secrets. We find no judicial expression of this view until 1960 in Electric
Reduction Co. of Canada v. Crane,641 where the court considered the contours of a
witness's qualified privilege to refuse to disclose trade secrets. American Tobacco
Co. v. Evans642 holds trade secrets legally protected in a similar context. The more
familiar setting is that of a former employer charging its one-time employee with
improper use and disclosure of trade secrets said to belong to the employer. 643
632. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
633. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
634. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
635. Id. at 151.
636. Id. at 156-57.
637. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
638. Id. at 492.
639. Id. at 493.
640. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-26-1 to 75-26-19 (1991).
641. 120 So. 2d 765, 770-71 (Miss. 1960).
642. 508 So. 2d 1057, 1059-60 (Miss. 1987). See also Building Insulators, Inc. v. Stuart, 136 So. 2d 613
(Miss. 1962); Retail Credit Co. v. Garraway, 126 So. 2d 271 (Miss. 1961).
643. See, e.g., ACI Chems., Inc. v. Metaplex, Inc., 615 So. 2d 1192 (Miss. 1993); Rice Researchers, Inc. v.
Hiter, 512 So. 2d 1259 (Miss. 1987); Redd Pest Control Co. v. Heatherly, 157 So. 2d 133 (Miss. 1963); Bagwell
v. H.B. Wellborn & Co., 156 So. 2d 739 (1963); Mitchell v. Atlas Roofing Mfg. Co., 149 So. 2d 298 (Miss.
1963); Donahoe v. Tatum, 134 So. 2d 442 (Miss. 1961).
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Though examples were given and illustrations offered, we find in Mississippi
jurisprudence no effort at a comprehensive definition of a trade secret until Rice
Researchers, Inc. v. Hiter.6  Quoting the then-near-half-century-old Restatement
of Torts, the court defined a trade secret as "any formula, pattern, device or com-
pilation of information which is used in one's business and which gives [one] an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use
it. "645
Mississippi law presently defines a trade secret by statute:
(d) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique or process, that:
(i) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,
and
(ii) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to main-
tain its secrecy.
616
The new Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition provides a more accessible
definition: "A trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation of a
business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an
actual or potential economic advantage over others."647 Obviously the Restate-
ment has no power to amend the statute. Restatement commentary, however, re-
lates that "the concept of a trade secret as defined in this Section is intended to be
consistent with the definition of 'trade secret' in § 1(4) of the Act [Section 75-26-
3(d) of the Mississippi Uniform Act]."64 Comparing the two, it seems clear the
Restatement definition is on the mark. It aids our search for the best reading of the
statute.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi recently addressed the definitional point in
ACI Chemicals, Inc. v. Metaplex, Inc.6"9 Though noting the statute, 650 the court
quoted extensively from the Fifth Circuit's decision in Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson
[hereinafter Cataphote /].651 Cataphote I in turn quoted from another Fifth Circuit
case, 5 2 which itself resorted to the original Restatement of Torts. 653 The Restate-
ment language quoted in Cataphote I and in turn quoted by the supreme court in
644. 512 So. 2d 1259 (Miss. 1987).
645. Id. at 1268 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939)). See also Cockerham v. Kerr-McGee
Chem. Corp., 23 F 3d 101, 105 (5th Cir. 1994); and Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290, 1293 (5th Cir.
1970) [hereinafter Cataphote 1]; Walker, supra note 560, at 372-73.
646. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-26-3(d) (1991).
647. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
648. Id. at cmt. b.
649. 615 So. 2d 1192 (Miss. 1993).
650. Id. at 1196 n. . The claim arose prior to the effective date of the statute.
651. 422 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1970).
652. Water Serv., Inc. v. Tesco Chem., Inc. 410 F.2d 163, 171 (5th Cir. 1969).
653. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
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A CI Chemicals is not the same as that quoted in Rice Researchers. Still, it is useful
for the illustrations it affords:
It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing,
treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a
list of customers.... A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use
in the operation of the business. Generally it relates to the formula for the pro-
duction of an article. It may, however, relate to the sale of goods or to other
operations in the business, such as a code for determining discounts, rebates
or other concessions in a price list or catalogue, or a list of specialized cus-
tomers, or a method of bookkeeping or other office management.654
C. Protecting Property and Personal Interests
Over the years there has been considerable debate regarding the nature of trade
secrets and of the rationale upon which protection is afforded and relief granted.
Many cases have described the plaintiffs interest in a trade secret as a property
right entitled to protection from interference61 5 and Mississippi's case law is
among these.656 On the other hand, other courts have eschewed any property right
analysis and have found the essence of an action a breach of confidence or other
improper conduct or a breach of a duty of good faith: "The protection is merely
against breach of faith and reprehensible means of learning another's secret. 657
According to Restatement commentary, this "dispute over the nature of trade se-
cret rights has had little practical effect on the rules governing civil liability for the
appropriation of a trade secret."
65 8
Trade secret protection, like all other rules in the area, coexists -often uneas-
ly- with the fundamental freedom each person enjoys to enter the market and
take his chances in free and vigorous competition. Witness one expression of the
limits of the rule: "An employee, upon the termination of his employment, is free
to draw upon his general knowledge, experience, memory and skill, howsoever
gained, provided he does not use, disclose or impinge upon any of the secret proc-
esses or business secrets of his former employer. "651
One way in which an employee is free to draw on his wits is found in what has
been called reverse engineering, an idea well accepted in this state. In Planhouse,
654. Cataphote 1, 422 F.2d at 1293; ACI Chems., Inc. v. Metaplex, Inc., 615 So. 2d 1192, 1195 (Miss. 1970)
(quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (citation omitted)).
655. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b (1995).
656. Rice Researchers, Inc. v. Hiter, 512 So. 2d 1259, 1268 (Miss. 1987); American Tobacco Co. v. Evans,
508 So. 2d 1057, 1059-60 (Miss. 1987); Planhouse, Inc. v. Breland & Farmer Designers, Inc., 412 So. 2d
1164, 1166 (Miss. 1982).
657. ACI Chems., 615 So. 2d at 1196 (quoting Cataphote , 422 F.2d at 1294). See Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson,
444 F.2d 1313, 1316 (5th Cir. 1971) [hereinafter Cataphote 11]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 39 cmts. a, b (1995).
658. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b (1995).
659. 2 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 54.2(a), at
416 (3d ed. 1968), quoted in A CI Chemicals, 615 So. 2d at 1195; Planhouse, 412 So. 2d at 1166 n. 1; Cataphote
1, 422 F.2d at 1295 (case decided under Mississippi law); Walker, supm note 560, at 373; William C. Walker, Jr.,
Business Torts: An Introductory Overview of Some Common-Law Principles, 38 Miss. L. INST. PROC. 17 (1983).
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Inc. v. Breland & Farmers Designers, Inc. ,660 the court recognized the right of a
former employee to secure information identical or substantially similar to the pu-
tative trade secret "by independent means and without resort to the trade se-
cret. 661 A CI Chemicals recognized that proprietary information is protected only
so long as competitors fail to duplicate it by legitimate independent research. Mis-
sissippi law recognizes, as a part of the definition of a trade secret, that no protec-
tion is afforded information "readily ascertainable by proper means. 662 In the
Official Comment to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, we find it explained that
proper means include
[d]iscovery by "reverse engineering," that is, by starting with the known product
and working backward to find the method by which it was developed. The acquisi-
tion of the known product must, of course, also be by a fair and honest means, such
as purchase of the item on the open market for reverse engineering to be lawful .63
D. Secrecy, Use, and Value
One feature of the legal description of a trade secret has been the element of
secrecy. It has been thought a truism that the subject matter of a trade secret must
be secret. 664 Mississippi's present definition relaxes the secrecy requirement. The
trade information need not be kept completely secret but must merely be "the sub-
ject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its se-
crecy. '665 The Restatement puts the same point differently, and arguably more
understandably, that the information need merely be "sufficiently. . .secret to af-
ford an actual or potential economic advantage over others."666
The new statutory definition marks another change that merits note. The first
Restatement definition limited trade secrets to information that was susceptible to
"continuing use in the operation of a business. "667 This definition and particularly
the "continuous use" feature were incorporated into Mississippi law inferentially
in Cataphote L 66 Rice Researchers required that the trade secret be "used in one's
business" but said nothing about continuous or systematic use.669 This "continuous
use" component of the definition, however, was excluded from the definition of
trade secret enacted with the Mississippi Uniform Trade Secrets Act, effective
660. 412 So. 2d 1164 (Miss. 1982).
661. Id. at 1167-68.
662. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-26-3(d)(i) (1991).
663. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AcT § I cmt. 2, 14 U.L.A. 438 (1985). See also, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. b (1995).
664. Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F2d 1290, 1293 (5th Cir. 1970); ACI Chemicals, Inc. v. Metaplex,
Inc., 615 So. 2d 1192, 1195 (Miss. 1993); Rice Researchers, Inc. v. Hiter, 512 So. 2d 1259, 1268 (Miss. 1987)
(quoting Cataphote v. Hudson, 444 F.2d 1313, 1315 (5th Cir. 1971)).
665. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-26-3(d)(ii) (1994).
666. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
667. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
668. Cataphotel, 422 F.2d at 1293.
669. Rice Researchers, Inc. v. Hiter, 512 So. 2d 1259, 1268 (Miss. 1987).
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July 1, 1990.7' Commentary in the new Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competi-
tion offers this historical explanation:
The prior Restatement of this topic limited the subject matter of trade secret law
to information capable of "continuous use in the operation of a business," thus ex-
cluding information relating to single events such as secret bids and impending busi-
ness announcements or information whose secrecy is quickly destroyed by
commercial exploitation. See Restatement of Torts § 757, Comment b (1939). Both
the case law and the prior Restatement, however, offered protection against the "im-
proper" acquisition of such short-term information under rules virtually identical to
those applicable to trade secrets. See id. § 759, Comment c. 71
The Official Comment to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act makes clear that the
"continuous use" requirement is excluded.
The definition of "trade secret" contains a reasonable departure from the Restate-
ment of Torts (First) definition which required that a trade secret be continuously
used in one's business. The broader definition in the proposed Act extends protec-
tion to a plaintiff who has not yet had an opportunity or acquired the means to put a
trade secret to use. The definition includes information that has commercial value
from a negative viewpoint, for example the results of lengthy and expensive research
which proves that a certain process will not work could be of great value to a compet-
672itor.
Suffice it to say, continuous use is no longer required before a market participant's
trade secret is protected under Mississippi law.
Pre-Uniform Act case law identified other attributes of legally protected trade
secrets. For example, Cataphote I states that "a trade secret need not be essentially
new, novel or unique, "673 although "it must possess at least that modicum of origi-
nality which will separate it from everyday knowledge."6 74 The statute improves
greatly on this, focusing upon value and including within the definition those se-
crets which possess economic value by virtue of their relative secrecy or potential
use- any notion of novelty or uniqueness being subsumed in the statutory defini-
tion. The Restatement definition says, in effect, that it does not matter whether the
secret is new, novel or unique but merely whether it is valuable.
E. The Suppletive Role of Privately Made Law
Often the party charged with theft of trade secrets is a former associate or em-
ployee of the plaintiff. Such relationships may or may not be permanent, as cove-
nants not to compete are subject to a rule of reasonableness regarding time and
670. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-26-1 to 75-26-19 (1991).
671. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d (1995).
672. UNIFORM TRADESECRETSACT§1, 14U.L.A. 439(1985).
673. Cataphote v. Hudson, 422 F2d 1290, 1293 (5th Cir. 1970) (quoting 2 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 52.1, at 373 (3d ed. 1968)).
674. Rice Researchers, Inc. v. Hiter, 512 So. 2d 1259, 1268 (Miss. 1987) (quoting Cataphote v. Hudson, 444
F.2d 1313, 1315 (5th Cir. 1971)).
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territory.6 75 Seeing this, some employers seek to augment protection of their trade
secrets by contract. Parties possessing trade secrets have legitimate interests at
stake, and courts are quick to enforce those secured by agreements incident to em-
ployment. Suffice it to say, trade secret holders may by the private law of contract
enlarge upon the rights secured to them by the positive law, subject only to a rule of
reasonableness.
IX. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. Origins in the Right of Privacy
In the last four sections676 we have addressed instances of actionable interfer-
ence with advantageous economic relations where our law's statutory species is
prominent. In antitrust, federal statutory law reigns supreme, although subject to
more than a few judicial glosses. In the areas of deceptive marketing and the law of
trademarks, we have seen the interaction with both federal and state statutory law.
When we turned to the appropriation of trade secrets, we saw state statutory law in
the ascendancy. These do not exhaust the field. We next turn to an evolving body
of law addressing another form of appropriation of trade values, a body of law
where there are no statutes to speak of (at least, not in Mississippi).
Non-consensual appropriation and use of some of the incidents of one's identity
and personality have been thought unfair for close to a century. The law's response
has evolved along interesting paths; today much of such behavior is universally re-
garded as actionable. In 1976, the Supreme Court of Mississippi saw "the appro-
priation of another's identity for an unpermitted use" as one of four variants of the
common law right of privacy.6 77 A decade later the court was able to say that
"[tihere is no dispute as to the existence of the cause in Mississippi," and turned
thereafter to the different injuries so inflicted which had given rise to recoverable
compensable damages.678 Two later cases have recognized the tortious quality of
such an appropriation.
Mississippi's most prominent case in this corner of the field is Candebat v.
Flanagan."' Irene and James Candebat paid a few dollars and joined a motorist as-
sociation that offered various services and expense reimbursements to members
who experienced highway emergencies. 681 The Candebats had such an emergency,
675. See, e.g., Herring Gas Co. v. Whiddon, 616 So. 2d 892, 897 (Miss. 1993); Frierson v. Sheppard Bldg.
Supply Co., 154 So. 2d 151, 155 (Miss. 1963).
676. Robertson, supra note 611, at 57-95, 331-52.
677. Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 326 So. 2d 471, 473 (Miss. 1976).
678. Candebat v. Flanagan, 487 So. 2d 207, 210 (Miss. 1986).
679. Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378, 382 (Miss. 1990); Prescott v. Bay St. Louis Newspapers, Inc., 497 So.
2d 77, 79 (Miss. 1986). See also Watkins v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 797 F Supp. 1349, 1359 (S.D. Miss.
1992); Mize v. Harvey Shapiro Enters., Inc., 714 F. Supp. 220, 225 (N.D. Miss. 1989); Mitchell v. Random
House, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 1250, 1258 (S.D. Miss. 1989); Bussen v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 682 F. Supp. 319,
324 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
680. Candebat, 487 So. 2d at 207.
681. Id. at 208.
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and it appears the association responded admirably.682 The Candebats' satisfaction
soured into suit when they learned that, without their consent or knowledge, the
motorist association was telling their story, and the association's concededly quite
satisfactory response, in promotional materials used for marketing its program to
others.683
The court held that the Candebats could recover in tort. 684 The court focused
upon the nature of the interests the law should protect.68 Noting that a number of
courts had characterized the plaintiff's interest as proprietary, if not pure property,
the court correctly saw beyond this and found that injury to a person's feelings and
emotions was a reasonable and frequent expectancy stemming from such con-
duct.686 The court recognized "that the use of one's name or likeness shares certain
characteristics of property" and then added that this "does not prove that the law
governing injuries to it must be governed solely by property related consider-
ations."687 Recalling our discussion of a similar point regarding trade secrets, the
interests at risk have a bit more of a personal flavor, at least with non-celebrities
like the Candebats. The court explained:
The injury to the plaintiffs feelings may very well be the more serious of the two in
many instances; often an intrusion which is of very little commercial consequence
can nonetheless cause serious emotional distress. The law should protect both the
proprietary and the emotional interests; it should not focus with tunnel vision on the
property-related characteristics of the tort.
688
Of importance, all of the Mississippi cases have cited with apparent approval
the work of the late Dean William Prosser68 and the expression and reformulation
of that work in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.69 This history surely presages
Mississippi's recognition of the more mature expression of the actionability of
non-consensual appropriation of a person's identity most often labeled today "the
right of publicity." A knowledgeable Mississippi lawyer, seeking to predict for a
client's benefit and protection the likely incidence of the public force, would surely
see it as such.
682. Id.
683. Id.
684. Id. at 210-12.
685. Id. at 212.
686. The court cited and quoted from Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 197 (Cal.
1955); Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Tex. 1973) and Olan Mills, Inc. v. Dodd, 353 S.W.2d 22, 24
(Tex. 1962). Candebat, 487 So. 2d at 212.
687. Candebat, 487 So. 2d at 212.
688. Id.
689. See W1 LLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804-14 (4th ed. 1971), cited in Pres-
cott v. Bay St. Louis Newspapers, Inc., 497 So. 2d 77, 79 (Miss. 1986); Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publishing
Co., 326 So. 2d 471,473 (Miss. 1976).
690. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977), cited in Deaton, 326 So. 2d at 473; Candebat, 487 So.
2d at 212; Prescott, 497 So. 2d at 79; see also Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378, 382 (Miss. 1990). Dean Prosser
was Chief Reporter for the Second Restatement.
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B. Reemergence as the Right of Publicity
All trace the history of the right of publicity from the right to privacy. 69 The
right of publicity was first weaned from its privacy forebears thirty years ago. 92 It
has since attracted broad judicial and scholarly recognition, 93 so that-as in Can-
debat- the debate today accepts the separate existence of the tort and focuses upon
its contours and remedies.694
Professor Hetherington substantially advances the ball when he explains the in-
adequacies of the copyright law fair use model and its present four-part balancing
test.695 Perceiving that such an approach allowed far too much ad hoc "Monday
morning quarterbacking", he sees the law as limiting its protection to the direct
commercial exploitation of identity.696 Professor Hetherington's reading requires
"that the unauthorized usage be both direct in nature and primarily commercial in
its motivation. "'697 By way of explanation, Hetherington adds:
[W]henever any attribute of celebrity identity is used to promote, endorse or sell a
product or service, the usage . . . [is] direct commercial exploitation. Likewise,
when a celebrity identity is used without permission to generate good will or other-
wise enhance the public perception of a business entity, charitable organization or
other collective pursuit, a similar conclusion should be reached.698
By way of contrast, Hetherington explains that "[wihen a user's primary motiva-
tion is to entertain, inform, analyze or draw inspiration for his own creative pur-
suits, however, the usage. . .[is] indirect and incidental and therefore permitted,
subject to appropriate safeguards."699 Professor Hetherington sees in the law a
sharp-edge case decider test which proceeds from the premise that predictability is
one of the most important ends to be sought "in the real world of celebrity exploita-
tion, news and entertainment.""7 ' Accepting arbitrariness at the edge, the law of
celebrity identity has one ask and answer "a single, simplified question: Is the pri-
mary purpose to sell or promote a product, service or cause or otherwise gain an
economic advantage in the marketplace for which the user should be expected to
pay?
70 1
691. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46, cmt.b (1995); H. Lee Hetherington, Direct Com-
mercial Exploitation of Identity: A New Age for the Right of Publicity, 17 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & Ajrs 1,4-7 (1992).
See also Melville B. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Eploitation of the Associative Value of Personal-
ity, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199 (1986); SheldonW. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw& CONTEPI. PROBS. 203
(1954); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
692. See Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
693. See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY (1994); Halpern, supra note
691; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
191 (1983); Nimmer, supra note 691.
694. See, e.g., Hetherington, supra note 691, at 4-7.
695. Hetherington, supra note 691, at 28.
696. Id. at 30-32.
697. Id. at 32.
698. Id.
699. Id.
700. Id. at 29.
701. Id. at 31.
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In form, the new Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition provides a sharper
test. Eschewing any direct/indirect dichotomy and qualifiers such as "primary" or
any thought of the user's motivation or purpose, the new Restatement declares
subject to liability "[o]ne who appropriates the commercial value of a person's
identity by using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of
identity for purposes of trade."7 °2 The new Restatement makes clear that it dis-
places only so much of the accepted right of privacy as lay within the Restatement
(Second) of Torts' appropriation prong of that right.70 3 Indeed, Restatement com-
mentary recognizes that appropriation of a person's name or likeness may amount
to trademark infringement, deceptive marketing, and defamation as well as inva-
sion of privacy,7 4 though the present law protects only "the commercial value of a
person's identity."7 5
Curiously, the new Restatement sees the reason for recognition of a right of
publicity as "generally less compelling" than in other areas of the field, the thought
being that "[t]he commercial value of a person's identity often results from success
in endeavors such as entertainment or sports that afford their own substantial re-
wards."706 This makes about as much sense as saying the rationale for recognizing
a right of property is less compelling in the case of the rich than the poor.70 7
The Restatement commentators make up for this lapse when they correctly rec-
ognize that no degree of public notoriety is a prerequisite to relief, for "the identity
of even an unknown person may possess commercial value. 707 The new Restate-
ment makes clear "an intent to infringe another's right of publicity is not an element
of liability.""' No proof of a defendant's primary motivation710 must precede aju-
dicial finding of liability. Consistent with and providing further support for the
thesis explained in Part IV above,' the new Restatement offers an external stand-
ard that focuses upon the nature and quality of the defendant's conduct and its ef-
fects, and not the intent or purpose or motive behind. Still, as elsewhere, evidence
of knowledge and intent is admissible on other material issues including identifica-
tion.
702. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
703. This, of course, is the identical "appropriation prong" as has been wholly incorporated into Mississippi
law.
704. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §46 cmt. b (1995).
705. Id. at cmt. a.
706. Id. at cmt. c. Contrast the view of Professor Hetherington, who argues that the unjust enrichment rationale
for the right of publicity
recognizes that achievement and maintenance of celebrity status requires a significant investment of
time, talent and finances. While the rewards can be substantial, they more often than not prove illusory.
Were it not for the promise of the substantial rewards that come with celebrity status, many individuals
would be reluctant to fight the long odds against achieving commercial success.
Hetherington, supra note 691, at 16.
707. But see, Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So. 2d 247, 254 (Miss. 1985) (citing Anatole France's "Le Lys Rouge"
(1894), in 5 WORKS OF ANATOLE FRANCE 91 (W. Stephens trans., 1924)).
708. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (1995). See also Hetherington, supra note
69 1, at 4-7.
709. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. e (1995).
710. Hetherington, supra note 691, at 32.
711. Robertson, supra note 61l, at 51-57.
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The right of publicity secures to each of us the commercial value of his identity
and "prevents the unjust enrichment of others seeking to appropriate that value for
themselves."712 Persons who have otherwise achieved public figure status are pro-
tected from dilution of the value of their identity.713 The right also protects con-
sumers by guarding against false suggestions of endorsement or sponsorship. 71 4 It
protects competitors as well who would suffer unfair disadvantage if the public
mistakenly came to believe a public personality endorsed a rival's wares.
The new Restatement declares the right of publicity infringed only when the de-
fendant acts "for purposes of trade," a term of art defined as including use in adver-
tising, placement on merchandise marketed by the defendant, or in connection
with services he renders, but "not ordinarily includ[ing] . . . to the use of a per-
son's identity in news reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or
non-fiction."7"' That such use is by or on behalf of charitable, educational, reli-
gious or other non-profit entities in no way precludes it from being considered for
purposes of trade.7"6
There is more that may be said of the right of publicity, as of each of the torts in
the field addressed. For the moment, it is a safe Holmesean positivist's prediction
that the court that drew on Prosser and the Restatement (Second) of Torts to pro-
duce Candebat will almost surely learn from Hetherington and the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition as it makes its CLV-satisfying refinements in the
right of publicity.
X. ToRTious INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTS
A. Valid and Enforceable Contracts
1. The Tort Emerges
We turn now to another statuteless corner of the field, a body of law that began
to crystallize in the last century and which continues to evolve. We refer to the tort
commonly known as interference with contractual relations and the rules that tell
us when such interference is actionable. We speak here of third party interference
with existing contracts: first those contracts everyone agrees are valid and en-
forceable, next those arguably voidable and thus unenforceable, then those termi-
nable-at-will. In Part XI, we address interference with not-yet-formed contracts,
the tort of interference with prospective business relations and other economic ad-
vantage or expectancy.
The rules arise in several settings. They speak first to the case where the defend-
ant has interfered with the performance of a contract between the plaintiff and a
712. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c (1995). See also Hetherington, supra note
691, at 16.
713. Hetherington, supra note 691, at 16-17.
714. Id. at 18 (suggesting the Lanham Act's § 43(a) umbrella may also undergird the right of publicity's con-
sumer protection function). See Allen v. National Video, 610 F Supp. 612, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (construing 15
U.S.C. § 1125).
715. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995).
716. Id. at cmt. a; Hetherington, supra note 691, at 41-42.
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third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform.717
Conversely, the rule speaks to one who so interferes by preventing the other per-
son, the putative plaintiff, from performing his contract. An interference tort may
occur when the defendant causes the plaintiffs performance of his contract to be-
come more expensive or burdensome.718 Again, our point of view is that of the
market participant who asks his lawyer, "But what should I do?" The third party
contemplating contact with another already in a contractual relationship has this
question. And so does the contracting party when he learns of the intermeddler's
interest or acts.
Cenac v. Murry7 ' recently observed that "[tihe tort of interference with per-
formance of a contract is one which has been recognized in Mississippi since at
least 1959 beginning with Bailey v. Richards."720 But, if my reading of the cases is
correct, Cenac is wrong twofold. A third party's tortious interference with one's
enjoyment of rights secured to him by an existing contract was thought actionable
in this state at least as early as Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Co. v. Fireman's
Fund Fire Insurance Co. ,72 decided in 1910. That venerable precedent, which
merits thoughtful reading,722 and which will be considered below in some detail,
cites to a number of authorities from other jurisdictions, but like other cases, sees
the action traceable to Lumley v. Gye723 in 1853. Moreover, Bailey v. Richards ad-
dresses interference with the plaintiffs pre-contract economic expectancy.724
Mississippi's first arguably mature though hardly imaginative description of the
tort appears in Irby v. Citizens National Bank.72 Irby was a pipe line contractor
who said he had, in progress, certain contracts in Louisiana.726 Irby charged that
the Citizens National Bank had told a Shreveport bank he was financially weak.727
This, according to Irby, caused the Shreveport bank to call a loan which deprived
him of working capital, forcing him to abandon the Louisiana contracts. Conse-
quently, he sued Citizens National.728 For the elements of the tort of interference
717. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979). See Merchants & Planters Bank of Raymond v. William-
son, No. 91-CA-00615, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 20 (Miss. Jan. 12, 1995) (petition for rehearing pending).
718. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766A (1979).
719. 609 So. 2d 1257 (Miss. 1992).
720. Id. at 1268 (citing Bailey v. Richards, 111 So. 2d 402 (Miss. 1959)).
721.52 So. 454 (Miss. 1910).
722. Deans Prosser and Keeton tell us Globe & Rutgers is an example "of the application of the doctrine to unu-
sual situations." WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS § 129, at 980 n.38 (5th ed. 1984).
723. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q. B. 1853). Globe & Rutgers quotes a Georgia case which in turn cites Lumley v. Gye.
Globe & Rutgers, 52 So. at 456. Southwest Drug Co. v. Howard Bros. Pharmacy, Inc., 320 So. 2d 776, 778
(Miss. 1975), also looks back to Lumley v. Gye for the origins of the action. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, Introductory Note to Chapter 37, at 5-6 (1979); PROSSER AND KEETON supra note 722, at 980-81; La-
wrence J. Franck, The Tort of Wrongful Interference with Contracts: A Conflict of Values, 38 Miss. L. INST. PROC.
139, 144, 151 (1983); Gary Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in Antitrust and Tor-
tious Interference Law, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1097, 1107-08 (1993).
724. Bailey v. Richards, I Il So. 2d 402, 406-07 (Miss. 1959).
725. 121 So. 2d 118 (Miss. 1960).
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with the contract of another, the Mississippi Supreme Court quoted encyclopedia
authority729 which has been frequently requoted.
Irby reports that the plaintiff must first "aver and prove the defendant's knowl-
edge of the contract in question."730 Thereafter,
a prima facie case of wrongful interference with a contract is made out if... [the
plaintiff offers credible proof] (1) that the [defendant's] acts were intentional and wil-
ful; (2) that they were calculated to cause damage to the... [plaintiff] in. . .[his]
lawful business; (3) that they were done with the unlawful purpose of causing dam-
age and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the defendant (which
constitutes malice); and (4) that actual damage and loss resulted.73
The court told Irby his proof fell short of the mark - that it "wholly failed to comply
with those requirements"'7 32 - and sent him packing. From the opinion, one might
imagine any number of reasons for the result. It is difficult to divine a precise rule
in Irby. The quotation, however, has persisted.7 33
The Mississippi cases in the field label the tort "intentional interference" with
contract or contractual relations. For reasons surely apparent by now, the word
"intentional" is deliberately excised from the tort's title. No case holds that a plain-
tiff fails who proves all elements of the tort save the interferer's intent. Only re-
cently the Mississippi Supreme Court stated that "the requisite intent is inferred
when the Defendant knows of the existence of a contract and does a wrongful act
without legal or social justification that he is certain or substantially certain will
result in interference with contract."734 Judge Keady gives much of this his special
spin in Mid-Continent Telephone Corp. v. Home Telephone Co. ," though he could
not resist insisting the plaintiff must prove the "defendant maliciously inter-
feres.""' This, as we have seen, accomplishes nothing except to remind one that
malice does not mean malice but, in law, means "the intentional doing of a harm-
ful act without justification or excuse, or, stated differently, the wilful violation of
a known right." '737 The Supreme Court of Mississippi in turn quotes Mid-Continent
729. 30 AM. JUR. Interference § 55 (1958).




733. This quotation has been frequently repeated without apparent reflection regarding its adequacy or cor-
rectness. See, e.g., Merchants & Planters Bank of Raymond v. Williamson, No. 91- CA-00615, 1995 Miss.
LEXIS 20 (Miss. Jan. 12, 1995) (petition for rehearing pending); Liston v. Home Ins. Co., 659 F. Supp. 276,
281 (S.D. Miss. 1986); Collins v. Collins, 625 So.2d 786,790-91 (Miss. 1993); ACI Chems., Inc. v. Metaplex,
Inc., 615 So. 2d 1192, 1200 (Miss. 1992); Cenac v. Murry, 609 So. 2d 1257, 1268 (Miss. 1992); Nichols v. Tri-
State Brick and Tile Co., 608 So. 2d 324, 328 (Miss. 1992); Galloway v. Travelers Ins. Co., 515 So. 2d 678,
682-83 (Miss. 1987); Protective Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Carter, 445 So. 2d 215, 217 (Miss. 1983). See also dis-
cussion in Franck, supra note 723, at 153; and Walker, supra note 560, at 338-39.
734. Merchants & Planters Bank of Raymond v. Williamson, No. 91-CA-00615, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 20 (Miss.
Jan. 12, 1995) (quoting Liston v. Home Insurance Co., 659 F. Supp. 276, 281 (S.D. Miss. 1986)).
735. 319 F. Supp. 1176, 1199-1200 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
736. Id. at 1199.
737. Id. at 1200.
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Telephone with apparent approval only recently,738 but seems not to notice that the
different statements of the definition are indeed quite different. "Harmful act" and
"violation of a known right" are hardly equivalent terms. "Without justification or
excuse" is an altogether separate definitional element which is not a part of "wilful
violation of a known right."
Nichols v. Tri-State Brick and Tile Co.739 and Cenac each consider a plaintiffs
claim of tortious interference with a contract. But, in each case, the plaintiffs con-
tract was with the defendant.74 The putative interferer was not a stranger to the
contract.74 Each case quotes Irby's statement of American Jurisprudence en route
to telling the plaintiff he understands little of the tort of interference with contract.
Nichols said what should have been obvious, that the "tort only arises if there is
interference with the contract between plaintiff and some third party."742 Cenac re-
iterated: " 'A party to a contract cannot be charged with [tortiously] interfering
with his own contract.' ,743 His remedy is in contract and for breach.
2. The Tort Justified
With these few cases, we may safely say the positive law of Mississippi includes
a right of action against an intermeddler who tortiously interferes with one party or
the other's performance of a valid and enforceable contract. Yet it is not immedi-
ately apparent why such an action exists."' After all, the plaintiff has a remedy of
and from the party with whom he has contracted and who has breached in material
particulars. That remedy may be available only in theory, although the risk of an
impecunious defendant is not ordinarily thought reason to give the plaintiff a sec-
ond party to sue. Still, one present justification for a further remedy against an in-
terfering stranger is that the breaching party may often be unable to respond to a
judgment. The intermeddling third party is by definition less than innocent in a
legal sense. His position is not unlike one who procures a criminal act or, at least,
is an accessory before the fact, and it seems just that he should be held to answer to
the innocent party disappointed in his reasonable expectations from his contract.
Besides, the defendant needs to be shown that in the future he must behave a bit
better. Hence, that "the injured party also has a right of action for damages ex con-
tractu against the party who breached the contract is not a defense to the interfer-
ence action."745 Of course, the plaintiff cannot have a double recovery.
If we read correctly the story of this interference tort, it serves ends beyond the
practical ones of making whole the plaintiff and punishing the defendant. A deeper
738. Cenac v. Murry, 609 So. 2d 1257, 1268 (Miss. 1992). See also Nichols v. Tri-State Brick and Tile Co.,
608 So. 2d 324, 328 (Miss. 1987); and Collins v. Collins, 625 So.2d 786, 790 (Miss. 1993).
739. 608 So. 2d 324 (Miss. 1992).
740. Nichols, 608 So. 2d at 326; Cenac, 609 So. 2d at 1258-59.
741. Nichols, 608 So. 2d at 326; Cenac, 609 So. 2d at 1260.
742. Nichols, 608 So. 2d at 328.
743. Cenac, 609 So. 2d at 1269 (citing Knight v. Sharif, 875 F.2d 516, 526 (5th Cir. 1989)).
744. Lawrence J. Franck poses and thoughtfully considers the same question in his article, The Tort of Wrongful
Interference with Contracts: A Conflict of Values, 38 Miss. L. INST. PROC. 131, 137-38 (1983).
745. Mid-Continent Tel. Corp. v. Home Tel. Co., 319 F. Supp. 1176, 1200 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
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justification is implicit in the latter end, one that arises from the perceived nature
of the right protected. The Supreme Court of Mississippi has made several excur-
sions into this realm and has declared: "The right of one to benefit from his con-
tractual arrangements is a property right which shall be protected.""74 Larry
Franck has surveyed the literature747 and reports that the property right thesis has
its adherents elsewhere. Franck urges acceptance of a "societal" explanation, that
the action exists to ensure the stability of contract.748" 'Formal contracts, because
they embody binding promises of future performance, are key structural elements
for the organization of a market economy. Contractual obligations can be seen as
intertwining and forming a grid-like foundation of economic predictability upon
which other forms of commercial activity may build.' ,149
The point needs further explication. Contract is a facility the law makes availa-
ble to competent persons to empower them to do much they otherwise could not
do, though we are indifferent to whether a given individual chooses to contract. If
a person meets the formalities and makes a contract with another, then society has
an interest in seeing that he enjoys the security of the facility. More important, so-
ciety has an interest in would-be contractors knowing in advance that the institu-
tion of contract itself is stable and secure. The way we have chosen to advance the
social interest is to place within the positive law enabling or empowering rules that
tell persons, descriptively, what they must do to make a contract and, prescrip-
tively, that, if they dot the "i's" and cross the "t's," the state will see that their con-
tract is honored. The law vindicates the practice of contracting as it affords the
individual remedies when his contracting partner breaches. It does so, as well,
when it addresses the improper conduct of a third party intermeddler, and when it
does this, the law focuses on the effect he causes. Implicit in the law is the value
judgment that such effects harm the economic order, that the plaintiff s right of re-
covery sounds in general and not just specific deterrence. It exists as much to pre-
vent officious intermeddling as to make the plaintiff whole.
The property right thesis at its core is by no means mistaken. We see this when
we see that the adjective "property" may not be needed. In this setting there is no
essential difference between a property right and a contract right. Each is the
product of privately made law, usually consisting of one or more instruments in
writing, creating theretofore non-existing rights or transferring rights to another.
Southwest Drug Co. v. Howard Brothers Pharmacy75 - the first Mississippi case to
746. Protective Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Carter, 445 So. 2d 215, 219 (Miss. 1983). Cranford v. Shelton, 378 So.
2d 652, 655 (Miss. 1980); and Southwest Drug Co. v. Howard Bros. Pharmacy Inc., 320 So. 2d 776, 778 (Miss.
1975), likewise embrace the property right thesis. See also Merchants & Planters Bank of Raymond v. William-
son, No. 91-CA-00615, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 20 (Miss. Jan. 12, 1995) (quoting Southwest Drug Co. v. Howard
Bros. Pharmacy, Inc., 320 So. 2d 776, 778 (Miss. 1975)). See generally PRossER & KEETON, supra note 722, at
981 n.39.
747. Franck, supra note 723, at 139-43.
748. Id.
749. Franck, supra note 723, at 143 (quoting John Danforth, Tortious Interference with Contract, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 1491, 1513-14(1981)).
750. 320 So. 2d 776 (Miss. 1975).
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call the right protected by the interference tort a property right- arose in the con-
text of a dispute regarding a lease of improved real property. It is understandable
that the court talked of property rights. But it is unimportant whether the right be
labeled property or contract. If a person acts with another according to the pre-
scribed modes, they generate valid and enforceable rights, and others may no
more interfere with impunity than they may offend the rights created and secured
in the Lanham Act, 5 the MUTPCPA,5 2 the Mississippi Uniform Trade Secrets
Act,753 or any of the other statutes noted above. To be sure, the right is not abso-
lute, as all rights have their penumbra and their exceptions, but within its sphere
the privately made law affords the parties to it an expectancy that either may claim
at his election according to its terms.
3. What Others Have Had to Say About the Tort,
and What May be Learned from What They Have Said
a. The Rule of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
The Restatement (Second) of Torts offers a refined black letter statement that
needs to be considered:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract
(except a contract to marry) between another and third person by inducing or other-
wise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the
other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person
to perform the contract.75 4
Excising the parenthetical about contracts to marry, the Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi presents this improved black letter statement in Shaw v. Burchfield.75 With
no little temerity the author suggests it falls short of the best and most practicable
expression of that rule.
b. Again, Intentional Does Not Mean Intentional
Aside from the generality of the Restatement rule, the principal difficulties
arise from the words "intentionally" and "improperly." The tort we address here
751. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128 (1988).
752. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-1 to -131 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
753. Miss. CODE ANN. §§75-26-1 to -19 (1991).
754. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
755. 481 So. 2d 247, 254-55 (Miss. 1985) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979) but not let-
ting on that the rule stated is a verbatim quotation of Restatement black letter). United States District Judge Tom
S. Lee followed suit in Liston v. Home Ins. Co., 659 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Miss. 1986), as did the Supreme
Court of Mississippi in Cenac v. Murry, 609 So. 2d 1257, 1268 (Miss. 1992). Merchants & Planters Bank of
Raymond v. Williamson, No. 9 1-CA-00615, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 20 (Miss. Jan. 12, 1995) (petition for rehearing
pending), quotes the Restatement black letter but attributes the text to Judge Lee's Liston opinion, only to follow
in the next sentence with the Irby elements quotation noted above. From a reading of the Cenac and Merchants &
Planters opinions, it appears not to have occurred to the court that there may be any difference of meaning in the
three formulations- Irby, Mid Continent, and the Restatement -of the tort of intentional interference with con-
tract.
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has long been labeled an intentional tort.7" 6 To be actionable, the Restatement
holds that the defendant's interference with the plaintiffs contract must be one the
defendant wished to occur or knew was substantially certain to occur as a result of
his action.7"7 But one is held to have intended the result if, in light of the relevant
facts and circumstances reasonably available, he-or one similarly situated -
would have seen the consequences as substantially certain to result. "Intention-
ally" in legal parlance no longer connotes the actor's wish or desire. One intends a
result if "he believes [or reasonably should have foreseen] that the consequences
are substantially certain to result from it."7"8 And so this does not disturb our read-
ing of the cases to require as a predicate to liability that the defendant's acts were
done knowingly and that it was reasonably foreseeable to one situated as was the
defendant, that one would cause pecuniary loss to the plaintiffs. Any defense law-
yer is asking for a malpractice suit if, knowing the plaintiff can prove these things,
he advises his client that success at trial is likely, because he doubts the plaintiff
can prove his defendant's specific intent and foresight.
The rule appears to offer, alternatively, that it may be satisfied by proof of the
actor's subjective desire to interfere with the plaintiffs contract or the equally sub-
jective "known by him to be a substantially certain result of his conduct.""7 The
problem with such a subjective desire standard is that inherent in the proof of in-
tent generally.7"' Practically speaking, the courts will always hold the standard sat-
isfied by preponderating evidence a reasonable actor in defendant's circumstances
should have known or foreseen the consequences, notwithstanding the defendant's
vehement denials of actual knowledge or intent. Fundamentally, the end implicit
in the more precise expressions of our law in the area is holding to an optimally
efficient level, the incidence of interference with contract, and, for that matter,
with other economic advantage of market participants. Because this end best fits
and justifies the field in full, our present rule regarding intent takes the form of a
circumstanced external standard.
By focusing on the subjective state of the defendant's mind, we reward the dul-
lards of the marketplace. A good set of Miranda761-type warnings would make
hash of that view. At its best, the only people it would hold would be those foolish
enough to admit they intended to interfere with the plaintiff's contract or to leave a
paper trail to that effect. Most would-be interferers will be smart enough to keep
756. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Introductory Note to Ch. 37, at 4 and § 766C, cmt. a (1979).
757. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A, Introductory Note to Ch. 37, § 766 cmt. j, § 766A cmt. e, § 766B
cmt. d, § 767 cmt. d (1979); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A & § 766 cmt. j (1979).
758. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A & § 776 cmt. j (1979). See Myers, supra note 723, at 1097, 1111
n.68.
759. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. d (1979).
760. Professor Myers has provided a valuable critique of the subjective intent standard. Myers, supra note 723,
at 1126-35.
761. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
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their true intent to themselves or will at least have enough sense to consult a lawyer
who will surely suggest silence. The Restatement goes on to (plow old ground and)
explain that the rule does not require that the plaintiff show ill will on the part of
the actor as a predicate to liability.762 Evidence of spite or ill will toward the person
harmed is relevant 63 and thus admissible,7 64 not unlike the reason evidence of mo-
tive is admitted in a homicide case. Proof of motive is not an element of the crime,
but it certainly helps to focus on the reason why the actor may have done what he is
charged to have done and reduce the risk of a mischievous result. All of this is
commonplace and plausible, though it is important that the familiar not be con-
fused with the necessary.
c. The Problematical "Improper" Standard
The defendant's acts must also have been done without right or justification, the
second prong of "improperly," the Restatement's carefully chosen word of art,
meaning "culpable and not justified."765 The Restatement reports that courts have
come to call this "legal malice" and to read it to mean that, to be actionable, the
harm must be inflicted intentionally and without justification.766
The Restatement draftsmen sought in "improper" a single expression which
would incorporate the two terms "culpable" and "not justified. 7 67 Culpable is clear
enough. If the defendant in fact interfered with plaintiffs contract, his conduct is
culpable. The point is fundamental and bears emphasis. A market participant in a
competitive relationship with the plaintiff may not, without more, interfere with
plaintiffs valid and enforceable contract. Such interference, without more, is per
se improper. Theoretically, if not practically, he has had his chance and lost. Once
a valid and enforceable contract has been entered, no competitor may come along
and offer a better deal or otherwise induce non-performance, no matter how effi-
cient that may appear in the short run. Implicit in the positive law of this state is
the judgment that the stability and predictability of the institution of contract are
more important than other short range considerations.
"Without justification" suggests that not every such interference is actionable.
Some are justified and protected by law, so long as independently tortious means
are not employed .768 Persons having a special and non-competitive relationship
with a contracting party are often justified. For example, a person charged with
the welfare of another does not open himself to suit when, in the discharge of that
762. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 766 cmt. r, § 766A cmt. f, § 766B cmt. f (1979).
763. See FED. R. EvID. 401; Miss. R. EVID. 401; and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 767(b) (1979).
764. See FED. R. EVID. 402; Miss. R. EvID. 402.
765. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Introductory Note to Ch. 37, at 6 (1979).
766. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS, Introductory Note to Ch. 37; § 766 cmt. s (1979).
767. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS, Introductory Note to Ch. 37, at 6 (1979).
768. Vestal v. Oden, 500 So. 2d 954, 957 (Miss. 1986); see also Merchants & Planters Bank of Raymond v.
Williamson, No. 91-CA-00615, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 20 (Miss. Jan. 12, 1995) (recognizing rule but taking case
outside it on premise-quite dubious on facts presented-that bank, putative tortious interferer, stood in fiduci-
ary relationship to plaintiff).
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responsibility, he causes his ward not to perform his contract.769 By giving truthful
information or honest advice within the scope of a request therefore, a lawyer or
other person is protected even though he thereby causes a third person not to per-
form a contract.77 Others not so close to a contracting party have a qualified privi-
leged to interfere. One may assert a legally protected interest of his own and
thereby cause a third person not to perform an existing contract, and he may do so
with impunity, so long as he employs no independently tortious means and acts in
objective good faith.771 The plaintiff may prove all else that the rule requires, but
his ship will founder if the defendant acts with right or justification.
Irby suggests a not unlikely scenario. Bank has agreed on conventional terms to
finance up to $2,500,000.00 of Hapless Harry's construction of a new building to
house Harry's widget manufacturing operations. Harry in turn engages a general
contractor to build the building, the general contractor in turn engages one or more
subcontractors, and all have agreements with materialmen and suppliers. Bank
knows about all of these contractual relations. Bank allows Harry to draw
$1,000,000.00 over the first several months of construction, and all is well. Harry
then commits an act of default. Bank refuses to release any further funds and com-
mences foreclosure on its security interest. All of this unquestionably aborts Har-
ry's contract with his general contractor, not to mention the other contractual
relations with subcontractors, materialmen and suppliers. All sue Bank for tor-
tious interference. Because Bank was within the rights it held under the note and
security agreement, it will prevail.
Larry Franck comes close to hitting the critical point when he notes that the
Martin v. Texaco, Inc. Court "said that in order for interference with an existing
contract to be actionable, the interference must be 'wrongful' and that by definition
'interference is not wrongful and actionable if undertaken by someone in the exer-
cise of a legitimate interest or right, which constitutes privileged interference.' ,772
One is also protected when he interferes with an illegal contract or a contract
otherwise contrary to public policy.773 And no doubt there are other cases where,
by reason of the nature of the contract or the defendant's relationship to one of the
parties to the contract, a disappointed contractor has no remedy against the inter-
ferer. But to repeat, because it is fundamental, the case of an ordinary competitor
is not one of these.
When we turn to the Restatement definition of "improper," however, is when we
run into trouble, for what we find is a hopelessly manipulable seven-factor balanc-
769. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 770 (1979); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 722, at 985.
770. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772 (1979); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 722, at 985.
771. Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Putnam, 290 So. 2d 612 (Miss. 1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
773 (1979); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 722, at 986.
772. Franck, supra note 723, at 154 (quoting Martin v. Texaco, Inc., 304 F Supp. 498, 502 (S.D. Miss.
1969)).
773. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774 (1979).
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ing test.774 In commentary, the Restatement draftsmen tell us we must determine
whether the interference is improper "through an appraisal of the several factors
and an evaluation of their comparative weight." '775 Later we are told the decision
"depends upon a judgment and a choice of values in each situation," that the fac-
tors are "to be weighed against each other and balanced at arriving at a judg-
ment." 776
We accept that liability at the penumbra depends on the interplay of a variety of
factors which are not reducible to a single rule. Such a form of expression of the
law would be a disaster were it used to cover the core cases. Much of the Restate-
ment's "improper" balancing act might in theory present the possibility of a just
outcome in individual cases, but it wholly ignores the market participant's primary
need: realistic and intelligible rules regulating primary private activity. However
well intentioned, fuzzy balancing tests provide unfortunate incentives to litigation,
not to mention enhanced transaction costs en route. Such a formulation of a pri-
mary rule effectively denies either party access to the law's summary processes."'
To be sure, market participants have an important, though secondary, interest in
just adjudication. Their primary interest is keeping out of court if possible. The
principal criteria for judging the quality of any body of law is whether it speaks
with a practical and coherent voice so that the typical person can order his affairs
with fair confidence he will never be haled into court.
4. The Centrality of Means and Effects
One of the principal values our law respects is each market participant's free-
dom of action. Whether a defendant is exercising his freedom of action or tor-
tiously trying to induce a third person to break his contract or refuse to deal with
the plaintiff is often difficult to determine with any sense of confidence, expost as
well as ex ante. The Restatement's concession in commentary that this question
"frequently presents a nice question of fact" '778 is surely the understatement of the
year. The point is punctuated by careful reflection on two Restatement illustrations
774. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF Tomrs § 767 (1979).
In determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally interfering with a contract. . . is improper or
not, consideration is given to the following factors:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c)the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,
(d)the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e)the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the
other,
(f)the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and
(g)the relations between the parties.
Id. I have explained in another context and on the pages of a prior issue of this journal the problems with this form
of legal expression. See James L. Robertson, Discovering Rule 11 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, 8
Miss. C. L. REv. 111, 146-53 (1988).
775. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. a (1979).
776. Id. cmt. b.
777. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56 and Miss. R. Civ. P. 56.
778. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. I (1979).
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in the context of a claim779 that the defendant has induced a third person to breach
his contract with the plaintiff:7..
1. Upon hearing of [Hapless Harry's] contract with [Arnold Aardvark], [Sheldon
Schmuck] ceases to buy from Harry. When asked by Harry to explain his conduct,
Schmuck replies that his reason is Harry's contract with Aardvark. Thereupon
Harry breaks his contract with Aardvark in order to regain Schmuck's business.
Schmuck has not induced the breach and is not subject to liability to Aardvark under
the rule stated in this Section.
2. Upon hearing of Harry's contract with Aardvark, Schmuck writes to Harry as fol-
lows: "I cannot tolerate your contract with Aardvark. You must call it off. I am sure
that our continued relations will more than compensate you for any payment you
may have to make to Aardvark. If you do not advise me within ten days that your
contract with Aardvark is at an end, you may never expect further business from
me." Thereupon Harry breaks his contract with Aardvark. Schmuck has induced the
breach and is subject to liability under the rule stated in this Section. 781
What is apparent upon reflection is that in each illustration Schmuck could have
the exact same state of mind and exact same wish or desire regarding the effect of
his ceasing to buy from Harry. It may well be that the only difference between the
two illustrations is that in illustration number two, Schmuck reduced to writing his
true intentions. Having opposite outcomes for the two cases makes no sense, nor
does having those outcomes turn on Schmuck's ability to keep a tight lip.
Occasionally fuzzy language - about malice, and motive, and purpose-to the
contrary notwithstanding, the law of business torts has historically and fundamen-
tally focused upon the nature and form of the defendant actor's conduct. We first
condemned violence and other forms of physical restraints practiced by the de-
fendant. Fraud and defamation and intimidation prejudicing a plaintiffs contracts
and potential economic advantages were actionable. The law condemning means
not tortious in and of themselves is traced to Lumley v. Gye782 wherein a singer un-
der contract to perform at the plaintiff s theater was induced by plaintiff's competi-
tor to abandon her duties to plaintiff so that she might sing for the defendant. The
court imposed liability even though the defendant's means of inducement failed to
fit the form of a common law tort.783 In retrospect, the principle seems unexcep-
tionable, as the singer was under contract to the plaintiff. The principle was ex-
tended to business relations that were merely prospective and potential some forty
years later.784 In time, the common law proved inadequate, in part, though not ex-
clusively, because of its generalized and imprecise form of expression. In 1890,
779. Id. § 773.
780. Id. § 774. 1 trust the ALl will not be offended that I personalize its illustrations.
781. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766, illus. 1, 2 (1979).
782. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
783. Id.
784. Temperton v. Russell, 62 L.J.Q.B. 412 (1893).
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the Sherman Act,785 itself infamous for its elusive language, commenced the pa-
rade of statutes which, as we have seen, are the increasingly preferred legal spe-
cies of choice. This is all well and good for cases at the core. The traditional
inadequacy of the statutory species-its seeming inability to deal with the cases at
the penumbra in any save the most arbitrary of ways -falls away in the wake of
Moragne and the view noted in Part III above. But through it all, in this historical
perspective, we see the law as evolving from a focus on subjective, internal stand-
ards to objective, external standards, so that it may today be safely said that the
centrality of the focus is on the defendant's behavior, conduct, means-and the ef-
fects caused.
5. The Tort Re-Restated
We have given the history of the tort. We have reviewed the cases that have ap-
plied it. We have justified it. We have considered what others have said of it. We
have seen its context within the field. It is time we return to our search for its con-
tours. Considering the case law in the aggregate, from Irby to the present, a nar-
rowed statement of the minimum requisites of a prima facie case emerges. The
plaintiff must provide credible proof of the following: (1) that at the time of the
acts complained of, defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the plain-
tiff s contract; (2) that the defendant's acts interfered with the plaintiff in his con-
tract so that as a proximate result thereof plaintiff suffered pecuniary loss; (3) that
it was at the time of defendant's acts reasonably foreseeable to one in the defend-
ant's circumstances that his acts would cause such an effect; and (4) that the acts
were done without right or justification.
This restatement affords the case law its best fit and proceeds from the best jus-
tification for the rule. It eliminates much of the ambiguity and vagueness from the
case law quotations. It addresses our subject: tortious interference with contract.
It focuses on conduct - interference with plaintiff in his contract - and effects -
damage resulting to the plaintiff. It presents an objective, external standard: rea-
sonable foreseeability by one in defendant's circumstances. It presents the prudent
market participant a standard he can understand and live with - it tells him his con-
tracts will be respected and in exchange he must respect the contracts of others.
And the Supreme Court of Mississippi has never held (as distinguished from said)
otherwise. Thinking of the posture of the lawyer advising a client, it is inconceiv-
able that the court would turn away a plaintiff who proved these elements, not-
withstanding the plaintiff failed to prove "the acts were intentional and wilful" or
"that they were done with the unlawful purpose of causing damage and loss."
B. Unenforceable Contracts
There is a second category of "existing" contracts we should consider. I refer to
those where the parties have agreed but where for some reason the contract is un-
enforceable in a court of law. These reasons range from the formal - such as failure
785. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
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to comply with the statute of frauds, lack of mutuality, and the like-to the sub-
stantive, such as unconscionable contracts and other contracts contrary to public
policy.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi has never addressed a case in this category.
Martin v. Texaco, Inc. ,786 a case in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Mississippi, is often discussed. The case concerned an oral agree-
ment between two parties regarding the purchase of certain real property, an
agreement which, of course, was unenforceable because of the statute of frauds.787
The court held an action for tortious interference did not lie, "that it would be le-
gally incomprehensible that defendant would be liable for interfering with a con-
tract which was itself not actionable."788 This is a bit much, if for no other reason
than more than a few knowledgeable lawyers have comprehended that the defend-
ant could indeed be liable. Professor Walker suggests such. "The decision, in fail-
ing to recognize an actionable interference on the basis of noncompliance with the
Statute of Frauds, misses the point- a voidable contract cannot be voided by one
not a party to it. '7 89 After all, the statute of frauds is an affirmative defense79
which, if not pleaded, is waived.791 If the defense is not pleaded, the contract is
enforceable according to its terms as though the statute had no existence. Restate-
ment commentary addresses the point. "[B]y reason of the statute of frauds...
the third person may be in a position to avoid liability for any breach. The defend-
ant actor is not, however, for that reason free to interfere with performance of the
contract before it is avoided."792 The point I would emphasize is that whether such
interference with a voidable contract is actionable should focus not on whether a
party has a formal defense on the contract, which is his to assert and his alone, but
upon the means employed by the defendant-actor and their reasonably probable ef-
fects. Means independently tortious, such as violence, threats, or intimidation,
will invariably support an interference action, even though the contract is lacking
in some essential formality. How far the courts will go recognizing recovery for
other unfair means of interference remains to be seen.
786. 304 F Supp. 498 (S.D. Miss. 1969).
787. Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-3-1 (1972).
788. Martin v. Texaco, Inc., 304 F Supp. 498, 501 (S.D. Miss. 1969). As noted above, Shaw v. Burchfield
utters like foolishness in considering at-will contracts. Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So. 2d 247, 255 (Miss. 1985).
789. Walker, supra note 560, at 354.
790. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c); Miss. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Other contract defenses a defendant sued on a contract is bur-
dened to plead include "duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, land] illegality." Id.
791. Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F2d 291, 298 n. I (5th Cir. 1979); Hertz Commercial Leasing Div. v.
Morrison, 567 So. 2d 832, 834 (Miss. 1990); Wholey v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., 530 So. 2d 136, 138-39 (Miss.
1988).
792. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §766 cmt. f(1979).
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C. Contracts Terminable-at- Will
The case of interference with the terminable-at-will contract is a special one.
When the action is brought, the contract will always have been terminated. In
Shaw v. Burchfield,793 the Mississippi Supreme Court observed:
We note that numerous cases from other states recognize that there is no right of re-
covery on the part of a discharged employee against one said to have interfered with
a contract terminable at will. These cases proceed on the premise that, where there
has been no breach of contract, conceptualizing a tortious interference fails as a mat-
ter of elementary legal logic.
794
If this be so, one might approach an interference tort as one for interference with
prospective economic advantage which is also actionable, as we will see in Part XI
below. After all, if a party can walk away at will, the other has but an expectancy
of future benefits. But this masks the fact that there is an ongoing relationship ris-
ing to the dignity of contract. By definition, the interference-the defendant's said-
to-be-actionable conduct-occurred before the third party terminated his
contract.
As elsewhere, the law of interference with at-will arrangements focuses upon
behavior, on means and effects. The relationship is but the occasion for fixing our
focus. The fundamental difference between interference with these contracts and
those we have considered to this point is that no action lies for competitive inter-
ference with an at-will arrangement unaccompanied by otherwise improper
means. As we have seen, without more, competitive interference with existing
contracts is actionable.
We noted above the early case of Globe & Rutgers Life Insurance Co. v. Fire-
man ' Fund Fire Insurance Co. "' We now return to it. The case raises the question
whether-and by what means-a competitor may entice away his competitor's
employees and thereby with impunity interfere with a terminable-at-will contract
of employment. Globe & Rutgers was decided on a demurrer. The court empha-
sized that the demurrer "confesses every material allegation of the declaration."796
Globe & Rutgers had charged that it and Fireman's Fund were competitors in the
fire insurance business in the Natchez area, that Globe & Rutgers enjoyed the ser-
vices of a local agent, one Trabue Lawrence, and that Fireman's Fund and others
desired to put Globe & Rutgers out of business in the State of Mississippi "as far as
practicable" '797 and, to that end, intimidated Lawrence by "threatening to drive him
out of his business as insurance agent" unless he should abandon his service of
Globe & Rutgers.798
793. 481 So. 2d 247 (Miss. 1985).
794. Id. at 255 (citations omitted). As the author of the Shaw opinion, I am relieved to find that I stopped an
inch or two short of embracing this formalistic nonsense. Beneath, of course, is a core truth we must confront.
795. 52 So. 454 (Miss. 1910).
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The court held that Globe & Rutgers had stated a claim upon which relief could
be granted, in that Fireman's Fund was "wickedly, unlawfully and maliciously in-
terfering with plaintiffs employ[ee] for the sole purpose of harming it." '799 The
court emphasized that "it may have been perfectly permissible for the defendants
to have employed the agent of plaintiff and to pay him better for his services...
[or] if the object of the employment was in the honest furtherance of their own
business enterprises. "800 The court said the defendant had "the right to use all
proper methods," citing other authority to the effect that" '[clompetition in busi-
ness is permitted, although frequently disastrous to those engaged in it. It is always
selfish, often sharp, and sometimes deadly.' "801 The opinion is incoherent in its
repeated emphasis that a competitor's defense rests on his methods, but that the
plaintiff carries the day if he proves the defendant employed those methods for the
impermissible purpose of driving the plaintiff out of business.
Assuming plaintiffs facts, the court's core ground for its Globe & Rutgers hold-
ing appears to be its view
that the interference with the business of plaintiff was not incidental to the accom-
plishment of some legitimate purpose of the defendants, but that the interference was
wanton and malicious, and for the purpose of driving the plaintiff out of business.
The gist of this action is the malicious and unlawful interference with plaintiffs
business, to his damage.802
On its face, the court's rationale is hopelessly confusing. If defendant's methods be
the focus of its defense, it is because proper methods are not actionable. Methods
connote conduct. If proper methods exonerate a defendant, it follows that im-
proper methods may hold him whatever his purpose.
Professor Walker would reinterpret Globe & Rutgers, emphasizing that Globe
& Rutgers had a contract of employment with its agent, Lawrence, and that this
contract of employment was protected by a competition privilege notwithstanding
that it was terminable-at-will.803 But phrasing the highly relevant competition con-
text as a privilege implies a defense Fireman's Fund had to prove. The fact is Fire-
man's Fund was free to make Lawrence a better offer any time it wished, and the
law left Lawrence free to accept that offer. One of the major achievements of the
new Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition is its rejection of the competition
privilege and enhanced respect for the competitor's freedom of action. Franck also
reinterprets Globe & Rutgers. "[A]lthough not expressly so stated in precise terms,
it would appear that this decision was premised on the protection of the plaintiffs
property rights in its business as an insurer rather than upon any societal interest in
protecting the contract relationship as such."8"4 He adds later:
799. Id.
800. Id.
801. Id. (quoting Martel v. White, 69 N.E. 1085, 1087 (Mass. 1904)).
802. Id. at 456.
803. Walker, supra note 560, at 352.
804. Franck, supra note 723, at 152.
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[B]ecause society attaches considerable importance to legitimate business enter-
prises, it deems deliberate efforts to destroy such enterprises socially undesirable,
for which reason it is easy to see why civil liability would be imposed upon one
whose motive in interfering with the contractual right of another is principally or
primarily to cause economic harm.805
Franck is cold, and he gets no warmer when he adds: "[B]ecause society views the
stability of contractual relationships as important, the mere motive to compete for
economic advantage will not justify interference with an existing contract. 80 6
This cannot be right. No one doubts Fireman's Fund could have approached La-
wrence and offered to double his pay if he would leave Globe & Rutgers and come
to work for Fireman's Fund. Without more, Globe & Rutgers' suit would have
been borderline frivolous.
To find the true rule of a case, we must find that minimum proof which would
provide a prima facie case. The indispensable element is the defendant's means -
those implicit in its threats directed at Lawrence. Indeed, we can dispatch all of the
rhetoric about malice and intent and purpose and reduce Globe & Rutgers to the
simple and quite defensible proposition that Fireman's Fund and its alleged co-
conspirators could not use predatory means to interfere with the right of Globe &
Rutgers and Lawrence to enjoy the benefits of their contractual agency relation-
ship so long as each wished it to continue. This seems precisely the approach the
Restatement takes.87 The means a reasonable man in Lawrence's shoes would
have understood from Fireman's Fund's threats to drive Lawrence out of business
if he did not cease his agency for Globe & Rutgers are a matter subject to objective
proof without the necessity of probing anyone's bent of mind. It is inimical to free-
dom of contract in its accepted and legally permissible realm. It is likewise inimi-
cal to the policy of promoting competition amongst employers for the services of
employees on the relative merits of the terms and conditions of employment of-
fered. The best reading of the rule of Globe & Rutgers thus becomes the rule we
restated in Part X.A.5. When that statement of the rule is applied to the facts of
Globe & Rutgers, in its procedural posture, the decision remains the same and is
infinitely more understandable and defensible.
805. Id. at 155.
806. Id. at 156.
807. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 (1979).
Competition as Proper or Improper Interference
(1) One who intentionally causes a third person not to enter into a prospective contractual relation with
another who is his competitor or not to continue an existing contract terminable at will does not interfere
improperly with the other's relation if
(a) the relation concerns a matter involved in the competition between the actor and the other and
(b) the actor does not employ wrongful means and
(c) his action does not create or continue an unlawful restraint of trade and his purpose is at least in part to
advance his interest in competing with the other.
(2) The fact that one is a competitor of another for the business of a third person does not prevent his
causing a breach of an existing contract with the other from being an improper interference if the contract
is not terminable at will.
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The same may be said of Standard Fruit & Steamship Co. v. Putnam.8"8 Stand-
ard Fruit is a case where the defendant interfered with the plaintiffs at-will em-
ployment contract with his employer, but where the defendant acted within his
legal rights in so doing. It seems that in December of 1969, Putnam was injured
while employed as a truck driver within a banana terminal leased and operated by
Standard Fruit."09 Putnam brought suit against the terminal operators and recov-
ered a $25,000.00 verdict en route to which he had sought to prove total, perma-
nent disability.81 Three years later, Putnam was back at work for the same
trucking company, A. Joseph & Sons, and drove onto the terminal where he was
spotted by Standard Fruit's manager who remarked, "I bought and paid for your
ass one time and I'm not going to do it any more,"811 and instructed all of his fore-
men and employees that Putnam was not to be permitted back on the premises.82
In due course, it appears that Putnam lost his job with Joseph, although other Jo-
seph trucks with other drivers were allowed on the terminal.83 There is much
loose talk in the opinion. What is critical is that Standard Fruit was recognized as
having property rights sufficient that it could of right exclude Putnam from the
premises it had under lease. The law of trespass said as much. 1 4
Professor Walker had a good bit to say about Standard Fruit, at least one part of
which seems wrong and another unnecessary. Walker says that "[p]rotection of the
actor's own legally protected interest has been recognized as a proper purpose
which justifies an interference with an existing contract."81 5 After summarizing
the opinion, Walker concludes that "[t]he opinion recognizes a privilege of one in
possession of real estate to exclude another who is susceptible to accident even if
the act results in the plaintiffs loss of employment. The privilege recognized is re-
ally based upon the defendant's legitimate (i.e., not improper) purpose for his
acts. 818 Not so. The defendant's purpose has nothing to do with it. The defendant
had a property right to exclude Putnam or anyone else for that matter, and it exer-
cised that right. That right was adequate that Standard could exclude Putnam
whether he had ever been injured or was "susceptible to accident." Why it exer-
cised that right is of no moment. So long as the defendant did not act for some le-
gally impermissible reason, e.g., "to further racial discrimination,"817 he could
exclude Putnam with impunity. Both the court and Walker seem to take seriously
the idea that it was important for Standard to show its conduct was reasonable by
reason of Putnam's history of accidents and resulting injuries. But this was not
808. 290 So. 2d 612 (Miss. 1974).
809. Id. at 613.
810. Id.
811. Id.
812. Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Putman, 290 So. 2d 612, 614 (Miss. 1974).
813. Id.
814. See Kirkwood v. Hickman, 78 So. 2d 351 (Miss. 1955).
815. Walker, supra note 560, at 352.
816. Id. at 353.
817. Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Putman, 290 So. 2d 612, 616 (Miss. 1974). Of course, in this private party
setting, by no means does the law reach or speak to all racial discrimination.
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necessary at all. It is not defendant's purpose that counts but its rights. Defendant
was acting within its rights whatever its purpose.
In Standard Fruit, nothing turns on whether Putnam's employment was at-will,
for a specific term, or otherwise conditioned. In the Standard Fruit opinion, the
court makes much of the notion that the defendant's interference may have been
incidental or at most a remote cause of Putnam's loss of his job. This is a slippery
point at best. On the one hand, Standard Fruit had no right to have Joseph fire Put-
nam, nor in fact did Standard Fruit insist on Joseph firing Putnam. On the other
hand, it seems fairly clear that Putnam would not have lost his job had it not been
for defendant's objection to his driving a truck onto the terminal premises. Putnam
did not have an action because the Defendant had a right to exclude him and did.
The bottom line is this: The positive law of Mississippi recognizes an action for
tortious interference with an at-will contract. The plaintiffs recovery is dependent
upon his showing the defendant employed improper means, that is, culpable
means without justification, without the trappings of the Restatement's balancing
test. In Globe & Rutgers, the plaintiffs action was recognized because of defend-
ant's culpable means. In Standard Fruit, the defendant prevailed because his con-
duct was justified by his acting in accord with a legal right already vested in him.
The lawyer called to advise a client when and whether he may interfere with an at-
will arrangement has some law to work with, albeit by no means all he would
wish.
One question remains: What, if any, difference is there between an action for
interference with an at-will contract and one for interference with prospective eco-
nomic advantage? Are there means we may hold improper when employed in one
context and not another? Superficially, less impropriety should suffice in at-will
interference. The existence of an ongoing at-will relationship is a value the law re-
spects. Still, the Restatement suggests this the one setting in which a competitor
may interfere with impunity.8"8 The offended party at no time has more than an
expectation of prospective economic advantage. This suggests that the approach to
impropriety in the two contexts should be the same.
XI. INTERFERENCE WITH OTHER ADVANTAGEOUS ECONOMIC RELATIONS
A. The Residual Business Tort
Improper means are not made actionable only when they interfere with existing
contracts. For at least a century" 9 the law has provided a remedy under certain
circumstances against one who interferes with the plaintiffs prospective contrac-
tual relations.8"' The areas we have been considering-antitrust, deceptive mar-
keting, trademarks, appropriation of trade values and, most recently, interference
with contracts - are but specific forms of market interference with the prospective
economic advantage of others. These are best seen as special instances of the gen-
818. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768(2) (1979).
819. See notably, Temperton v. Russell, 62 L.J.Q.B. 412 (1893).
820. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1979).
(Vol. 15:331
THE LAW OF BUSINESS TORTS
eral rule, a general rule proscribing improper interference, special instances of
which arose in recurring patterns of market behavior and interests in need of pro-
tection. Over time these produced identifiable decisional patterns.
The case law left much to be desired. Clarity and sophistication imperatives
gave impetus to the movement to statutes. We now address the leftovers, an area
where the law is still in flux. There are no statutes here, although Restatement has
been made. A generation ago the Restatement (Second) of Torts accorded black
letter status to tortious "interference with prospective economic advantage."821
Now, the new Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition accepts the dynamic
nature of the law on the edges, proclaiming actionable "[all] other acts or practices
...[or other]. . . unfair method[s] of competition, taking into account the nat-
ure of the conduct and its likely effect on both the person seeking relief and the
public."822 Of necessity, these residual business torts require generality of expres-
sion approaching abstraction. The case law remains unruly, as it has always been
because it falls outside the more manageable fact patterns. Unavoidably, the law-
yer's process is perilous. But the questions do arise and Mississippi market partici-
pants do sue and get sued. Many more are threatened and are at risk. And we will
do the best we can.
B. An Early False Step -And Its Lessons
Our first case to address tortious interference with prospective economic ad-
vantage is Wesley v. Native Lumber Co. ,23 decided just four and a half months after
Globe & Rutgers.824 The trial court had sustained a demurrer, and so we take it as
given that the defendant employer had told his workers that, if they traded with the
plaintiff, who operated a mercantile business and a barber shop, he would fire
them.828 The employees disobeyed, and the defendant was true to his word.828
Plaintiff sued, charging loss of actual and potential customers and, as a result, loss
of profits827 It is noteworthy that nothing in the opinion suggests plaintiff Wesley
and defendant Native Lumber Company were business competitors.
The Wesley Court held, if plaintiff proved what he alleged, he could recover.
8 28
In a confused statement nearing unintelligibility, yet often quoted and discussed,
the court said: "It is true a person has the right to refuse to have business relations
with any person whomsoever, whether his refusal is the result of caprice or mal-
ice, without laying himself liable to action therefor."829 So far so good, for surely
this is unexceptionable. Inexplicably, the court follows immediately with "but he
821. Id. § 767.
822. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1(a) (1995).
823. 53 So. 346 (Miss. 1910).
824. 52 So. 454 (Miss. 1910).
825. Wesley, 53 So. at 346.
826. Id.
827. Id.
828. Id. at 347.
829. Id.
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cannot, from such motives, influence others to the same course, for the purpose of
injuring the business of such other. The act and the accompanying motive together
constitute the unlawful act."83 The court offered no rationale for this pronounce-
ment. It merely cited Globe & Rutgers831 for the proposition that "an act, legal in
itself, may become illegal, and a ground of action, when accompanied by the mali-
cious purpose to injure the business of another, resulting in such injury," '832 which,
of course, contradicts completely the first phase of the Wesley rule. But, assuming
this makes sense (which, as we have seen, it does not), it hardly helps Wesley
which has just declared that a person has the right to refuse business relations with
another, even if motivated by "malice."
Professor Walker takes a shot at explaining all of this. He notes that Wesley
"made no mention of a purpose to appropriate plaintiffs business nor the use of
improper means." '833 He offers that the case "stands for the proposition that inten-
tional injury to the plaintiffs business by inducing third parties not to trade, when
not actuated by a legitimate purpose, is an actionable tort. Such is the result even if
the means used are not otherwise wrongful."834 In other words, intentional injury
by definition is actionable. We confronted the problems with this view in our dis-
cussion of Memphis Steam Laundry in Part IV above."3 Franck says the case turns
on the fact that Wesley and Native were not competitors, that the defendant was
held liable because "the societal value of business competition was simply not
present."836 Although he does not say so expressly, Franck appears to accept that
employers are free to tell their employees they may not trade with a competitor, on
pain of being fired.
There is much talk in the opinion of the role of malice. The court unmistakably
is saying that Native would have been within its rights to discharge its employees
who let Wesley cut their hair, so long as Native did not act "with the malicious pur-
pose to injure the business of" Wesley.837 As we have seen, the word "malicious"
adds nothing. The court says it is holding Native liable in favor of the third party,
Wesley, because of Native's purpose, assuming Wesley can prove it.838 But suppose
at trial Wesley is unable to extract from Native an admission of its purpose but
merely shows under the circumstances that Native, when it discharged the em-
ployees, knew or reasonably should have known of the likely adverse impact on
Wesley's business, i.e., that Native reasonably knew and understood from all of
the circumstances the consequences likely to result from its conduct. Surely not
every employer who fires an at-will employee may be held liable for every likely
830. Id.; see also Franck, supra note 723, at 131, 164; Walker, supra note 560, at 344-45.
831.52 So. 454 (Miss. 1910). See discussion in Part X.C, supra.
832. Wesley, 53 So. at 347.
833. Walker, supra note 560, at 344.
834. Id.
835. Robertson, supra note 611, at 52-56.
836. Franck, supra note 723, at 165.
837. Wesley, 53 So. at 347.
838. Id.
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detriment suffered by those with whom the employee habitually traded. The ques-
tion may be one of proximity and foreseeability, as well as lack of justification.
The necessary proximity and foreseeability seem present here, and no competitive
posture nor any relationship between Native and its employees offers a justifica-
tion.
Wesley is an anomalous opinion. There may be no rule we can tease from its
holding that a competent court would enforce today. Under the law at the time (and
presumably now, as well), the discharged employees of Native Lumber Company
would have no right of action.9 That is to say, the facts suggest the discharged
workers were at-will employees subject to discharge with or without cause. But if
the employees had no right of action, why should Wesley? Certainly the immedi-
ate impact of Native's conduct was far more damaging to the employees than it was
to Wesley. The employees lost their entire livelihood - temporarily at least. Wesley
merely lost the profits he would have enjoyed had the Native employees had the
wherewithal to continue trading with him. Accepting that Native's management
are proverbial Holmesean bad men, they will surely find it odd that they can dis-
charge the employees with impunity but still be subject to suit at Wesley's hands.
Native may legitimately ask that the law speak with one voice and tell it what it
may do and what it may not do without risk of suit. Fortunately, we have more
than Wesley from which to build this state's residual jurisprudence of tortious inter-
ference with other prospective economic advantage.84O
C. The Right Rule for (Perhaps) the Wrong Reasons
Southern Bus Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway & Mo-
torcoach Employees ofAmerica811 is a conventional, improper means business tort
case arising in the context of a labor dispute. The Union had a collective bargain-
ing agreement with Southern Bus Lines.842 The agreement expired, and, no new
agreement having been reached, the Union called a strike.843 Three months into
the strike, Southern Bus Lines, a certified common carrier, announced it would
begin accepting non-union applications for employment and would resume opera-
tions.844 The bus line sought to serve passengers and shippers, including the
839. See, e.g., Hartle v. Packard Elec., 626 So. 2d 106 (Miss. 1993); Rape v. Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co., 100
So. 585 (Miss. 1924); but see McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., Inc., 626 So. 2d 603, 606-07 (Miss. 1993).
840. Still, Wesley offers a valuable thought experiment. Set the case in other eras and with other facts. Suppose
the case had arisen in the late 1920's or 1930's and the facts reflected that Wesley had sought and encouraged
trade with pro-union organizers and sympathizers, that Native Lumber Company was angrily anti-union, and
that it discharged any employees who traded with pro-union businesses. Or move the case forward to the late
1950's or early 1960's and imagine that Wesley refused to hew the line in support of a racially segregated society,
that Native Lumber Company's management was militantly segregationist, and that it discharged any employee
who refused to boycott Wesley. Reverse the facts. Assume that Wesley, Native's management, and the affected
employees are all black persons, that Wesley has long enjoyed profitable trade from members of the white com-
munity which is being subject to a boycott by much of the black community and that in order to punish Wesley for
his refusal to comply with the boycott, Native discharges all employees who trade with Wesley.
841. 38 So. 2d 765 (Miss. 1949).
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United States Postal Service, and hired new employees."' The Union organized
picket lines which led to violence.846 Southern Bus Lines was before the Mississippi
Supreme Court on the Union's successful demurrer to Southern Bus Lines' com-
plaint for injunction47 The supreme court reversed.' In its complaint, the bus
line alleged union interference with its contracts of carriage and employment, ex-
isting and prospective, and alleged "thirty-two separate acts of violence and dam-
age to property. '849 The complaint was filled with charges of the Union's "force,
violence, coercion or intimidation." While the word "intimidation""" is arguably
ambiguous, we find a clue of the court's meaning when it speaks of "threats, abu-
sive language, or other acts amounting to intimidation" as improper means.8"'
To be sure, the Southern Bus Lines opinion is a bit dated. It contains a lot of
loose language, and in its overall tone displays a hostility to labor unions typical of
another era. The best reading of the opinion, however, stands out. The law of
business torts affords an employer/market actor a remedy against persons who
employ improper means, and thereby interfere with its existing and prospective
contractual relations and economic expectancies, be those in the form of relations
with customers for whom the market participant provides services or employees
whose services it engages.852 Certainly thirty-two acts of violence followed by
threats of further force and violence are enough to qualify as improper means, ar-
guably means tortious in any context. Of note, the case does not rely on any dis-
tinction between the Union's interference with prospective economic advantage
and existing contracts. As we have explained above, much less than force and vio-
lence will suffice where the defendant interferes with an existing contract.
A generation later the court decided Southern Christian Leadership Conference,
Inc. v. A. G. Corp. ,83 although again we find much loose dated language. In
SCLC, members of the black community were boycotting white-owned busi-
nesses in an effort to secure certain political, economic, and legal rights all agree
the City of Grenada had theretofore denied.85 4 A.G. operated a small retail gro-
cery business known as Pak 'N Sak, approximately two-thirds of whose customers
were black persons.855 A.G. had made a modest profit for some ten years before
845. Id.
846. Id.
847. Id. at 768.
848. Id. at 77 1.
849. Id. at 767.
850. Id. at 768, 769, 770.
851. Id. at 768.
852. Duncan Kennedy sheds great light on the difficulties in articulating the rule that governs cases such as this
in his article, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication:A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986).
853. 241 So. 2d 619 (Miss. 1970).
854. Id. at 620.
855. Id. at 624.
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the boycott.8 16 Within six months after the boycott began, A.G. had to close its
doors. 5
Properly seen, SCLC addresses the plight of a market participant whose pro-
spective economic advantage with his customers has been substantially interfered
with by the defendants through allegedly improper means. The court found that
SCLC had engaged in "a secondary boycott, threats, intimidation, duress and
force," all of which it held improper means. 8 8 The lower court found "illegal
means" consisting of "mass picketing, they blocked the store entrance and cus-
tomers could not go in and out; once when entreated to move on and not block the
way, they sat down in the sidewalk, making their obstacle even worse. 8 59 The
court found SCLC had also brought "pressure. . .to bear on those guilty of shop-
ping with . . .[A.G., which] caused terror and fright" within the black commu-
nity.86° This was accomplished by posting photographs and names of persons
trading with A.G. at mass meetings.861
SCLC is a case one has to be careful with. This state's courts of that time were
not distinguished for their sensitivity to the First Amendment rights of civil rights
organizations and those who worked with them. If the opinion may be taken at
face value, SCLC stands for the unexceptionable proposition that physically pre-
venting customers from trading with the defendant and causing "terror and fright"
among those who did are improper means within the law of business torts.862 Of
course, force and violence constitute a separate tort toward the victim. It certainly
works no unfair surprise to those responsible that they be held to the affected mar-
ket actor as well.
There is much else in Southern Bus Lines, and particularly in SCLC, that one
might legitimately take exception to, the problematic discussion of the role of civil
conspiracy being but a part thereof. Still, one can strike the loose and offensive
language and find with confidence and within each case an emerging and sensible
proposition: Practicing improper means in the form of force and violence and
fright and terror and thereby interfering with another's prospective economic ad-
vantage will render the actor liable in tort. And this is so no matter how worthy
one's cause or how otherwise legitimate one's economic combat with another. The
point where free speech becomes tortious interference may be difficult to divine,
and there are and will ever be troublesome shades of gray-a twilight zone-be-
tween the clear cases on either side of the divide. But there are relatively clear
cases on the actionable side.
856. Id. at 625.
857. Id. at 619.
858. Id. at 624.
859. Id. at 626.
860. Id.
861. Id. at 622.
862. See Kennedy, supra note 852; see also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
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D. A Partial Breath of Fresh Air
Wagley v. Colonial Baking Co.863 is similar to the Memphis Steam Laundry case
but with the important difference that two market participants acted in concert to
ruin plaintiff. The case reinforces the view that improper means is the gravamen
of a business tort action. The plaintiff, a partnership doing business as Dixie Land
Baking Company, and the two defendants, Colonial Baking Company and Hardin's
Bakery Corporation, were all engaged in the bakery business in the Jackson area
and competed with each other.864 Dixie Land charged and sought to prove that Co-
lonial and Hardin's engaged in a series of "concerted and simultaneous" reductions
of the wholesale price of white bread for the purpose of stifling competition and
inflicting economic injury on Dixie Land.865 Dixie Land brought suit under the
state antitrust laws and for a common law conspiracy to monopolize.86 The es-
sence of these charges was that defendants had improperly interfered with plain-
tiffs prospective economic advantage. At the end of all of the evidence, the trial
court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants, though giving no recorded rea-
son. 
867
It is important to note that Colonial and Hardin's were selling in the Jackson
area at prices lower than in other parts of the state. 868 The State Antitrust Act de-
clared unlawful the usual anticompetitive means, including price discrimina-
tions.869 Significantly, the Wagley Court quoted law from otherjurisdictions which
wholly pretermitted any reference to intent. With apparent approval, the court
cited the Supreme Court's affirmance of the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Gre-
nada Lumber Co. v. State of Mississippi87 by stating: "The Court further declared
that a combination that is actually in restraint of trade under a statute which is con-
stitutional, is illegal whatever may be the motive or necessity inducing it." '871 The
court went on to quote encyclopedia authority:
The authorities are generally agreed that if the necessary effect of the contract or
combination is to stifle or directly or necessarily to restrict free competition or
lessen it to an unreasonable extent, such contract or combination is under the ban of
the law, whatever may have been the intention of the parties.72
The whole thrust of the Wagley opinion on the state antitrust count is that action-
ability turns on the defendant's employing proscribed means to proscribed effects,
863.45 So. 2d 717 (Miss. 1950).
864. Id. at 718.
865. Id.
866. See discussion in Part V Robertson, supra note 611, at 80-81.
867. Wagley, 45 So. 2d at 718.
868. Id. at 717.
869. MIss. COOE ANN. § 75-21-3(d) (1991).
870. 217 U.S. 433 (1910).
871. Wagley v. Colonial Baking Co., 45 So. 2d 717, 721 (Miss. 1950).
872. Id. (citing 36 AM. JUR. Monopolies § 134, at 607).
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injuring plaintiff. 73 Thus, Wagley is an important building block in the view we
find predominating the field as a whole.
But there is more. In the second count for common law conspiracy, the Wagley
Court cited Memphis Steam Laundry as "the only case we can find where proof was
made by evidence of express threats."874 The court then emphasized that the plain-
tiff prevails "even if express threats against [plaintiff] be not proven, if the circum-
stantial evidence be sufficient to establish a like purpose," '75 importing an
objective, external standard for the "threats" issue. The Wagley Court reiterated
the important principle "that the reduction of prices is an absolute right of the
owner of a business and is lawful of itself."7 ' If it had only stopped there! Alas,
Memphis Steam Laundry was still much a part of the judicial mindset, and so we
find:
[U]nder the guise of exercising an absolute right, it is not lawful indirectly to inter-
fere with the business, employment, or occupation of a third person, where the exer-
cise of the right was with the object of injuring the third person rather than primarily
of benefitting the person exercising the right.
8 77
This is straight out of Memphis Steam Laundry and, of course, falls as we have
seen above-and as all else in Wagley suggests it must.
The Wagley Court's core holding, however, is clear. The defendants were in con-
cert practicing proscribed price discrimination or other forms of predatory pric-
ing, i.e., pricing below cost. Predatory pricing is an improper means of
competition and, if you practice it, you may expect to be sued. The statute ex-
pressly proscribed destruction or the attempted destruction of "competition in the
manufacture or sale of a commodity, by selling or offering the same for sale at a
lower price at one place in the state than another.8 78 Colonial and Hardin's "fixed
the price of bread in Jackson at a price lower than their price for the same bread
outside the city limits."87 This is sufficient to make a prima facie case that Dixie
Land was entitled to have submitted to the jury. And proof of intent or purpose is
wholly irrelevant, as well it ought to be.
Dissenting, Justice Roberds disagreed on the facts and chided the court that the
case reflected:
[Niothing but a price-war between private enterprises selling the same commod-
ity- one type of war, at least, of benefit to the public, and one permitted to private
institutions under our supposedly competitive form of free government. And appel-
873. Wagley, 45 So. 2d at 72 1.
874. Id. at 722 (citing Memphis Steam Laundry-Cleaners, Inc. v. Lindsey, 5 So. 2d 227 (Miss. 1941)).
875. Wagley, 45 So. 2d at 722.
876. Id.
877. Id.
878. Id. at 723. See Act now codified as Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-21-3(d) (1991).
879. Wagley, 45 So. 2d at 723.
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lants [Wagley] started the war. It is not the first time in history that the aggressor has
been the loser in the end.880
Of course, price-cutting not sinking to the depths of predatory pricing is a quite
proper means of competition. The dispute between majority and dissenting mem-
bers of the court is thus one of fact and not law.
E. "Off the Wall"Advice May Get You in Trouble
Bailey v. Richards881 is another case concerning the tort of interference with ec-
onomic expectancies, which is best understood and explained by applying objec-
tive or external standards to the conduct of the defendants. Importantly, for the
first time since Wesley in 1910, the defendant's means were not independently tor-
tious or otherwise unlawful.
J. C. Gibson owned a house in Jackson he wanted to sell.882 He was represented
by a broker named Bailey.883 The Burgdorffs were interested in buying the
house.884 It seems a realtor named Millstein first showed the Gibson house to the
Burgdorffs, but at that time they were not interested.88 Thereafter, another real-
tor, Wiley E. Richards, showed the Gibson house to the Burgdorffs, and they
agreed to make a counter offer which was acceptable to Gibson.886 Millstein
learned what was about to happen and claimed a share of the commission, since he
had been the first to show the house to the Burgdorffs.887 Richards did not agree
but offered to escrow the commission so that the sale could take place and he and
Millstein could fight about the commission later.888 Bailey, however, intervened
and apparently convinced Gibson that, if the sale went through in this posture, he,
Gibson, stood the risk of having to pay two commissions.889 It is not clear how this
could have been so if the agreement to escrow the commission had been reached.
In any event, it was clear that Gibson was willing to sell and the Burgdorffs were
willing to buy, and the only thing standing in the way of completing the sale-and
specifically the formation of a contract to sell -was Bailey's insistence that the
commission dispute be worked out first. The sale ultimately fell through and Ri-
chards brought suit against Bailey for tortious interference."'
The opinion leaves much to be desired. Richards was claiming a commission,
presumably to be paid by Gibson, the owner.891 He sued because Bailey interfered
880. Id. at 725 (Roberds, J., dissenting).
881. 111 So. 2d402 (Miss. 1959).
882. Id. at 403.
883. Id.
884. Id.
885. Id. at 404.
886. Id. at 403.
887. Id. at 405.
888. Id. at 404.
889. Id. at 405.
890. Id. at 403.
891. Id.
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with this right to receive a commission from someone.892 His right to a commis-
sion was dependent upon a consummated sale to the Burgdorffs.893 Quoting from
encyclopedic authority, the court referred to the action as one for "[w]rongful or
malicious interference with the formation of a contract." '894 A more accurate label
would have been "tortious interference with [Richards'] prospective economic ad-
vantage"- Richards' commission turned on a sale, not a contract to sell. The jury
having found for Richards and against Bailey in the sum of $3,500.00, the su-
preme court affirmed, saying: "[T]he jury was warranted in believing that...
[Richards] had a reasonable expectation of the contract's being consummated ex-
cept for the influence and interference of. . .[Bailey] and Millstein in thwarting
the consummation thereof."89
The long and short of the matter is that there was never any reasonable basis for
Gibson or Bailey or anyone else believing that Gibson might have to pay a double
commission. Gibson was ready to sell and the Burgdorffs were ready to buy.
There is no suggestion in the opinion of any legitimate reason Bailey may have had
to persuade Gibson that he should not go through with the deal and sign - and per-
form - the contract. The court does not consider whether, as Gibson's broker, Bai-
ley may have had a privilege to offer advice, even bad advice, so long as he
advised in good faith.898 This aside, Bailey definitely interfered with Richards' ec-
onomic expectancy of a commission (presumably from Gibson), and on that fact
the court correctly so held. Bailey would have been liable as well to the Burgdorffs
had they chosen to bring an interference action.
Bailey is a troublesome opinion. The only thing wrongful about Bailey's advice
to Gibson is that it appears to have been just that- it was dead wrong. Perhaps you
could describe Bailey's attitude as wilful or bull-headed, but no profit attends call-
ing it malicious. The best I can do with the case is say, bad advice, as in "off the
wall" bad advice without any rational basis, is by definition advice given in objec-
tive bad faith and, as such, an improper means. When such conduct interferes
with another's prospective economic advantage and causes loss, the offended
party may recover in tort.
E Then There Are "Off the Wall"Decisions
Cenac v. Murry... arises out of a contract for the sale of "a little country store in
McLaurin, Mississippi."898 Carl Wesley Murry and Shirley Ann Murry, sellers,
entered into the contract with Rebecca Cenac, buyer, in June of 1986.899 The
structure of the agreement was a "Contract For Deed," much like a conditional
892. Id.
893. Id.
894. Id. at 407 (quoting 86 C.J.S. Torts § 43, at 955 (1954)).
895. Id. at 406.
896. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 770 (1979).
897. 609 So. 2d 1257 (Miss. 1992).
898. Id. at 1259.
899. Id.
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sales contract, the essence of which was that Cenac would not get a deed to the
property until the entire sales price of $100,000.00 had been paid."' The contract
provided that, if Cenac defaulted, the Murrys would recover the business and
Cenac would forfeit all sums paid.9"' Over the next eighteen months, the Murrys,
and particularly Carl Murry, engaged in a course of harassing behavior that inter-
fered with Cenac's ability to do business out of the store. 902 Cenac brought suit
against the Murrys, charging, inter alia, tortious interference with business rela-
tions or prospective economic advantage and breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing inherent in the contract. 9 3
On the claim for tortious interference, the court considered Mississippi and
secondary authority, and held: "[A] cause of action exists where one engages in
some act with a malicious intent to interfere and injure the business of another, and
injury does in fact result."904 The court then emphasized conventional tort theol-
ogy that the plaintiff must prove a loss and that the defendant's conduct caused the
loss. 90 5 "The remedy for the tort is damages," but surely this is not all.90 ' Indeed,
Cenac is a classic case where the plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief as well,
assuming he/she makes the proper proof.
Cenac is also an appropriate case for making clear that the court's summary
statement of the rule is simply wrong - wrong not in the sense that this is not what
the law ought to be, but because this is not in fact the rule we apply. Courts, like
parents, are watched for what they do, not for what they say. The gravamen of the
action was the improper means of the defendant, Carl Murry, pursuing a course of
harassing treatment which caused economic injury to the plaintiff. It may be that
Murry was, in fact, activated by "a malicious intent"-indeed, if plaintiff is to be
believed, Murry was crazy, but there is nothing in the case suggesting that Cenac
would have any less right to recovery if she simply proved Murry's course of har-
assing behavior without mentioning intent or malice. Nevertheless, the court
plunges forward, holding: "[T]he Cenacs succeeded in showing malicious acts on
the part of Murry, accompanied with a design to interfere and disrupt the business
which they purchased with a motive of re-acquiring the store by forcing the
Cenacs to default. 907 This may well be so, but nothing in the opinion or in any rule
of law I know anything about suggests any necessity for proving all of this window
dressing. It was adequate to prove the acts-the means-and their reasonably
foreseeable effects. This part of the opinion takes a peculiar turn at the end. After
much sound and fury, the court held for the Murrys on the interference claim for
the reason that Cenac never provided "hard proof" that the financial losses claimed
900. Id.
901. Id. at 1260.
902. Id.
903. Id.
904. Id. at 1271.
905. Id.
906. Id.
907. Id. at 1271-72.
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were the product of Murry's conduct."0 8 The court described the Cenacs' causation
proof as "speculation."909
The court then turned to the Cenacs' claim that the contract contained an im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.910 Reiterating Murry's bizarre be-
havior, the court observed: "If the covenant of good faith and fair dealing has no
meaning in this case, it has no meaning in any case." 911 The court then held that:
[Tihe appropriate remedy for the breach of the covenant of good faith is the measure
of expectancy type damages. Each party to a contract has a justified expectation that
the other will act in a reasonable manner, and when one party acts outside of ac-
cepted commercial practices to deprive the other party of the benefit of the contract,
the contract is breached. 9 2
Ignoring the obvious possibility (if not necessity, given the facts) of injunctive re-
lief, the court held that the rescission remedy would be cumbersome and that
"damages are the favored remedy unless damages are wholly inadequate as a rem-
edy." 3 The court forgot that it found Cenac's damages proof legally insufficient
on the claim only a moment earlier, and ended with this startling statement: "Be-
lieving as we do that the wrongs committed by Murry are deserving of a remedy in
this case, we remand. . . for the appropriate determination of damages."914 Con-
ventionally, a plaintiff gets but one chance to prove his damages. If the proof is too
speculative or legally insufficient, the defendant is entitled to judgment, though his
behavior be actionable, although less certainty suffices for the quantum than for
the fact of damage. 9 Not deterred, the court said this plaintiff should have a sec-
ond bite at the apple and went on to provide that on remand the Cenacs could have
another try at proving the same damages it said they had proved inadequately on
the former claim.91 This, of course, makes no sense whatsoever. About the only
sensible point imbedded in Cenac is (the court's bizarre handling of the damages
issue aside), in cases where the parties have dealt with each other, there is and
should be no essential difference in this context between the claim for interference
with prospective economic advantage and the claim for breach of the implied cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing, save the formalpoint that a party may only
breach, not interfere with, his own contract.
908. Id. at 1274.
909. Id. at 1272.
910. Id. at 1273.
911. Id.
912. Id.
913. Id. at 1274.
914. Id.
915. See, e.g., Merritt v. Dueitt, 455 So. 2d 792, 793 (Miss. 1984); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Com-
mercial Union Ins. Co., 394 So. 2d 890, 895 (Miss. 1981).
916. Cenac, 609 So. 2dat 1274.
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G. The Residual Tort in a More Commercial Setting
Nichols v. Tri-State Brick & Tile Co.917 makes the same point. It arises from a
three-party business transaction. In April of 1984, Pan-Brick, Inc., the holder of
patents covering a system for manufacturing panels used to provide exterior siding
for residential and commercial buildings, entered into a licensing agreement with
Enertec, making Enertec its sole licensee." 8 The agreement authorized Enertec to
manufacture and sell the panels in a number of Deep South states.919 In May of
1984, Enertec approached Tri-State and the two entered a distributorship and loan
guaranty agreement.92 Tri-State would act as distributor of the panels and guaran-
tee one-half of a $300,000.00 bank loan to Enertec.9 1 On the same date, Tri-State
also entered into an agreement with Pan-Brick essentially providing that, should
Enertec's license be terminated for any reason, Tri-State would have the option to
cure any default and assume operations under the license.922 Tri-State claimed this
was additional security for its guaranty of Enertec's loan.92 3 Insofar as the record
reflected, Tri-State never exercised the option.924 Licensee/Manufacturer Enertec
ultimately failed, took bankruptcy, and its trustee sued Tri-State and Pan-Brick. 25
Enertec's trustee brought a two-count complaint against Tri-State: contractual
interference and fraud, followed by a contractual interference claim against Pan-
Brick.92 6 The circuit court entered summary judgment for Tri-State and Pan-
Brick.927 Enertec's trustee appealed.92 The supreme court reversed.929
The court held the Trustee had made a prima facie showing of tortious interfer-
ence with business relations by presenting evidence that Tri-State had deliberately
withheld timely delivery of brick slices. 9 30 Enertec's trustee submitted an affidavit
by a knowledgeable person that he had personally witnessed and participated in
" 'the telephoning of the brick slice suppliers in other states and instructing them to
with-hold [sic] timely delivery of brick slices to Enertec Southern, Inc.' "931 Un-
917. 608 So. 2d 324 (Miss. 1992).
918. Id. at 326-27.
919. Id. at 326.
920. Id.
921. Id.
922. Id. at 327.
923. Id.
924. Id.





930. Id. at 328-29. En route, and inappropriately, the court recited the Irby formula for tortious interference
with contract. See supra note 731 and accompanying text. Of course, as we have seen, the first element of a cor-
rect articulation of that tort is knowledge of the contract. See page 368; Collins v. Collins, 625 So. 2d 786, 791
(Miss. 1993). By definition, the elements of tortious interference with contract cannot be the same as interfer-
ence with other economic advantage, although the former is an instance of the latter. Other cases making this
same mistake include Protective Service Life Insurance Co. v. Carter, 445 So. 2d 215, 216-17 (Miss. 1983); and
Hardy Brothers Body Shop v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 848 F Supp. 1276, 1291 (S.D. Miss.
1994).
931. Nichols, 608 So 2d at 329.
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der the fraud count, it is suggested that Tri-State represented it would not use its
dominant credit position as a tool to injure Enertec and that Tri-State had prom-
ised it would make a capital investment.932 In any event, for purposes of surviving
summary judgment, the claim was more than established by the evidence that Tri-
State personnel telephoned brick slice suppliers and instructed them to withhold
timely delivery to Enertec.933
What is less clear is whether this is a tort claim for interference with business
relations/prospective economic advantage or whether this may be a breach of
some implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It would certainly seem ar-
guable that the distributorship agreement between Enertec and Tri-State con-
tained such an implied covenant,934 one to the effect that Tri-State would not
attempt to undermine Enertec's manufacture of the siding panels Tri-State was to
distribute. Apparently, Tri-State made a number of representations that Enertec
relied on, all of which makes the claim sound like one for promissory estoppel.
Just why Enertec's trustee would take on the additional burden of proving this
claim by clear and convincing evidence by calling it fraud instead of promissory
estoppel is not clear. The most likely explanation is the familiar explanation: exu-
berance in pleadings on the part of plaintiffs counsel.
The central lesson of this case is that the label/form of action one uses in plead-
ings is not nearly so important as the substance. At its core (and remembering that
the case is only at the summary judgment stage), Tri-State stands for the proposi-
tion that calling up a manufacturer's suppliers and telling them to withhold timely
delivery of needed supplies is an unfair method of competition and, because so, a
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. Moreover, falsely
making a number of representations to a market actor of the sort that one would
reasonably rely on and which are in fact relied on to one's detriment, is actionable
whether one calls it promissory estoppel or fraud.
H. A Step Back and a Bit of an Overview
This survey of cases is less than satisfying. The fact patterns present a crazy
quilt, although this is not surprising when we remember we address a residual
business tort. All business torts disappoint reasonable expectations of prospective
economic advantage in one way or another. All business torts involve unfair busi-
ness practices and focus on "the nature of the conduct and its likely effect[s] .""
Interference torts do no less, though they be on the edge of the field.
Interference with prospective economic advantage (other than the prospective
economic advantage that, in the ordinary course, the plaintiff market actor would
reasonably expect to flow from fair competition, non-deceptive marketing, fair
use of its trade secrets and other trade values, and from existing contracts) is diffi-
932. Id.
933. Id.
934. See Cenac v. Murry, 609 So. 2d 1257, 1272 (Miss. 1992); UHS-Qualicare, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Commu-
nity Hosp., Inc., 525 So. 2d 746, 757 n.8 (Miss. 1987).
935. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1(a) (1995).
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cult to reduce to black letter form. Because there is no contract, the elements of
this residual tort cannot be the same as tortious interference with contract, not-
withstanding the less than perceptive recitations of some judicial authors. We
know that the plaintiff must show "a reasonable probability" that there would have
been an economic advantage but for the defendant's interference. 7 We know fur-
ther that the plaintiff must show the defendant's acts interfered with the plaintiff in
his prospective economic advantage so that, as a proximate result thereof, plaintiff
suffered pecuniary loss. Beyond this, the elements are the same as the restated tort
of interference with contract presented above, to-wit: the plaintiff must show that,
at the time of defendant's acts, it was reasonably foreseeable to one in the defend-
ant's circumstances that his acts would cause such an effect; and that the acts were
done without right or justification.
9 38
This said, it is important to remember that several categories of cases lie outside
the liability loop. An actor having a financial interest in the business of the person
induced may act to protect his interest and is not subject to liability if, in doing so,
he does not employ improper means. 13 Similarly, one who is "charged with re-
sponsibility for the welfare of a third person" such as a guardian or a teacher or a
lawyer may not be held liable when he acts to protect the welfare of that person,
again so long as he does not employ independently wrongful means.940
One who acts to influence the would-be plaintiffs policy in the conduct of his
business by inducing third persons not to trade with the plaintiff is thought to be
acting properly, provided "the actor has an economic interest in the matter" and
the means employed are not independently wrongful nor likely to lead to an unlaw-
ful effect. 941 As Restatement commentary notes, "[a]ll retailers in a community,
whether competitors or not, may have an interest in each other's policy relative to
hours of business. . . . And the employees of one retailer may have an economic
interest in the hours of employment maintained by a competing retailer."942 Pro-
viding truthful information or rational advice within the scope of a request is not
actionable even though it interferes with the performance of a contract or encour-
ages one not to enter a prospective contract, 943 nor may one be held for asserting in
good faith a legally protected interest or who by appropriate means causes the non-
performance of an agreement that is illegal or contrary to public policy.
936. A number of cases addressing the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage cite the ele-
ments of the tort of interference with contract, seemingly without realizing that the fit is less than apt. See, e.g.,
Nichols v. Tri-State Brick & Tile Co., 608 So. 2d 324, 328 (Miss. 1992); Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Carter, 445
So. 2d 215, 216-17 (Miss. 1983); Hardy Bros. Body Shop v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F. Supp.
1276, 1291 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
937. Cockerham v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 23 F.3d 101, 105 (5th Cir. 1994).
938. See supra page 368.
939. Cockerham, 23 F.3d at 106; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 769 (1979).
940. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 770 (1979). But see Bailey v. Richards, I I l So. 2d 402 (Miss. 1959).
941. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 771 (1979). See Southern Bus Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of
St. Elec. Ry. & Motorcoach Employees of Am., 38 So. 2d 765 (Miss. 1949); Southern Christian Leadership
Conference v. A. G. Corp., 241 So. 2d 619 (Miss. 1970).
942. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 771 cmt. d (1979).
943. Id. § 772. See Bailey v. Richards, Ill So. 2d 402 (Miss. 1959).
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These views find expression in the Restatement (Second) of Torts which brings
us back to our core consideration. A market participant may not be held to have
impermissibly interfered with his competitor's prospective economic advantage
so long as his acts, objectively assessed, at least in part advanced his interest in
competing with the other, although competition will not suffice to justify inducing
breach of an existing contract. 944
One of the major policy judgments imbedded in our law is that competition is
beneficial and should be protected. And so the Second Restatement of Torts here
provides:
(1) One who intentionally causes a third person not to enter into a prospective con-
tractual relation with another who is his competitor or not to continue an existing
contract terminable at will does not interfere improperly with the other's relation if
(a) the relation concerns a matter involved in the competition between the actor
and the other and
(b) the actor does not employ wrongful means and
(c) his action does not create or continue an unlawful restraint of trade and
(d) his purpose is at least in part to advance his interest in competing with the
other.
(2) The fact that one is a competitor of another for the business of a third person
does not prevent his causing a breach of an existing contract with the other from be-
ing an improper interference if the contract is not terminable at will.
945
The new Restatement of Unfair Competition says essentially the same, only more
succinctly -and it drops "intentional" and changes "improper" to "unfair," without
change of practical effect, as we have seen.946
These views are the product of a crystallized pattern of decisions over the years
and the many statutes in the field. They reflect that reading of the Mississippi law
of business torts that best fits and justifies the texts in the field. This reading fo-
cuses upon unfair and improper means but falls short of a clear statement of when
they are so. We know means independently tortious or otherwise unlawful meet
the mark, but cases from Temperton v. Russell to Nichols v. Tri-State suggest there
is more. The Restatements offer an approach to assessing these cases at the edge.
The new Restatement proscribes "other acts or practices of the actor determined to
be similarly actionable as an unfair method of competition, taking into account the
nature of the conduct and its likely effect on both the party seeking relief and the
public."947 This is but a condensation of the old Restatement as it urges that we
consider the following factors:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
944. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORrs § 768 (1979).
945. Id. § 768. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § I cmt. a (1995).
946. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (1995).
947. Id. § 1.
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(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the con-
tractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.948
In commentary, the Restatement draftsmen tell us we must determine whether
the interference is improper "through an appraisal of the several factors and an
evaluation of their comparative weight."949 Later we are told the decision "depends
upon a judgment and choice of values in each situation," that the factors are "to be
weighed against each other and balanced in arriving at a judgment."
950
What is clear in the end is that liability at the penumbra depends on the interplay
of a variety of factors which are not reducible to a single rule. Such a form of ex-
pression of the law would be a disaster were it used to cover the core cases, as we
have explained in Part X. A. above. However much the Restatements' "unfair" and
"improper" balancing acts might in theory present the possibility of a just outcome
in individual cases, they wholly ignore the market participant's primary need for
realistic and intelligible rules regulating primary private activity. My reading of
this state's valid legal texts - statutes as well as cases - suggests the Restatement
approaches the mark but is not quite there. It is easy to find support for each of
these seven tort factors, but one stands out when we survey the field as a whole.
The reading that best fits and justifies the texts in the field requires recognition
that our central focus be on the nature of the actor's conduct. The other six serve
but as aids to adjudication in problematic cases.
XII. REMEDIES
A. Aggregation and Multiplication
[A] legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain
things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court; -and so
of a legal right. 91
Holmes penned these words in a famous essay almost a century ago, his thesis
being that a proper study of the law should concentrate upon "what the courts will
do in fact, and nothing more pretentious."5 2 In Holmes' view, talk of rights and
duties and all else ranged from, at best, preliminary considerations to, at worst,
metaphysical nonsense. Shorn of remedy, the legal process is but an academic ex-
ercise. Think how we would think of a lawsuit if, at its end, the trier of fact would
announce the "truth" of what happened and who was in the right and send the par-
ties on their way. Clients do not pay fees to learn about rights but about remedies -
948. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 767 (1979).
949. Id. at cmt. a.
950. Id. at cmts. a, b. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § I cmt. g (1995).
951. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 458 (1897).
952. Id. at 461.
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their own and of those they may offend. The law is ultimately about risks and
remedies.
In the multifarious field of business torts, the law of risks and remedies is
grounded within all of the known legal genera and species. We have seen the
meaning and effect of this feature of the landscape at the stage of primary rules and
the rights they engender. The proper aggregation of law is no less important on the
remedial stage. Rules regulating and providing remedies for deceptive marketing
and trademark infringement, as we have seen, are found in federal law-the
Lanham Act,"5 3 in state statutory law, and in the common law of the several states.
Misappropriation of protected proprietary information may be remedied under
state statutory law, the common law of the state, and under the private law of con-
tracts. As with rules and rights, such a remedial scheme should not be seen as em-
anating from discrete legal compartments, but as the product of the law as an
integrated whole.
The wealth and variety of statutes in the field-federal and state-notwith-
standing, we have seen that the common law actions for unfair competition and
related business torts remain viable.9 4 With few exceptions, the existence of a le-
gal remedy in one sphere in no way precludes other remedies. Multi-count com-
plaints are the order of the day, and appropriately so - until the day we unite all
into a single and comprehensive competitive tort.
Statutory recognitions of this premise abound. For example, the MUTPCPA
provides that "[t]he remedies in this chapter are in addition and not in derogation
of remedies otherwise available under federal, state or local law to the attorney
general, the district or county attorneys, or to persons injured by violations of this
chapter." ' In the Mississippi Trademark Registration Act, we find it provided
that "[t]he enumeration of any right or remedy herein shall not affect a registrant's
right to prosecute under any penal law of this state,"9"6 and thereafter "[n]othing
herein shall adversely affect the rights of [sic] the enforcement of rights in marks
acquired in good faith at any time at common law." '957 This'language takes meaning
from our settled recognition that "[t]here is a common-law property right in a
trade-mark, and, if used or imitated by others, an action will lie."95 '
On the other hand, some statutes do preclude (some) other remedies. For ex-
ample, the Mississippi Uniform Trade Secrets Act provides that "[e]xcept as pro-
vided in subsection (2), this chapter displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary and
other law of this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade se-
953. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(1988).
954. See, e.g., Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark-Ell Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1978); Memphis Steam
Laundry-Cleaners, Inc. v. Lindsey, 5 So. 2d 227 (Miss. 1941). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 766-774A (1979).
955. Miss. CODE ANN.. § 75-24-23 (1991). The Consumer Rental-Purchase Agreement Act is to like effect.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-171(3) (Supp. 1995).
956. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-25-23 (1991).
957. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-25-25 (1991).
958. Correro v. Wright, 47 So. 379, 380 (Miss. 1908). See also Staple Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Federal Staple
Cotton Coop. Ass'n, 162 So. 2d 867, 869 (Miss. 1964).
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cret."9 9 The Act goes on to provide, however, that "[t]his chapter does not affect:
(a) Contractual remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade
secret; (b) Other civil remedies that are not based upon misappropriation of a
trade secret; or (c) Criminal remedies, whether or not based upon misappropria-
tion of a trade secret.
960
The operative general principle to be derived from all of this is, unless other-
wise provided by statute, business tort remedies are cumulative. This is a function
of the fact that law is and ought to be seen as an integrated whole, with differences
in genera and species having importance only when we seek to identify the source
of the power to make changes or when we need consult familiar hierarchical rank-
ings to determine which controls in the event of conflict.9 61 A corollary of this lat-
ter provision is the power of preemption on the part of higher ranking legal genera
and species, an example of which is the provision just quoted from the Mississippi
Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Unless limited or preempted by some higher genera or
species of law, all remedies provided in any genera or species may and properly
should be accumulated.
B. Where to Sue
Given the assortment of business tort remedies available, it should surprise no
one that (most) plaintiffs have more than one courthouse where they may seek sol-
ace. A federal forum is available, of course, where there is complete diversity of
citizenship and where the requisite $50,000.00 jurisdictional amount is at is-
sue.9 6' General federal question jurisdiction is available where (some substantial
part of) the plaintiffs claim arises under federal law.963 Some federal "business
tort" statutes provide their own grant of federal court subject matter jurisdiction.964
And, if there is an independent ground for general or specific federal question ju-
risdiction, state law claims may be brought in a federal action via supplemental ju-
risdiction.96 All of this is familiar enough.
Mississippi's recognition of concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims is now
settled -the state's once fervent hostility to federal sources of law a less than happy
chapter of our (not so distant) past. Indeed, the state forum for litigating federal
claims is becoming increasingly important. 966 With the limited exception of cases
where federal law vests subject matter jurisdiction exclusively in the federal
959. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-26-15(1) (1991).
960. MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-26-15(2) (1991).
961. See Part 111, Robertson, supra note 611, at 45-48.
962. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
963.28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
964. See, e.g., Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988).
965. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988) (formerly known as pendent jurisdiction).
966. See, e.g., Greenville Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 575 So. 2d 956, 959 (Miss.
1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1512 (1992); Burrell v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, 536 So. 2d 848, 863-64
(Miss. 1988); Marx v. Truck Renting & Leasing Ass'n, 520 So. 2d 1333, 1346 (Miss. 1987); Gregory v. Federal
Land Bank, 515 So. 2d 1200, 1203 (Miss. 1987).
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967courts, any federal claim may also be heard and adjudged in the courts of this
state.968 In such cases, the anachronistic division of our trial courts into circuit and
chancery courts is not without its difficulties, and these are worth a pause.
The law has long been well settled that a chancery court has pendent jurisdic-
tion to hear and adjudicate claims at law. In a case exhibiting an independent
ground for equity or chancery jurisdiction adequate to bring the case within chan-
cery court subject matter jurisdiction,96 9 the chancery court is empowered to grant
wholly legal relief. 7
The converse principle-that the circuit court has jurisdiction to hear equity
claims via pendent jurisdiction-is of more recent vintage, appearing first in Hall
v. Corbin. 971 Hall began as a garden variety replevin action. The defendant in re-
plevin and a third-party intervenor sought to assert a possessory interest in the au-
tomobile and, more importantly, a claim for an equitable lien based upon the
plaintiffs alleged fraudulent use of the defendant's funds. 972 The court held that
"where a circuit court has jurisdiction of an action at law, it may hear and adjudi-
cate in that action all claims, including those with an equitable smell, arising out of
the same transaction and occurrence as the principal claim."973 Since Hall, a num-
ber of cases have held a circuit court may hear equity claims and provide equitable
remedies via pendent jurisdiction."'
This pendentjurisdiction principle was reaffirmed and expanded in McDonald's
Corp. v. Robinson Industries, Inc. 971 McDonald's held that a county court, sitting
as a special court of eminent domain, had jurisdiction to try title, a matter tradi-
tionally thought exclusively within the subject matter jurisdiction of chancery
courts.976 In consequence, the Mississippi Supreme Court was soon thereafter in
McDonald v. Holmes97 7 able to state, almost routinely that "[wie have made clear
that our trial courts, chancery and circuit, have full jurisdiction to adjudicate all
967. Patent and copyright claims, arguably business torts, are of exclusive federal competence. See Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234
(1964).
968. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453
U.S. 473 (1981).
969. See Miss. CONST. of 1890, art. VI, § 159; Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-5-81 (1991).
970. See, e.g., Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454, 464 (Miss. 1983); Morgan v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 222 So. 2d 820, 826 (Miss. 1969); Shaw v. Owen, 90 So. 2d 179 (Miss. 1956);
Duvall v. Duvall, 80 So. 2d 752, 755 (Miss. 1955); Burnett v. Bass, 120 So. 456, 457 (Miss. 1929).
971. 478 So. 2d 253, 255 (Miss. 1985).
972. Id. at 254.
973. Id. at 255.
974. Gibson v. Manuel, 534 So. 2d 199,200 n.2 (Miss. 1988) (circuit court could consider motion for prelimi-
nary injunction); see Miss. R. Civ. P. 65; American Elec. v. Singarayar, 530 So. 2d 1319, 1320 n. I (Miss. 1988)
(same); Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So. 2d 332, 337-38 (Miss. 1987) (circuit court could consider claims for
equitable relief); Canton Farm Equip. v. Richardson, 501 So. 2d 1098, 1103 (Miss. 1987) (same).
975. 592 So. 2d 927, 934 (Miss. 1991).
976. Id.
977. 595 So. 2d 434 (Miss. 1992).
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claims in a single action without regard to whether they arise in equity or at
law. ,978
And what of the venerable motion to transfer? Of this, I once opined:
One of the inevitable by-products of our divided trial court system-circuit and
chancery-is that there will be cases that present multiple issues, some legal and
some equitable. While in certain instances there is the power of the one court to
transfer a portion of the matter to the other for hearing. . . that power is exercised as
a matter of convenience and not necessity.
979
In conventional business dispute litigation, often the plaintiff is in need of a
range of remedies- for past wrongs, compensatory damages of one form or an-
other, punitive damages, and, more equitably, prospective injunctive relief (pre-
liminary and permanent), specific performance, restitution, an accounting, a
constructive trust or equitable lien, among others. Traditionally, these cases were
brought in chancery court, the old thinking being that the demand for equitable re-
lief made this the exclusive forum. It seems settled today that the circuit courts
have full jurisdiction over such cases and, pendent to their authority over the
action at law, may grant such equitable relief as may be appropriate.
The practical effects of all of this are twofold: First, whatever court the plaintiff
elects should, in the words of the new Restatement commentary, be "generally free
to select the remedy or combination of remedies that most effectively protects the
interests threatened by the defendant's misconduct."980 Second, the plaintiff has
the election whether he wants a jury trial, and, when the plaintiff has elected,
there is little the defendant can do about it, the constitutional right to trial by
jury981 to the contrary notwithstanding.982 The defendant can always move to
transfer-to circuit court or to chancery court, as the case may be-but, if the mo-
tion is denied, he is stuck.
C. Who Can Sue
We have shown the law of business torts marked by a hodgepodge of federal and
state statutes and case law and historically discrete torts. As one might expect,
these have generated a not dissimilar hodgepodge of public and private remedies.
Public remedies range from criminal fines, civil penalties, injunctions, and, in
some cases, license revocation or suspension. Private remedies include most
prominently prospective injunctive relief-prohibitory and mandatory, prelimi-
nary and permanent - and compensatory damages for past harm and future loss of
profits and other ascertainable pecuniary losses, or at times an accounting for the
978. Id. at 436.
979. Ivy v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 510 So. 2d 520, 528 (Miss. 1987) (Robertson, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
980. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 35 cmt. a (1995).
981. MIss. CONST. of 1890, art. III, § 3 1.
982. Cf McLean v. Green, 352 So. 2d 1312, 1314 (Miss. 1977); Talbot & Higgins Lumber Co. v. McLeod
Lumber Co., 113 So. 433 (Miss. 1927).
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profits of an unjustly enriched defendant or a royalty in lieu of damages measured
by the fair market value of what the defendant has (mis) appropriated.
It is important to recall what we have seen, that most private plaintiffs may fall
into one of two broad but quite different categories: (1) competitors -those who
compete horizontally with or suffer unfair competitive harm at the hands of the
defendant; and (2) consumers and other buyers -those situated vertically in the
chain of distribution who do business with the defendant and are purchasers or
consumers of the defendant's goods or services. Unless otherwise provided by
law,983 those who may bring an action include parties within either group, indeed,
any person harmed, or, in the case of prospective injunctive relief, reasonably
likely to be harmed, as a direct and proximate result of the actionable competitive
conduct of the defendant.
The State Antitrust Act empowers a broad range of parties as potential plain-
tiffs, viz "[a]ny person, natural or artificial, injured or damaged by a trust and
combine as herein defined, or by its effects direct or indirect." 9" 4 Though no other
statute goes so far, all preserve (almost) all remedies otherwise available, as noted
above. The MUTPCPA expressly authorizes a concurrent regime of public and
private enforcement. 85 As we have seen,986 the Act makes actionable at least
eleven general species of "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
trade practices."987 We know from experience that most, if not all, of these prac-
tices harm both competitors and consumers. The very phrase "unfair methods of
competition" connotes bona fide and fair dealing competitors as the parties most
likely to suffer from the proscribed wrongs. This is certainly true in the case of
"disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading
representation of fact," made actionable in section 75-24-5(h).988 Even though the
statute expressly provides private remedies only for consumers, there is no reason
to think competitors, when harmed, are forbidden to sue. Otherwise, the private
enforcement dimension of the law's remedial scheme might founder as "[iun many
instances . . . the cost of obtaining relief may exceed the purchaser's potential
remedy."9 9 After all, the section providing consumers their remedy says that rem-
edy is "[i]n addition to all other statutory and common law rights, remedies and
defenses,"99 and the Act saves all other remedies "available. . . to persons injured
983. For example, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988), has been judicially con-
strued so that only business competitors, direct or indirect, have standing to sue. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill, Ltd.
v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F2d 232 (2d Cir. 1974). The new RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
addresses only "potential liability for harm" between and among competitors and is "not intended to be applicable
to disputes between buyers and sellers." Statement of Professor Robert C. Denicola Before the 1988 Annual
Meeting of the ALI (May 20, 1988), supra note 25, at 461.
984. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-21-9 (1991).
985. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-9 to -21 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
986. See Part VI, Robertson, supra note 611, at 81-95.
987. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(2) (Supp. 1994).
988. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(h) (1991 & Supp. 1994).
989. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2 cmt. a (1995).
990. MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(1) (1991 & Supp. 1994).
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by violations of this chapter."991 The common law has long given the injured com-
petitor a remedy,992 and the statute, enacted in 1974, is best seen as augmenting
what was already there.
In the end, of course, whether as a practical matter a plaintiff within either cat-
egory may mount a successful claim is a function of his ability to prove that his
losses, economic and otherwise, have been, or, are likely to be, substantially
proximately caused by defendant's actionable conduct (and not by other forces-
economic or otherwise -for which defendant is not responsible).
D. Whom to Sue
Often there is more than one legally viable defendant. In Mid-Continent Tele-
phone Corp. v. Home Telephone Co. ," plaintiff sued in tort, charging that the de-
fendant had interfered with plaintiffs existing contract.994 The court held that the
(theoretical) possibility of recovering damages against the breaching party did not
affect plaintiffs right to damages from the interfering defendant, apparently in rec-
ognition of the separate right interfered with -the right to have one's contracts se-
cure from improper interference.99 "That the injured party also has a right of
action for damages ex contractu against the party who breached the contract is not
a defense to the interference action."' Of course, no plaintiff may be made whole
but once.
E. Private Plaintiff Entitlement to Injunctive Remedy
1. Permanent Injunctive Relief
It is widely accepted that private parties suing on common law business torts
may seek injunctive relief.997 This is so notwithstanding that the traditional tort
remedy has been one for compensatory damages. Many statutes say the same
thing. Section 34 of the Lanham Act998 authorizes courts to grant injunctions "ac-
cording to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem rea-
sonable" to prevent deceptive trade practices, including, but by no means limited
to, infringement of marks registered under the Act and infringement of unregis-
tered marks."' The Mississippi Trademark Registration Act provides that "any
court of competent jurisdiction may grant injunctions to restrain such manufac-
ture, use, display or sale as may be by the said court deemed just and reason-
991. MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-23 (1991).
992. See, e.g., Memphis Steam Laundry-Cleaners, Inc. v. Lindsey, 5 So. 2d 227 (Miss. 1941), discussed in
Part IV, Robertson, supra note 611, at 50-56.
993. 319 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
994. Id. at 1187.
995. Id. at 1200.
996. Id.
997. See, e.g., Staple Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Federal Staple Cotton Coop. Ass'n, 162 So. 2d 867 (Miss. 1964);
Cotton's Holsum Bakers, Inc. v. Smith's Bakery, Inc., 130 So. 2d 570 (Miss. 1961); Correro v. Wright, 47 So.
379, 380 (Miss. 1908).
998. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(1988).
999. Id.
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able.""1 "0 Other examples of statutory authorizations of a private right to pursue
injunctive relief for business torts may be found in the Mississippi Uniform Trade
Secrets Act,"°01 and the Unfair Cigarette Sales Act.1002
The new Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition proclaims injunctive relief
as the preferred remedy in deceptive trade practice cases. 003 In anticipation of ob-
jection on grounds the equitable remedy of an injunction should be available only
where the remedy of damages is found inadequate, this convincing explanation is
offered:
In unfair competition cases, the wrong is ordinarily not a single event but a course of
business conduct, and the plaintiff is thus subjected to continuing harm. Frequently,
the harm is not reparable by an action for monetary relief because of the difficulty of
proving the amount of loss and the causal connection with the defendant's wrongful
conduct. See Section 36. Thus, the judicial preference for injunctive relief in unfair
competition cases is not an exception to ordinary remedial principles, but rather an
application of those principles in a context in which injunctive relief is generally the
most appropriate remedy. 004
As noted above, the new Restatement offers a flexible realistic rendering of
what a plaintiff must prove to get his injunction, viz the plaintiff must show only
that the representation is likely to deceive or mislead prospective purchasers to the
likely commercial detriment of another; proof of actual deception or actual harm is
not required. See § 3, Comment e. Thus, injunctive relief may be awarded even
though the fact or extent of harm to the party seeking relief is uncertain.
10 0 5
The Restatement commentators go on to observe that "[s]uch a remedy does not
afford a windfall to the plaintiff and furthers the public interest in preserving the
integrity of the marketplace.
Although injunctive relief is the remedy of choice in deceptive marketing and
trademark infringement cases, it remains subject to equitable principles, and the
court is free to balance the interests of the parties in light of the circumstances of
the case. The Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth the factors relating to the
appropriateness of injunctions in tort actions generally.00 7 The new Restatement
addresses the point in unfair competition cases and provides:
(2) The appropriateness and scope of injunctive relief depend upon a compara-
tive appraisal of all the factors of the case, including the following primary factors:
(a) the nature of the interest to be protected;
1000. MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-25-23 (1991).
1001. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-26-5 (1991).
1002. MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-23-23(a) (1991).
1003. RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 35 (1995).
1004. Id. § 35 cmt. a.
1005. Id. § 2 cmt. h, § 3 cmt. e.
1006. Id. §2 cmt. h.
1007. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 936 (1979).
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(b)the nature and extent of the appropriation;
(c) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of an injunction and of other reme-
dies;
(d)the relative harm likely to result to the legitimate interests of the defend-
ant if an injunction is granted and to the legitimate interests of the plaintiff if an
injunction is denied;
(e) the interests of third persons and of the public;
(f) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit or asserting its
rights;
(g)any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff; and
(h)the practicality of framing and enforcing the injunction. 008
Put otherwise, an injunction is like a suit of clothes. It should be fashioned to fit
the facts in need of coverage.""
All of this is easy enough to state in the abstract. 1 '0 Precisely what quantity and
form of injunctive relief should be ordered in a given case may be quite another
matter. For instance, a former employee may not "use, disclose or impinge upon
any of the secret processes or business secrets of his former employer."' " From
this it may seem to follow that, where a former employee offends this rule, the
former employer is entitled to injunctive relief. Mississippi law follows theory and
holds this is so, but that the injunction may not run in perpetuity: "[T]he former
employer is entitled to injunctive relief for no longer period than it would take the
former employee to secure the same information or same position by independent
means, and without resort to the trade secret."0 12 This view now enjoys the rein-
forcement of legislative acceptance by reason of the enactment in 1990 of the Mis-
sissippi Uniform Trade Secrets Act,1"1" which expresses the general rule with
slightly different language:0 14 "[A]n injunction shall be terminated when the trade
secret has ceased to exist, but the injunction may be continued for an additional
reasonable period of time in order to eliminate commercial advantage that other-
wise would be deprived from the misappropriation."1 1 The trick, of course, is to
find a Herculean judge'01 6 with the ability to translate this theoretically unassaila-
1008. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 44 (1995).
1009. In cases of appropriation of trade secrets and other trade values, the new Restatement provides that
courts should consider the above factors and, as well, "the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of an injunction and
of other remedies." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 44(2)(c) (1995).
1010. As surely by now we all see, balancing tests like the above are at best hortatory and at worst masques for
lawlessness. See Robertson, supra note 774, at 147. Compare discussion supra Part XI.
1011. 2 CALLMANN, supra note 496, § 54.2(a), at 416.
1012. Planhouse, Inc. v. Breland & Farmer Designers, Inc., 412 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (Miss. 1982).
1013. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-26-5(1) (1991).
1014. The new Restatement phrases it this way: "The duration of injunctive relief in trade secret actions should
be limited to the time necessary to protect the plaintiff from any harm attributable to the appropriation and to
deprive the defendant of any economic advantage attributable to the appropriation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 44(3) (1995).
1015. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-26-5(1) (1991).
1016. 1 refer again to Ronald Dworkin's mythical Judge Hercules. See RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
239, 245 (1985); RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-30 (1977).
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ble, but hopelessly unrealizable rule, into a judicial decree the parties can under-
stand and conform to.
The general law of injunctions forms an important backdrop here and should
always be consulted. 1017 For example, one important factor in deciding whether an
injunction should issue concerns the likelihood of defendant's continued miscon-
duct without it. If repetition of the wrongdoing is likely, an injunction will issue
even if the defendant acted in good faith and has ceased his wrongful conduct and
no actual harm to plaintiff has been shown." 18 Beyond this, an injunction must
fairly inform the enjoined party what he must do or is prohibited from doing, and
this must appear in the body of the order of the court and not by way of reference to
the pleadings or other extraneous matter. 1019
A note of caution. The constitutional guarantees of free speech play a modest
but real role in the area of commercial speech,1020 though the final contours of that
role are hardly free from doubt.1021 Courts otherwise wholly inclined to enjoin fu-
ture speech, e.g., in cases of commercial disparagement or false advertising, or
the like, will carefully tailor their orders that First Amendment values may be se-
cure. 1022 For the moment, it is safe to say market participants have no protected
interest in commercially deceptive or confusing speech. Commercial speech may
be regulated or, if otherwise appropriate, enjoined when its contents are false, de-
ceptive, or misleading.0 23 There is an economic dimension here as well. Interfer-
ence in the communication of non-deceptive commercial speech generates
anticompetitive consequences."" Constitutional interpretation here ought and
does mirror economic imperative.
2. Preliminary Injunctive Relief
One important subissue here concerns the availability of preliminary injunctive
relief. Given the general state of court dockets and the amount of time it takes for
parties to complete pretrial processes in business tort cases of even average com-
plexity, a permanent injunction at the end of the case may be as effective as closing
1017. See GEORGE D. WARNER, JR., WARNER'S GRIFFITH MISSISSIPPI CHANCERY PRACTICE §§ 433-65 (rev. ed.
1991); see also Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REv. 994 (1965).
1018. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 35 cmt. b (1995).
1019. See, e.g., Hall v. Wood, 443 So. 2d 834, 841 (Miss. 1983); Southwest Starving Artists Group, Inc. v.
State ex rel. Summer, 364 So. 2d 1128, 1131 (Miss. 1978).
1020. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bi-
gelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
1021. See, most recently, City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
1022. See GEORGE J. ALEXANDER, COMMERCIAL TORTS § 5.1 (2d ed. 1988); Developments in the Law- Compet-
itive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888,903-04 (1964); seealso Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Inc. v. A.
G. Corp., 241 So. 2d 619 (Miss. 1970); Southern Bus Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees, 38
So. 2d 765 (Miss. 1949).
1023. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); Transgo, Inc. v.
Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1022 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986); RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 35 cmt. c (1995).
1024. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2 cmt. a (1995).
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the gate after the horse is long gone. Preliminary injunctive relief, according to Re-
statement commentary, is an essential weapon in the law's remedial arsenal."102
Procedurally, of course, requests for preliminary relief are controlled by
rules. 10 26 Where the application is made in a court of the State of Mississippi, the
matter is addressed
to the Chancery Court's 110 271 sound discretion. Following other jurisdictions, we
have accepted that the court considering such an application must weigh and balance
an assortment of equities110 281 and, in the end, make at least four findings, to-wit:
(1) There exists a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the mer-
its;
(2) The injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable injury;
(3) Threatened injury to the plaintiffs outweighs the harm an injunction
might do to the defendants; and
(4) Entry of a preliminary injunction is consistent with the public interest.
1 29
Federal courts act on like criteria.'0 "0
In trade secret (mis)appropriation cases, we have statutory authority for pre-
liminary relief:
[A] court shall preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable means,
which may include granting protective orders in connection with discovery proceed-
ings, holding in-camera hearings, sealing the records of the action and ordering any
person involved in the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade secret without prior
court approval. 03
E Unenforceable Contracts
A further remedy in business tort cases is that the contract or agreement be de-
clared void or unenforceable. For example, the State Antitrust Law provides that
1025. Id. § 35 cmt. h.
1026. FED. R. Civ. P. 65; Miss. R. Civ. P. 65.
1027. Business tort actions often involve claims for both legal and equitable remedies-damages for past inju-
ries and an injunction to prevent future injuries. Such a suit may be brought in circuit or chancery court at the
plaintiffs election.
1028. Judge Richard A. Posner has refined this balancing test as an algebraic formula in American Hospital
Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products, Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986) (cited and discussed briefly in Amer-
ican Electric v. Singarayar, 530 So. 2d 1319, 1324 (Miss. 1988)). I recommend the American Hospital Supply
opinion to those who enjoy thought experiments, and, as well, the critical commentary in Linda S. Mullenix,
Burying (With Kindness) The Felicific Calculus of Civil Procedure, 40 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1987).
1029. Durant v. Humphreys County Memorial Hosp., 587 So. 2d 244, 250 (Miss. 1991) (citation omitted).
On the question whether an interlocutory appeal may follow the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction in
business tort cases brought in state courts, see and compare American Electric v. Singarayar, 530 So. 2d 1319
(Miss. 1988), and American Tobacco Co. v. Evans, 508 So. 2d 1057 (Miss. 1987).
1030. See, e.g., Barnes v. Moore, 970 F2d 12, 13 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992);
Quality Inns Int'l v. Patel, 622 F. Supp. 826, 828-29 (S.D. Miss. 1985); Middleton Mfg. Co. v. Super Sagless
Corp., 382 F. Supp. 979, 982-83 (N.D. Miss. 1974), affd, 515 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1972).
1031. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-26-11 (1991). American Tobacco Co. v. Evans, 508 So. 2d 1057 (Miss. 1987),
is to like effect, albeit in a different context.
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contracts or agreements pursuant to any trust or combine made illegal by the Act
"[are] void, and cannot be enforced in any court."1"32 The Unfair Cigarette Sales
Law contains a similar proviso to the effect that any contract, express or implied,
made by any person in violation of the Act "is illegal and void and no recovery
shall be had thereon."" 33 The law regarding unfair competition in the sales of
books, magazines, and other printed matter provides expressly, in addition to
other remedies, that "the said contract or agreement shall be deemed void and
cannot be enforced in any court."'1034 With respect to other business torts, the fa-
miliar rule that prohibits enforcement of contracts against public policy comes into
play.
G. Compensatory Damages
The traditional tort remedy has always been actual, compensatory damages.
Indeed, "[w]hoever heard of a tort where the plaintiff was not entitled to recover
such damages as he may prove caused by defendant's tortious conduct?"' 0 35 The
problem has been finding a formula for assessing damages that is at once sound in
theory and viable in practice.
It is worth noting that in years past the common law has pursued a niggardly
approach to proof of such damages. In commercial disparagement cases, for exam-
ple, plaintiffs were expected to make proof of the persons who had refused to trade
because of the disparagement.0 3 6 Of late, this view seems on the wane. Mid-Con-
tinent Telephone Corp. v. Home Telephone Co. 10 37 recognized the right of recovery
of consequential damages in an interference-with-contractual-relations case.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes a broader remedy in interference
cases:
(1) One who is liable to another for interference with a contract or prospective con-
tractual relation is liable for damages for
(a) the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or the prospective rela-
tion;
(b)consequential losses for which the interference is a legal cause; and
(c) emotional distress or actual harm to reputation, if they are reasonably to
be expected to result from the interference. 038
The Restatement then recognizes the principle noted at the end of Part XII.D
above:
(2) In an action for interference with a contract by inducing or causing a third party
1032. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-21-11 (1991).
1033. Id. § 75-23-17.
1034. Id. § 75-23-53.
1035. Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Moss, 513 So. 2d 927, 931 (Miss. 1987) (Robertson, J., concurring).
1036. See, e.g., Tobias v. Harland, 4 Wend. 537 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830); Shaw Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Des
Moines Dress Club, 245 N.W. 231 (Iowa 1932).
1037.319 F. Supp. 1176, 1200 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
1038. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A(1) (1979).
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to break the contract with the other, the fact that the third person is liable for the
breach does not affect the amount of damages awardable against the actor; but any
damages in fact paid by the third person will reduce the damages actually recover-
able on the judgment. 
1039
The new Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition recognizes a broad and
flexible judicial attitude toward claims for compensatory damages in trademark
and trade name infringement and other deceptive marketing cases:
(2) The pecuniary loss for which damages may be recovered. . . includes:
(a) loss resulting to the plaintiff from sales or other revenues lost because of
the actor's conduct;
(b)loss resulting from sales made by the plaintiff at prices that have been
reasonably reduced because of the actor's conduct;
(c) harm to the market reputation of the plaintiffs goods, services, busi-
ness, or trademark; and
(d) reasonable expenditures made by the plaintiff in order to prevent, cor-
rect, or mitigate the confusion or deception of prospective purchasers result-
ing from the actor's conduct. 
1040
The right to recover such damages is not automatic. Here it is important to re-
member that the tail once wagged the dog, and, because of the necessity of an
equitable remedy, business tort actions were once brought almost exclusively in
courts of equity, and the substantive law of remedies developed there. True, those
courts heard and adjudged plaintiffs claim for damages but brought to bear their
usual discretionary flair, in consequence of all of which the new Restatement sets
forth a series of factors the court should consider before awarding damages in de-
ceptive marketing and trademark infringement cases:
(3) Whether an award of damages for pecuniary loss is appropriate depends upon
a comparative appraisal of all the factors of the case, including the following primary
factors:
(a) the degree of certainty with which the plaintiff has established the fact
and extent of pecuniary loss caused by the actor's conduct;
(b)the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of other remedies, including an ac-
counting of the actor's profits;
(c)the intent of the actor and the extent to which the actor knew or should
have known that the conduct was unlawful;
(d)the role of the actor in bringing about the infringement or deceptive
marketing;
(e) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit or otherwise as-
serting its rights; and
(f) any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff.
10 41
1039. Id. § 774A(2).
1040. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36(2) (1995).
1041. Id. § 36(3).
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In cases of appropriation of trade secrets or other trade values, the new Restate-
ment employs similar factors and adds "the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of
other remedies. "1042
Assuming damages are to be allowed, plaintiffs loss of profits is the place to
begin. Proof of loss of profits proceeds by the same legal process whether the
claim sounds in tort or contract.10 43 It is a truism that, to be recoverable, loss-of-
profits damages must be shown with reasonable certainty. Conversely, the law
precludes recovery of lost profits left to guesswork, speculation, or conjecture.' 4
In understanding this truism, we must remember the law tolerates much more im-
precision in quantum of damage than in the fact of its occurrence or its cause. Un-
certainty will more likely prove fatal when it goes to the fact of damage and its
source, but not to its amount. 1
045
Proof of loss of past profits is tough enough. In Lovett v. E.L. Garner, Inc. 1046
the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized that
[i]n Mississippi, one may recover for loss of future profits in a breach of contract
action as long as such profits are proved with reasonable certainty, not based on
speculation or conjecture. . . . In calculating loss of future profits, such loss is that
of net profits as opposed to gross profits. 10 471 To ascertain net profits, a party must
deduct such items as overhead depreciation, taxes and inflation.10 481 Further, future
profits should always be discounted at an appropriate rate to arrive at present
value. 110 491 And, finally, the plaintiff must mitigate damages if he is able to do
so. 
1 05 01
There are no guidelines set in stone specifying the degree of certainty that we re-
quire of parties in proving loss of future profits. Indeed, the degree of proof required
usually depends on the particular facts of the case.110 5 11 One guideline frequently
recognized by this Court is a party's proof of its past profits.
0 52
The court went on to note that "[v]ariables such as inflation, market availability,
etc. [should be] considered in the damages calculation. The future profits ...
,,'053[must be] discounted to present value ....
1042. Id. § 45(2)(c). As nice as all of this sounds, I remain skeptical whether such balancing tests carry us far
toward principled and consistent adjudications.
1043. Cook Indus., Inc. v. Carlson, 334 F. Supp. 809, 817 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
1044. See, e.g., Mid-Continent Tel. Corp. v. Home Tel. Co., 319 F. Supp. 1176, 1200 (N.D. Miss. 1970);
Lovett v. E.L. Garner, Inc., 511 So. 2d 1346, 1352-53 (Miss. 1987).
1045. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Hutchinson, 159 So. 862, 863 (Miss. 1935); Delta Table & Chair Co. v.
Yazoo & M.V.R. Co., 63 So. 272, 273 (Miss. 1913).
1046. 511 So. 2d 1346 (Miss. 1987).
1047. See ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFIT § 6.1 (3d ed. 1987). See also Cook In-
dus., Inc. v. Carlson, 334 F. Supp. 809, 816 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
1048. DUNN, supra note 1047, at §§ 6.4-6.9.
1049. Id. § 6.14.
1050. Id. § 6.19.
1051. See Note, The Requirement of Certainty in the Proof of Lost Profits, 64 HARV. L. REv. 317, 319 (1950).
1052. Lovett v. E.L. Garner, Inc., 511 So. 2d 1346, 1353 (Miss. 1987) (citations omitted). See also Sanders v.
Dantzler, 375 So. 2d 774, 777 (Miss. 1979).
1053. Lovett, 511 So. 2d 1353.
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In Cenac v. Murry," 4 the court held:
[T]he appropriate remedy for the breach of the covenant of good faith is the measure
of expectancy type damages. Each party to a contract has a justified expectation that
the other will act in a reasonable manner, and when one party acts outside of ac-
cepted commercial practices to deprive the other party of the benefit of the contract,
the contract is breached.
1055
The court held that the recission remedy would be cumbersome and that "damages
are the favored remedy unless damages are wholly inadequate as a remedy.
10 56
Statutory business torts also commonly authorize injured parties on proper
proof to recover compensatory monetary damages. Although seldom used, be-
cause of the more generous federal civil remedies, the State Antitrust Act provides
a plaintiff "may recover all damages . . . sustained by him." 1057 The MUTPCPA
authorizes recovery of "any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or per-
sonal." 105 ' The Mississippi Trademark Registration Act provides the owner of a
registered mark may recover "all profits derived from and/or all damages suffered
by reason of such wrongful manufacture, use, display or sale."10 59 The Mississippi
Uniform Trade Secrets Act authorizes recovery of damages for misappropriation
of trade secrets and defines damages to "include. . .the actual loss caused by mis-
appropriation.'1060
Planhouse, Inc. v. Breland & Farmer Designers, Inc. ,1061 noted above, presents
another difficult dimension regarding the measure of damages. A corporation's
former shareholder/employee, during the course of his connection with the corpo-
ration, secretly copied seventy-four sets of house plans the corporation used in
conducting its business of "designing and drafting house plans."10 62 After separa-
tion from the corporation, the former employee opened a competing business and
used the secretly copied plans and admitted he profited therefrom to the tune of
some $21,503.95.1063 The problem lay in the fact that the law allowed the former
employee to reproduce the plans by independent means, even if this meant draw-
ing upon his general knowledge, experience, memory and skill, howsoever
gained.1064 Mirroring the view it took of the shape of injunctive relief noted above,
the court held that "damages should have been fixed at the amount of profits made
by Hughes (Planhouse) from the sale of the reproduced copies for the reasonable
length of time that it would have taken him to have reproduced the plans by inde-
1054. 609 So. 2d 1257 (Miss. 1992).
1055. Id. at 1273.
1056. Id. at 1274.
1057. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-21-9 (1991).
1058. Id. § 75-24-15 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
1059. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-25-23 (1991).
1060. MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-26-7(l) (1991).
1061. 412 So. 2d 1164 (Miss. 1982).
1062. Id. at 1165.
1063. Id. at 1166.
1064. Id. at 1167.
[Vol. 15:331
THE LA W OF BUSINESS TORTS
pendent means, which he had a right to do. '065 In theory, again, the court is
clearly correct. Few judges, however, have the computers or the competence to
make such computations.
Candebat v. Flanagan,1"06 discussed above, presented a measure-of-damages
problem in the context of a right of publicity case, an action for appropriation of
another's identity for commercial value. The court saw plaintiffs claim two-
pronged, for "1. [t]he intentional intrusion upon the solitude or seclusion of an-
other; [and] 2. [t]he appropriation of another's identity for an unpermitted
use."1067 Accepting that some see it otherwise, the Mississippi Supreme Court re-
jected the idea that commercial misappropriation was all that was involved:
The injury to the plaintiffs feelings may very well be the more serious of the two in
many instances; often an intrusion which is of very little commercial consequence
can nonetheless cause serious emotional distress. The law should protect both the
proprietary and emotional interests; it should not focus with tunnel vision on the
property-related characteristics of the tort.
10 68
H. Unjust Enrichment/Accounting for Defendant's Profits
The damages remedy in a business tort context has always been problematic,
and the principal reason this has been so is the difficulty in isolating and proving
with any reasonable level of confidence the harm defendant has caused.06" "In a
competitive market, proof of loss resulting from the wrongful conduct of a partic-
ular competitor is often difficult. The plaintiffs sales are subject to a variety of
forces, including business cycles, shifts in consumer demand, and the legitimate
marketing strategies of competitors." 70 This is one reason for the preference of
the equitable remedy of injunction. Another equitable remedy the courts have or-
dered proceeds on an unjust enrichment theory and pursues an accounting of the
defendant's profits and thereafter restitution. 1071
Against this backdrop, we note the Mississippi Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
which authorizes recovery of damages and defines damages, as including "both the
actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by mis-
appropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss. '"1"72 The new
Restatement recognizes an accounting for the defendant's net profits as another
1065. Id. at 1168.
1066. 487 So. 2d 207 (Miss. 1986).
1067. Id. at 209.
1068. Id. at 212.
1069. In the related context of copyright infringement, the courts have seen that a rule of liability which merely
takes away the profits from an infringement would offer little discouragement to an infringer. Jobete Music Co. v.
Hampton, 864 F. Supp. 7, 10 (S.D. Miss. 1994). Within statutory limits, the courts may enhance damage awards
"to sanction and vindicate the statutory policy." Id.
1070. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 cmt. b (1995).
1071. Restitution to prevent unjust enrichment is distinguished from damages in that the measure of recovery
for the former is defendant's gained profits and for the latter is plaintiffs lost profits. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES 224 (2d ed. 1993).
1072. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-26-7(1) (1991).
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remedy the court may consider in infringement and other deceptive marketing
cases. 1073 On principle it should be available as well in the case of other business
torts. The idea is that, upon proper proof, the court may order transferred to the
plaintiff "the gains resulting to the defendant from the wrongful conduct."'1 74 The
remedy rests on the underlying assumption that "the profits earned by the defend-
ant represented profits diverted from the plaintiff."10 75 The accounting remedy is
thus seen "as a surrogate for plaintiffs lost profits."" 76 Historically, the remedy
has been reserved for cases of intentional misconduct. Obviously, the court must
be alert that the plaintiff has no double recovery.
The remedy is otherwise problematic since upon a showing of defendant's gross
sales the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the proportion of sales not attribut-
able to the infringement and the costs properly deductible from gross revenue to
establish the net profit for which the defendant is accountable. 1077 However, the de-
fendant's profits may bear only a slight relationship to the loss actually sustained
by the plaintiff, and an accounting can therefore produce a potential windfall to the
plaintiff and a substantial penalty to the defendant.
10 78
These things said, and assuming no law prohibits the accounting remedy, the
new Restatement recognizes the power of the court to award "the net profits
earned on profitable transactions resulting from the intentional unlawful con-
duct." 0 7 a The Restatement then provides:
(2) Whether an award of profits is appropriate depends upon a comparative ap-
praisal of all the factors of the case, including the following primary factors:
(a) the degree of certainty that the actor benefitted from the unlawful con-
duct;
(b)the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of other remedies, including an
award of damages;
(c) the interests of the public in depriving the actor of unjust gains and dis-
couraging unlawful conduct;
(d)the role of the actor in bringing about the infringement or deceptive
marketing;
(e) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit or otherwise as-
serting its rights; and
(f) any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff.
10 8
This view has precedent in this state's jurisprudence. In Richardson v.
ThomasI0 81 the trial court had held the seller of a business prohibited from using a
1073. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 37 (1995).
1074. Id. § 37 cmt. a.
1075. Id. § 37 cmt. b.
1076. Id.
1077. Id. § 37.
1078. Id. § 36 cmt. b.
1079. Id. § 37(1).
1080. Id. § 37(2).
1081. 257 So. 2d 877 (Miss. 1972).
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trade name previously associated with the business and ordered the infringing
seller to pay the buyer the seller's "actual profits made by the [seller] as a result of
the illegal use of the trade name previously used by the [seller] or he was entitled to
his loss of sales resulting from the illegal trade practice on the part of [seller] .,"o82
The award -some $3,500.00-representing profits lost by the plaintiff because of
the defendant's unfair competition-was sustained, plus an additional $1,000.00
for impairment of goodwill, and $500.00 in general damages for inconvenience
and annoyance. 1083 What is important for present purposes is the Mississippi Su-
preme Court's suggestion that restitution for unjust enrichment could have been
allowed as an alternative to loss-of-profits damages:
The plaintiff, appellee, was entitled to his actual profits made by the appellant as a
result of the illegal use of the trade name previously used by the appellee or he was
entitled to his loss of sales resulting from the illegal trade practice on the part of ap-
pellant. 1
084
Of course, since the plaintiff sought damages in lieu of restitution, the latter rem-
edy was not discussed.
I. Royalty in Lieu of Damages
A further form of monetary relief in business tort litigation is royalty in lieu of
damages. We begin with the Mississippi Uniform Trade Secrets Act which, in rel-
evant part, provides: "In lieu of damages measured by any other methods, the
damages caused by misappropriation may be measured by imposition of liability
for a reasonable royalty for a misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a
trade secret. "1085 Royalty in lieu of damages implicitly accepts the premise that
trade secrets are property, 08 6 the royalty being a reasonable payment for the use of
one's property.
The new Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition picks up the royalty con-
cept and elaborates. The Restatement emphasizes that a royalty in lieu of damages
is one of four methods of computing an award of monetary relief. This alternative
is provided by reason of the difficulty of computing with any level of accuracy the
plaintiffs loss and/or the defendant's unjust enrichment. A comment explains how
the royalty should be measured:
A reasonable royalty is the price that would have be agreed upon by a willing buyer
and a willing seller for the use made of the trade secret by the defendant. The method
1082. Id. at 881.
1083. Although plaintiff sought 20% of the $35,000.00 gross decline in business, the court thought that only
10% of the gross decline was caused by the infringing use and that the additional decline was the result of defend-
ant's fairly selling a competing product. Id.
1084. Id.
1085. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-26-7(l) (1991).
1086. See Rice Researchers, Inc. v. Hiter, 512 So. 2d 1259, 1268 (Miss. 1987); American Tobacco Co. v.
Evans, 508 So. 2d 1057, 1059-60 (Miss. 1987); Planhouse, Inc. v. Breland & Farmer Designers, Inc., 412 So.
2d 1164, 1166 (Miss. 1982).
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is not limited to a percentage of the defendant's sales or profits and may instead rely
on any appropriate measure of the fair market value of the defendant's use.
0 87
Restatement commentary continues to identify three situations in which a reason-
able royalty may be the proper measure of monetary relief:
[(1)], when the defendant has made a substantial good faith investment in the trade
secret prior to receiving notice of the plaintiffs claim . . . [(2)], when the plaintiffs
loss, although difficult to measure, is apparently greater than any gain acquired by
the defendant. . . . [and (3)], in cases in which the defendant's gain from the trade
secret is difficult to measure but apparently exceeds the plaintiffs loss.
10 88
In cases of the defendant's appropriation of the commercial value of another's
identity, a reasonable royalty may also be the appropriate measure of damages.
"Among the evidence relevant in determining the value of the use are the manner
in which the defendant has exploited the plaintiffs identity, the relative fame of the
plaintiff, and the price the plaintiff has received in the past for similar uses in the
past."10 89 The royalty remedy is not available only to the famous. Private persons,
who are in no sense public figures, may also find this an appropriate measure of
recovery. "Private persons may also recover damages measured by the value of the
use by establishing the market price that the defendant would have been required
to pay in order to secure similar services from other private persons or from pro-
fessional models."'0 90
There are no Mississippi cases on this point.
J. Punitive or Exemplary Damages
Punitive damages are among the more controversial remedies on today's legal
landscape. 0 " Without question, they may (as distinguished from "should") be
awarded in (most) business tort cases.0 92 This general view may be traced to
Memphis Steam Laundry,1093 decided half a century ago. That case presented a
common law action for unfair competition. The court found that the evidence sup-
ported the charge of malicious' 94 interference with the plaintiffs trade or calling
and "some actual damages" flowing therefrom and thereupon affirmed an award
1087. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 cmt. d (1995); see also id. at cmt. g.
1088. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 cmt. g (1995).
1089. Id. § 49 cmt. d.
1090. Id.
1091. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Re-
sources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993); see also the legislative and political history leading to the enactment of
H.R. 1270, Reg. Sess. (1993), now codified as Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65 (Supp. 1994).
1092. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 cmt. n, § 45 cmt. i, § 49 cmt. e (1995).
1093. Memphis Steam Laundry-Cleaners, Inc. v. Lindsey, 5 So. 2d 227 (Miss. 1941).
1094. Many of the older cases speak often, though carelessly, of malice as an element of a business tort. The
better view today is that the motive behind the defendant's actions or practices is not particularly relevant to
whether defendant is or should be subject to liability. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§1 cmt. c (1995); Walker, supra note 560, at 338-42; and Part IV, Robertson supra note 611, at 48-51. Today,
malice, in the sense of acting out of spite or ill will, is a fruitful point of inquiry in business tort cases only where
there is a bona fide question whether punitive damages should be assessed.
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of punitive damages. °95 This view has been supplemented by statute. For exam-
ple, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act provides "[i]f willful and malicious misappro-
priation exists, the court may award exemplary damages."'0 96
In Weems v. American Security Insurance Co. ,1097 the court held that before pu-
nitive damages may be assessed the plaintiff must "show some wilful or malicious
wrong of [sic] the gross or reckless disregard for the rights of others."10 98 What is
important about Weems is that the court emphasized that "the substantive test for
awarding punitive damages is the same in bad faith refusal cases as in any other
case where punitive damages are sought."'0 99 The liability standards by reference
to which punitive damages may be assessed are the same without regard to who
the defendant is, or what his line of business is, or the particular actionable con-
duct that got him sued in the first place." 00
The legislature has recently enacted that punitive damages may not be recov-
ered unless the plaintiff first proves his entitlement to actual compensatory dam-
ages.' ' Of course, this has always been the law in this state.O'' The new
legislation also provides for a bifurcated trial -the demand that punitive damages
be assessed is not litigated until the claim for actual damages has prevailed.
10 3
This procedure has long been available."0 4 Royal Oil Co. v. Wells"0 5 and State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Simpson106 find this process a function of Rule 42(b)
of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal Rule 42(b)"1 7 is no doubt
similarly adequate.
K. Treble Damages
Two of the more prominent federal statutes recognizing business torts and pro-
viding private civil remedies have forged a particularly severe penalty. The
Lanham Act provides, in cases where the plaintiff proves that the defendant has
violated the plaintiffs rights in a trademark registered with the Patent and Trade-
1095. Memphis Steam Laundry, 5 So. 2d at 230, 232-33.
1096. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-26-7(2) (1991).
1097. 486 So. 2d 1222 (Miss. 1986).
1098. Id. at 1227.
1099. Id. at 1226.
1100. Other cases in which the malice/fraud/gross neglect/reckless disregard standard have been applied in-
clude C&C Trucking Co. v. Smith, 612 So. 2d 1092, 1102 (Miss. 1992); Dawkins v. Redd Pest Control Co., 607
So. 2d 1232 (Miss. 1992); Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Evans, 553 So. 2d 1117, 1122 (Miss. 1989);
Whittington v. Whittington, 535 So. 2d 573, 583 (Miss. 1988); Colonial Mortgage Co. v. Lee, 525 So. 2d 804,
808 (Miss. 1988). See also Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (Supp. 1994).
1101. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(b), (c) (Supp. 1994).
1102. Cook Indus. Inc. v. Carlson, 334 F. Supp. 809, 817 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Mississippi Power Co. v. Jones,
369 So. 2d 1381, 1386 (Miss. 1979); Allen v. Ritter, 235 So. 2d 253, 257 (Miss. 1970).
1103. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(c) (Supp. 1994).
1104. It seems not to have occurred to anyone that this proviso is properly procedural and just may have been
beyond legislative competence. See Hall v. State, 539 So. 2d 1338 (Miss. 1989).
1105. 500 So. 2d 439, 450 (Miss. 1986).
1106. 477 So. 2d 242, 254 (Miss. 1985).
1107. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
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mark Office, the plaintiff may recover treble damages.1108 The statute specifically
provides that the plaintiff may recover three (3) times the defendant's profits or the
damages sustained by the plaintiff, "whichever is greater," and "unless the court
finds extenuating circumstances. ' 1109 Of this, United States District Judge Tom S.
Lee has written that "[o]nce the court has determined the amount of actual dam-
ages, it may, in its discretion, increase the award to no more than three times the
amount proved. But it must first have proof of the amount of the economic harm to
plaintiff.""110
The more famous treble damages proviso is that found in the Federal Antitrust
Laws where the statute simply provides that a prevailing plaintiff "shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained." 11
L. Attorney's Fees
For better or for worse, longstanding Mississippi jurisprudence holds there is
no common law power to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party, excepting
only the case where the proof is such that punitive damages may also be
awarded. 1112 With this sole exception, the court has repeatedly said that "in the ab-
sence of contractual provision or statutory authority therefor, this Court has never
approved awarding trial expenses and attorney's fees to the successful litigant.""1"
That sole exception, however, can be and has been used creatively (or, disingenu-
ously, depending on one's point of view). In Smith v. Dorsey, 4 the court assessed
defendants with one dollar ($1.00) in punitive damages and then awarded plain-
tiffs their full attorneys' fees. 
1115
A great many statutes providing remedies for business torts do provide that the
prevailing party may recover his reasonable attorney's fees. These include the fed-
eral antitrust laws.' 6 and the Lanham Act."' 7 The recently enacted Consumer
Rental-Purchase Agreement Act allows the consumer to recover "reasonable attor-
ney's fees as determined by the court." 11 8
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act has a more limited authorization for attorney's
fees."' 9 "If (a) a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith, (b) a motion to
1108. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (1988).
1109. Id.
1110. Rodeway Inns Int'l v. Amar Enters., 742 F. Supp. 365, 369 (S.D. Miss. 1990).
1111. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
1112. See, e.g., Wilson v. William Hall Chevrolet, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 279, 281 n.4 (S.D. Miss. 1994); RESTA-
TEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 cmt. o (1995).
1113. Grisham v. Hinton, 490 So. 2d 1201, 1205 (Miss. 1986). See, most recently, Cenac v. Murry, 609 So.
2d 1257, 1275 (Miss. 1992) (citing cases).
1114. 599 So. 2d 529, 550-51 (Miss. 1992). See also Richardson v. Canton Farm Equip., 608 So. 2d 1240,
1255-56 (Miss. 1992).
1115. The prudent pleader will expressly pray for attorneys' fees. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(g), and Wilson v. Wil-
liam Hall Chevrolet, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 279, 282-83 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
1116. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
1117. Id. § I117(b).
1118. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-171(l)(c) (Supp. 1995).
1119. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 cmt. j, and Reporter's Notes thereto (1995).
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terminate an injunction is made or resisted in bad faith or (c) wilful and malicious
misappropriation exists, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to the pre-
vailing party.1120 The unfair Cigarette Sales Law contains a similar proviso. 121
This approach is not uniform. The State Antitrust Act and the Mississippi Trade-
mark Registration Act do not contain provisos that attorney's fees may be
awarded.
The right to recover attorneys' fees can be a two-way street. In Deer Creek Con-
struction Co. v. Peterson,"22 the court affirmed an attorneys' fees award against a
plaintiff who was unsuccessful on a charge of consumer fraud. "Any party who
charges fraud under Section 75-24-5 does so at the risk of having attorney's fees
assessed against him if that charge is successfully defended on any ground by the
opposing party, and it is immaterial that recovery is had on other counts of a decla-
ration."" 23 MUTCPA has recently been amended to provide that only defendants
can recover attorneys' fees.
11 24
As noted above, preliminary injunctive relief is a remedial weapon necessarily
available to courts faced with unfair competition claims. The nature of the process
leading to the granting of a preliminary injunction, however, is such that there will
be times when, upon plenary trial on the merits and upon mature reflection, the
court will find for the defendant and dissolve the preliminary injunction. Where
this occurs, settled law opens the door to another setting in which the court may
award attorney's fees in the absence of statute, albeit we engage in the subterfuge
of calling the award "damages" and not "attorney's fees" and make it in favor of the




The most prominent public remedies are those the Federal Trade Commission
is empowered to pursue. Federal law provides that "[u]nfair methods of competi-
tion in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or af-
fecting commerce, are declared unlawful."" 12' The FTC is then authorized where
appropriate to issue show cause and cease and desist orders,1 27 and to bring
actions in the appropriate United States District Court to enforce and collect civil
penalties for violation of Commission rules "respecting unfair or deceptive acts or
1120. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-26-9 (1991).
1121. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-23-23(a) (1991).
1122. 412 So. 2d 1169 (Miss. 1982).
1123. Id. at 1174.
1124. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15 (1991 & Supp. 1995); Wilson v. William Hall Chevrolet, Inc., 871 F.
Supp. 279, 280-81 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
1125. See, e.g., Rice Researchers, Inc. v. Hiter, 512 So. 2d 1259, 1270 (Miss. 1987).
1126. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988).
1127. Id. § 45.(b).
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practices."1 128 Again, as we all well know, there are public powers to enforce the
federal antitrust laws. 11
29
A number of state statutes providing remedies for business torts empower offi-
cers and agencies of the state to seek and secure remedies upon proof of violations.
Most serious, a number of these statutes create misdemeanor offenses.'1 30 The
State Antitrust Laws provide, upon proof of a trust or combine proscribed by the
Act, that fines may be imposed not in excess of $5,000.00 for the first offense and
not less than $10,000.00 for a second or subsequent offense.' 131 State law provides
that any wholesaler or retailer who violates the Unfair Cigarette Sales Law shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by a fine of not more than $500.00. 132
The Mississippi Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act provides
that the state may assess a civil penalty not in excess of $500.00 against any person
who has wilfully used a method, act, or practice prohibited by that law and, fur-
ther, a $5,000.00 maximum penalty for any person who violates an injunction is-
sued to secure enforcement of the Act. 11
33
Perhaps of great practical importance, the MUTPCPA goes further and upon a
showing of one or more of a broad range of instances of unfair competition, em-
powers the court to appoint a receiver or revoke "a license or certificate authoriz-
ing that person to engage in business in this state, or both."" 34 License revocation




There seems so much more to say, and yet with a little luck, we have said
enough to show the law of business torts in Mississippi is much more-and much
less-than it has always seemed. It is rich in detail. It is worthy of sensitive and
diligent study by lawyers who understand that, in the end, it is not much different
from any other field of positive law. Labels like antitrust and deceptive marketing
1128. Id. § 45(m)(1). There is much more that could and perhaps should be said regarding FTC's remedial and
enforcement powers and processes, enough to double the length of this already too lengthy paper. Any such dis-
cussion is pretermitted, as we address here primarily private remedies. It is worth reminding the reader that the
courts have consistently held the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U. S.C. §§ 41-77 (1988), creates no private
remedies. Private litigants enjoy no right of action-implied or otherwise-for business practices condemned
under the Act. See, e.g., Baum v. Great W. Cities, Inc., 703 F.2d 1197, 1209 (10th Cir. 1983); Dreisbach v.
Murphy, 658 F.2d 720, 730 (9th Cir. 1981); Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243, 1249 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978). This does
not mean, of course, that other areas of law do not make parallel proscriptions of "unfair methods of competition"
upon which private parties may sue to their heart's (and proofs) content.
1129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 9, 15a (1988).
1130. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-23-1, -3 (1994) (false and deceptive advertising); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-
23-29 (1994) (enticing employee under contract to leave employment); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-23-33 (1994) (un-
lawful printing and distributing written material interfering with exercise of lawful trade or calling); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 97-23-83 to -85 (1994) (unlawful threats, coercion, and boycott to prevent lawful conduct of business);
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-23-87 to -91 (1994) (unlawful copying or sale of recordings).
1131. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-21-1 (1991). See also Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-21-7 (1991).
1132. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-23-7(a) (1991).
1133. Id. § 75-24-19 (1991 and Supp. 1994).
1134. Id. § 75-24-Il (1991 and Supp. 1994).
1135. Id. § 75-23-25 (1991).
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and trademark infringement and appropriation of trade values and tortious inter-
ference will no doubt survive our assimilative findings, and they should, though
we hope with lessened legal effect. We need them to identify and define and orga-
nize and communicate. But if we have begun to approach anything like the goals
we saw at the beginning, we see that each is but a way of addressing the actionable
disappointment of a market participant's reasonable economic expectancies.
I accept that it takes more than merely identifying the commonality of concept
underlying all of the assorted rules and actions historically labeled business torts to
bring those rules under one broad umbrella. Lawyers seldom oppose progress, but
they frequently resist change and, more than ever, in their ways of thinking and
talking and advising clients and arguing to courts. Labels that have lasted for dec-
ades are the lawyer's security blanket, and it is one of the anomalous by-products
of the trend toward specialization that increased sophistication in discrete areas of
practice leaves lawyers less inclined than ever to abandon accustomed ways of do-
ing things. Lawyers provide services market participants need. For all of the fa-
miliar reasons, the legal profession as a whole has by and large held the upper hand
in dictating the time and place and manner and price of those services.
Recalcitrance and inertia aside, the call for predictability and clarity and rea-
sonableness and practicability in the law is tugging at us as never before. In a
sense, the call is nothing new. There have always been lawyers, a small special
few, who have understood the call and tried to answer. There are new reasons to
believe nowadays their numbers are increasing. Courts and their traditional proc-
esses have less of a monopoly on regulation and dispute resolution as administra-
tive and alternative designs such as arbitration and mediation are increasingly
used. Look at the number of lawyers who work in-house as compared to a genera-
tion ago. Market forces tend toward efficiency, and the field of lawyer and client is
no exception. Informed demand is a proliferating and powerful incentive to a more
pliable supply. In a sensible society, the market participant should be able to ask his
lawyer what the law asks of him, and be given a reasonably reliable and under-
standable answer, and more and more market participants are insisting that it be so
and with effect. M.B.A.'s are much less tolerant of traditional lawyerspeak, and
businessmen who are not are becoming bolder and learning the new ways. Clients
are becoming increasingly impatient with the lawyer who says there is a federal
statute that says thus and such, and then there is a state act which requires this or
that, and behind that is a common law rule that may or may not still apply, and, of
course, your contract says you must do so and so. Of right they need, and today are
more able to demand, answers and more convincingly so.
Recent years have seen a marked movement toward acceptance of commonality
and coherence in concept in the law of business torts. The professionals in the field
who dominate the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws are producing black letter law that accepts the
pro-competitive and fairness imperatives that power the legal engine and does so
with a certain sensitivity to the transaction cost problem and the limits of the law's
processes. These have produced enlightened over-arching principles and proceed
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with coherence and consistency to the detail. The broad principles of the federal
acts, such as § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, are affording a field well-formed for this
progress. Legislatively, Mississippi has fertilized the field with the 1992 passage
of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the 1994 amendments to the MUTPCPA.
Judicially, Candebat's recognition of the right of publicity, as well as the continu-
ing recognition of tortious interference law in Tri-State Brick and Cenac, though
less well done, are steps in the right direction.
Most notable, a wide array of forces are pushing malice and intent and similar
forms of expression toward legal obsolescence. The new laws address means and
effects and are forcing less than imaginative courts to confront the fact that malice
and intent never meant much anyway. The uniform and model state laws - whether
through the NCCUSL, the USTA or the FTC - have all abandoned malice and in-
tent as relevant legal concepts, save only for the extraordinary cases of civil penal-
ties and punitive damages. The new Restatement of Unfair Competition wholly
eschews talk of malice and intent. As clients insist on knowing what they can and
cannot do, and what economic effects if traceable to their behavior will get them
into trouble, lawyers will respond and inevitably our courts may be expected, al-
beit grudgingly, to stop forcing the facts into the outmoded molds and to quit talk-
ing in terms of malice and intent.
The law of business torts challenges us to think big. As much as we need to at-
tend each tree in the field, it has become increasingly apparent that, as we step
back, we see a forest with far more in common than has been thought. Not only is
there within each rule a core of certainty and a penumbra of doubt, but it is so in
the field as a whole. We have found and reviewed many discrete rules and have
found as well that these proceed from a few common premises which can be easily
mastered and deducible as a matter of common sense. The key to successful legal
interpretation in the field is to see and accept the policy judgment that free market
competition is to be desired, that it serves the public interest when it is vigorous
and innovative, and that it is the function of government to see only that competi-
tion is pursued by substantially fair means, not because all of this is right or good,
much less demonstrably so, but because, as a matter of elementary practicable
reasoning, it is demonstrably the predominant belief of that irrebutably presumed
rational sovereign who has given us the field. The promotion of fair competition is
the policy that must inform our reading of that law, our giving of advice to clients,
and arguing and deciding cases at the edge, and this is so that like cases may be
treated as much alike as is reasonably practicable, that fields can tend toward order
and predictability, and that the crude approximation of justice that is the best we
ever find through the forms of law is and always will be secondary and subordinate
to the market participant's need to know not so much how to conduct his business
so that he can successfully defend his conduct in court, but to know how to act so
that he will minimize the risk that he will have to make a defense, and, if he so
acts, that no court will interfere with his reasonable and prospective economic ad-
vantage. And that the state will flourish as never before.
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